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Tuesday, July 30, 2019

Sociological Bulletin: Table of Contents



Volume 68 Issue 1, April 2019
First Published February 13, 2019; pp. 7–24
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 25–43
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 44–59
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First Published February 7, 2019; pp. 60–75
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 76–93

Review Article

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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 94–104

Book Reviews

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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 105–107
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 107–109
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 109–112
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 112–114
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 114–115
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 115–117
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 118–120
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First Published March 27, 2019; pp. 120–122

In Assam, basic dignity at stake




There are concerns over how the State government plans to solve the issue of stateless citizens after the NRC exercise

The Supreme Court has extended the day of reckoning for the controversial exercise known as the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam from July 31 to August 31, giving a month’s relief or another opportunity to those who are off the list to scramble and get into it. Thus, it has provided an equal time frame for those who say that many on the list shouldn’t be there because they are not actually ‘foreigners’.
With this extension, the Court rejected demands by both the Central and State governments which, concerned about the nationwide controversy about the drive, had said they wanted to re-verify 10% to 20% of those on the list. In making such a request, the governments were expressing a degree of anxiety about the data quality of a process for which they themselves have pressed strongly since 2014.
The Court’s decision was based on a declaration by the State Coordinator of the NRC, the officer whom it has mandated to run the NRC, that such a review was not necessary: his team had already re-verified 27% of the list. This again has roiled the waters — the local unit of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) says the officer, Prateek Hajela, had no business to do so. The State unit’s president asserted that the party stood by its demand for a 20% re-verification: “Even if some more time is taken, we want a correct NRC.”
The concern here is that many Hindu Bengalis will be left out of the NRC and hence also get disenfranchised in the process. This has happened numerous times in the ongoing exercise as also with members of traditional tribal groups in the State.

Identifying Indians

The goal of the gargantuan effort of the NRC appears simple: identify Indians living in Assam and by exclusion pick out the ‘foreigners’ or Bangladeshis. In this case, some 40 lakh people were left out of the NRC when the draft list was published last July. This led to an outcry by civil society groups, and media accounts showed how citizens had been left out, reportedly on religious and ethnic grounds, and due to bad data collection. In the past months, not less than 36 lakh or 3.6 million counter claims seeking inclusion were filed.
That is nearly 90% of those who were left out. In the last storm of data-driven efforts, the country’s highest court allowed not less than two lakh complaints against people alleged to be “foreigners” by others whose identity was kept secret. Unknown entities tossed vague charges against people who had lived in India for generations.
The overall effort is to untangle what appears to be nothing short of a Gordian knot — to resolve the issue of illegal immigration from neighbouring Bangladesh into the region over decades. But each stage and layer appear to underline how challenging the problems remain, with issues of legal redress being acute.

The plight of the stateless

Concerns in Assam have been high over the purported influx post-1971 after the creation of Bangladesh. The effort is to calm local anxieties and also cater to a political agenda. Yet the question that is often asked but rarely answered is what happens to those individuals (and their dependents) who are deemed stateless after they find themselves off the list.
I have two questions: What becomes of them while applying to tribunals and courts for relief — all the way to the Supreme Court, a detailed, drawn-out process? How will the government deal with those who are declared non-citizens and if Bangladesh refuses to take them, saying they are not its nationals, as it has consistently held for decades?
In this context, the recent remarks of a senior BJP leader from Assam on the issue are important. For they outline a process which the government believes can help resolve the situation. In a recent television panel discussion, the BJP leader underlined his non-acceptance of the Assam Accord, which has been the madhyam (medium) for the issue of alleged migrants, and which enabled the conferring of citizenship on a distinct group of people after a cooling off period of 10 years.
About 75,000 persons who benefited from this process had migrated from then East Pakistan between 1966 and 1971; most of them were Hindus. The BJP leader said that such a cooling off period was unacceptable, that “there should be” push back” but “push back with dignity”.
But it is significant, however, that what appears to be emerging is that until such expulsion, alleged foreigners must have access to rights that will enable their survival. These would include the right to education and health. But it would exclude the right to vote or to acquire property so that they did not have a role in political processes.
Is this an indication of how the governments, in Assam and the Centre, are thinking of resolving the issue? Could the “suspected” perhaps not be displaced from their locations but deprived of the right to vote and acquisition of property? As has been mentioned earlier, what also needs to be clarified is the status of lands on which they are living or have acquired. Will they be deprived of those? Would this amount to creating an enduring phenomena since Bangladesh refuses to take alleged illegals back?
Many of those who are off the list are poor, cannot afford lawyers and may not even know of their right to legal aid. At stake is the basic dignity of the weak, voiceless and vulnerable. The next few months will see how many of them will receive succour and how many will need to carry their bundles of documents from court to court in an unending and perhaps desperate search for hope.

Sanjoy Hazarika is International Director, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. The views expressed are personal

Source: The Hindu, 30/07/2019


Needed: A trilateral pact on the Brahmaputra river
India, China and Bangladesh should manage the shared resource in the region and depoliticise water security.
ANALYSIS Updated: Jul 29, 2019 19:40 IST
The recent flooding of the Brahmaputra, and China’s sharing of satellite data showing flooded districts in Assam has brought attention to the need for better management of this important river basin by China, India, and Bangladesh. The Brahmaputra is the fifth-largest river in the world by flow. However, unlike the major river systems of the Indus and the Ganga, it currently has no water-sharing treaty, nor is an agreement under negotiation.
A recent book I co-authored with Satu Limaye and Joel Wuthnow examines the challenges faced by the three countries at the domestic, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Underscoring the environmental and humanitarian challenges, the breach of the Brahmaputra’s embankments in mid-July displaced an estimated 5.8 million people in Assam and 400,000 people in northern Bangladesh. At a minimum, better forecasting capabilities and data-sharing are required to reduce the impact of future flooding on downstream populations.
But the geopolitical stakes are also high, not least because the Brahmaputra runs through Arunachal Pradesh, an area disputed by China as “Southern Tibet.” India, China, and Bangladesh have not yet prioritised this issue, but continue to allow tensions in diplomatic relations to compromise water security in this river basin.
For example, China apparently cut off limited data-sharing with India due to the Doklam standoff in 2017. The year before, China announced that it would temporarily divert the Xiabuqu river — a tributary of the Brahmaputra, which is known as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet — due to the construction of a dam. Both moves caused alarm among Indian policymakers and strategists over the potential for China to cause difficulty to downstream countries.
However, India also has a downstream neighbour — Bangladesh — which is concerned about India’s river linking project, and its potential to adversely affect the resources of the Brahmaputra (known as the Jamuna in Bangladesh). More immediately, Dhaka is eager to finalise a water-sharing agreement over the Teesta River — a tributary of the Brahmaputra — with New Delhi. The agreement has been stalled since the failure to conclude it in 2011.
Being downstream of China and India, Bangladesh suffers severe impacts (widespread erosion and flooding), and thus, has the most to gain from a water-sharing agreement. But India and China stand to benefit from an agreement as well. For China, this is an opportunity for it to demonstrate leadership on a serious issue of human security and improve its international reputation, which has been damaged by the country’s assertiveness in East Asian waters.
India for its part would benefit not only from data-sharing with China to mitigate flooding, but also from the exchange of information about hydropower dam construction. As an example of an important river cooperation, China was the first country to provide India with satellite data of flooding in Assam after New Delhi requested this information under the International Charter Space and Major Disasters.
In recognition of the challenges and uncertainties faced by the Brahmaputra stakeholders, the three countries should take action. By the summer of 2020, India, China, and Bangladesh should aim to sign a trilateral memorandum of understanding on the Brahmaputra. This would represent an acknowledgment of the importance of this basin, and the need for all three countries to work together to manage this large body of shared resources.
In the short term, an MoU that launches a dialogue between scientists and policymakers would help depoliticise water security, and provide an opportunity for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, President Xi Jinping, and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to demonstrate high-profile cooperation to the international community.
An ambitious long-term goal could be the formation of a Brahmaputra Basin Commission. The attainment of this goal will face several obstacles, including China and India agreeing to set aside the dispute over Arunachal Pradesh as it relates to water security, and India bringing on board domestic-level stakeholders. But laying the groundwork for a commission is a necessary first step in addressing the environmental, humanitarian, and geopolitical threats that will only continue to rise in the Brahmaputra River Basin.
Nilanthi Samaranayake is director, strategy and policy analysis, CNA, Washington
The views expressed are personal
Source: Hindustan Times, 29/07/2019

Monday, July 29, 2019

Economic & Political Weekly: Table of Contents

Vol. 54, Issue No. 30, 27 Jul, 2019

Editorials

Strategic Affairs

Law and Society

Commentary

Book Reviews

Perspectives

Special Articles

Letters

Notes

From 50 Years Ago

From the Editor's Desk

Current Statistics