Explained: China’s border law and India

 

China’s new law on land borders has come into effect from the new year. While some feel India should worry about its border areas, others note that China’s actions have been aggressive even without it.

China’s new law on land borders, passed on October 23, came into effect on January 1. This has happened at a time when the border standoff in eastern Ladakh remains unresolved, when China has renamed several places in Arunachal Pradesh as part of its claim on the Indian state, and when the Chinese Embassy in Delhi has written to Indian MPs, including a minister, who had attended a dinner reception hosted by the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile.

What is the new law?

The Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the law for the “protection and exploitation of the country’s land border areas”.

State media Xinhua reported that under the law, “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of… China are sacred and inviolable”, and the state needs to “take measures to safeguard territorial integrity and land boundaries and guard against and combat any act that undermines [these]”.

It mandates the state to take measures “to strengthen border defence, support economic and social development as well as opening-up in border areas, improve public services and infrastructure in such areas, encourage and support people’s life and work there, and promote coordination between border defence and social, economic development in border areas”. This means that it is encouraging the development of villages for civilians in the border areas.

However, the law also asks the state to follow the principles of “equality, mutual trust, and friendly consultation, handle land border related-affairs with neighbouring countries through negotiations to properly resolve disputes and longstanding border issues”, Xinhua reported.

The law lays down four conditions under which the state can impose emergency measures, including border shutdown.

Why did China bring it?

Shuxian Luo, a post-doctoral fellow at the Washington DC-based John L Thornton China Centre of the Brookings Institute, wrote in November that several factors may have led to China’s move.

First, she said, “this law reflects Beijing’s renewed concerns over the security of its land border while it confronts a slew of unsettled disputes on its maritime front… the confrontations on the Sino-Indian borders in recent years may have reminded Beijing that as a classic land-sea power China must always ready itself to cope with threats in both the continental and maritime domains”.

The Covid-19 pandemic “also underscores the imperative for Beijing to exert greater control over its somewhat porous land border”. Also, the law “reflects Beijing’s thinly-veiled worries about the stability of its hinterland bordering Central Asia” as the withdrawal of the US forces and Taliban takeover “aggravated Beijing’s concerns that Afghanistan… may become a hotbed for terrorism and extremism that could spread to Xinjiang”.

She believes domestic politics too may have been a contributing factor, bolstering President Xi Jinping’s standing in the lead-up to the 20th Party Congress later this year when he would secure a third term.

Does it concern India?

Although the law is not meant specifically for India, it is bound to have some impact. China and India share a disputed 3,488-km boundary, the third longest among China’s 22,457-km land boundaries with 14 countries, after the borders with Mongolia and Russia. Besides India, Bhutan (477 km) is the only other country with which China has a disputed land border.

There is a growing suspicion that China may have been stalling further negotiations on the standoff in eastern Ladakh for this new law to come into force. The Corps Commanders last met in October. India had hoped that China would agree to disengage from Patrolling Point 15 in Hot Springs, which it did not. The meeting did not even result in a joint statement, as had been happening for most earlier meetings. The date for the round meeting is still awaited, amid concerns that the Chinese delegation can use the new law to try to bolster their existing positions.

Apart from PP15, China is blocking Indian troops from accessing its traditional patrolling limits—PP10, PP11, PP11A, PP12 and PP13—in Depsang Plains. Also, certain “so-called civilians” have pitched tents on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control in Demchok and are refusing to vacate it.

Another sticking point could be that the new law prohibits construction of permanent infrastructure close to the border without China’s permission. Both, India and China have been building new roads, bridges and other facilities faster since the standoff began; in fact, China had objected to India’s workers even before.

What impact can it have on India-China relations?

The view is still divided. Much depends on China’s actions, regardless of the new law.

Some experts feel the new law will make China dig its heels in, on the ongoing standoff as well as for resolution of the larger boundary issue. Others feel the new law is only a tool China government will use if it wants, as its actions have been aggressive even before this law.

The Brookings article in November said “Beijing appears to be signaling determination to resolve the border disputes on its preferred terms. The law sets an overall tone of resolve upfront.”

Gautam Bambawale, who was India’s ambassador to China in 2017-18 and has dealt with Beijing for much longer, had told The Indian Express earlier that the law only “states the obvious” as “every country is in the business of protecting its territorial integrity… The big question is what is your territory, and there we don’t agree with each other”. He said that with their actions in eastern Ladakh, “the Chinese are clearly indicating that they are tired of trying to resolve the boundary or the LAC through negotiations; they’re indicating they’ll do it through use of force.”

In an issue brief for the think tank Centre for Land Warfare Studies in December, the recently retired Army Major General Ashok Kumar wrote that the new law is the “latest attempt by China to unilaterally delineate and demarcate territorial boundaries with India and Bhutan”.  The law has “huge implications for India… This problem requires a whole-of -nation solution more than a purely military solution… in conjunction with accelerated construction of 624 ‘Xiaokong’ villages along and inside the disputed land boundaries with India, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created conditions for a ‘militarised solution’ to the boundary issue.”

What are these villages, and what is the relation to the new law?

China has been building “well-off” border defence villages across the LAC in all sectors, which the new law encourages. President Xi visited a village in Tibet near the border with Arunachal Pradesh last July.

In October, even before the law was announced, Eastern Army Commander Lt Gen Manoj Pande, who is responsible for the 1,346-km LAC from Sikkim to Arunachal Pradesh, had said: “According to their own policy or strategy, model villages have come up near the border… for us, it is a matter of concern, how they can make dual civil and military use of these facilities and villages.”

Former Northern Army Commander Lt Gen D S Hooda had told The Indian Express earlier: “If you [China] start having settled population on the other side, creeping across what we [India] feel is our border, at some stage later, whenever, when you start discussing the border between the two sides, they will say we [China] have settled population in this area.”

Bambawale, however, said China has been doing this anyway: “The law is not a necessary condition to be able to do that.”

Written by Krishn Kaushik 

Source: Indian Express, 3/01/22

What Xi Jinping as president for life means for China and the world

 

China is on track to becoming a global super power but will their President Xi Jinping hold them down or help them to fly

China’s Central Committee holds seven plenums every five years and its most recent, which concluded on Thursday, raises several questions surrounding the future of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its Chairman, Xi Jinping. Xi appears to have an ironclad grip on the CCP and China, positioning himself as the presumed leader of the country indefinitely.

In 2016, Xi was declared a “core” leader of the CCP, a title that has only been conferred upon three other Chinese rulers, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. A year later, Xi incorporated a list of his speeches and policies into the Chinese constitution. In his most conspicuous manifestation of power, in 2018, China’s National Congress voted to amend the Chinese constitution by abolishing the two-term limits on the Presidency. Xi has also thus far failed to nominate a successor, which previous leaders typically do at the start of their second term. Xi looks increasingly likely to win a third term during the 2022 Chinese elections and could potentially retain power for the rest of his life.

 President for Life

A peaceful transition of power is integral to the stability of any country, as recently evidenced by Donald Trump’s efforts to discredit President Joe Biden’s electoral victory. China’s last leader for life was Mao, who oversaw one of the country’s most disastrous periods during the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forwards. Mao’s successor, Xiaoping spoke against the cult of personality embraced by Mao and ushered in a series of reforms that both opened the country’s economy and established limits on individual power. In a report for the Lowey Institute, Richard McGregor, and Jude Blanchette, detail the importance of an orderly transition, highlighting the fact that autocrats’ attempts to remain in power for life often trigger succession crises, formal leadership challenges or military coups. While previous Chinese dynastic power struggles were largely limited within its borders, they write, “the global impact of a 21st century succession crisis would be immense.”

Xi for his part has said that he is personally opposed to lifelong rule, but his actions indicate that he is unprepared to relinquish power anytime soon. McGregor and Blanchette argue that by removing term limits and refusing to nominate a successor, “Xi has solidified his own authority at the expense of the most important political reform of the last four decades: the regular and peaceful transition of power.” Compounding the problem, there are very few barriers between the state bureaucracy and the CCP. Describing the distinction between the two as a “mirage,” Srijan Shukla writes in an ORF report that the “matrix” structure of governance employed in China shows how “the final power lies with the party, and not the government.” As the General Secretary of the CCP, a role that notably has never had term limits, Xi wields significant sway over both the party and the Chinese government as a whole.

Control over the CCP and society

Xi has made a notable effort to consolidate his status within the CCP and the larger Chinese political apparatus. In 2013, he launched a much-heralded anti-corruption campaign which established his uncompromising leadership style and side-lined several of his more vocal rivals. Xi, as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), also restructured the organisation between 2015 and 2016 in order to remove his opponents from leading positions and install his own supporters in key roles. As described by one Jamestown Foundation report, Xi has also encouraged the practice of biaotai or ritualistic declarations of loyalty by prominent regional supporters.

Inculcating his own policies and philosophy into the party’s charter he has also consolidated his position as its unquestioned leader. In a 2018 party keynote speech, Xi stated that political thoughts such as the ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ should be used to “arm the entire party, educate the people and push forward work.” 

McGregor and Blanchette summarise his grip on the political apparatus, writing that “hardening political conformity under Xi, combined with the more banal realities of bureaucratic policies, have led to numerous officials publicly declaring fealty to Xi.”

His grip over Chinese society is also noteworthy. Through the use of extra-judicial detentions and other coercive measures combined with strict restrictions on freedom of speech, Xi has spearheaded a sustained crackdown on dissent. Targeting journalists, activists, academics and ethnic minorities, this crackdown has systematically silenced and punished anyone who dares to criticise Xi.

The CCP has also engaged in revisionist history, launching a year-long campaign for the nationwide study of Xi’s philosophy. In addition to the content taught, party leaders have also been encouraged to recruit supporters from college campuses and to establish youth wings across the state. In a more creative form of indoctrination, the CCP under Xi has also established Overseas Chinese Service Centres, a global network of offices designed in name to help the Chinese diaspora to adapt to life in different countries. While the centres likely do serve that purpose, they also encourage loyalty to Xi and promote his achievements and thoughts across the globe.

Dissent

Despite these measures, there has been limited criticism of Xi to emerge from China. After his removal of term limits, Chinese social media users took to posting images of Winnie the Pooh (who they think looks like Xi) as a subtle attempt to protest his grip on power. All mentions of Winnie the Pooh were later banned by the CCP. In another rare rebuke of the President, a law professor in Beijing, Xu Zhangrun, called on lawmakers to reverse the decision to abolish term limits. Zhangrun was subsequently arrested in 2020 but has since been released. China’s slowing economic growth and mounting governmental debt could also promote dissent amongst the middle class, who are peddled a version of Chinese economic superiority that may not always match up to their experiences in the labour market.

In Hong Kong and Taiwan, two contested territories, the criticism has been even more pronounced. In 2019, after the CCP introduced an extradition order in Hong Kong, which is a Special Administrative Region of China, mass protests erupted across the state. After activists sieged the Polytechnic University, the Chinese government oversaw a series of high-profile arrests which were met with wide-spread international condemnation. Similarly in Taiwan, which China views as a breakaway state, the country’s President, Tsai Ing wen, promised to uphold its sovereignty after Xi called for the reunification of both countries. Internationally, China has faced massive criticism over its human rights abuses, its trade practices, and its aggressive foreign policy under Xi.

Impact on China

Since Mao, China has had a series of leaders who prioritised an open, almost capitalist, economic policy and a moderate, cautious foreign policy. Under Xi, much of that has changed. As another Jamestown Foundation

 points out, Xi has shown a willingness to discount or rewrite history in a way which suits his priorities. On the 40th anniversary of the economic reforms instituted by Xiaoping, Xi failed to mention the venerated leader’s name even once. Instead, he made several references to ziligengsheng or self-reliance, a phrase regularly used by Mao. Xiaoping’s policies catapulted China into a 21st century economic powerhouse and Xi’s willingness to ignore that could be interpreted as a trajectory towards greater state control over businesses.

In its most recent five-year plan, the CCP has outlined tighter regulations over much of the Chinese economy. It states that rules will be introduced to cover national security, technology, and monopolies. Shares in many Chinese companies have fallen this year following concerns over the crackdown, with high-profile companies like the Ant Group, chaired by Chinese billionaire Jack Ma, failing to escape scrutiny. In an article for Foreign Affairs Magazine, Elizabeth Economy argues that “too much party control – perhaps too much consolidated in Xi’s hands – has contributed to economic stagnation.” China’s credit ratings have also fallen sharply since 2017, with agencies such as Moody’s and S&P predicting a negative outlook over fears of overarching government control and declining economic growth. In an interview with indianexpress.com, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a professor of political science at Hong Kong Baptist University, says that as Xi continues at the helm, China will increase its control over large businesses, but small ones will likely be spared.

According to another article in Foreign Affairs Magazine, policy making has also suffered under Xi with “decisions becoming more opaque and politicized.” This is largely because under the current political climate, ministers are unable to question Xi’s policies and fear giving him accurate information when that information undercuts his assumptions. Meanwhile, although Xi’s crackdown on corruption has been commendable, it has failed to end the patronage system in the bureaucracy and has also pardoned companies and individuals closely connected to Xi from oversight.     

China also risks greater uncertainty in the event of a succession crisis. According to data collected by McGregor and Blanchette, 41 per cent of the world’s autocrats either experience death, exile, or imprisonment within a year of leaving office. That’s true for only seven per cent of democratic leaders. Xi’s unwillingness to relinquish control could lead to domestic tensions in China which would subsequently have cascading consequences for the rest of the world.

 Impact on the rest of the world

In the early 2000s, Chinese leaders emphasised the fact that China would rise peacefully. However, under Xi, the country has assumed a far more aggressive posture. The CPP has modernised its military, employed the use of grey zone tactics in building islands in the South China Sea, has stifled civil liberties in Hong Kong and Tibet, has engaged in mass cyberwarfare, been involved with border skirmishes with India and has pursued an aggressive form of international relations known as Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. Beijing is clear in its ambitions to be a global superpower and it is willing to toe the line when it comes to means of achieving that.

Xi has also spearheaded the ambitious One Belt One Road (BRI) initiative, investing over $4.3 trillion in foreign infrastructure projects as of September 2020. Although the US has tried to counter the BRI with its Blue Dot alliance, it pales in comparison to the BRI in both scale and impact. A 2019 study by global economic consultants CEBR forecasted that the BRI would boost global GDP by $7.1 trillion per annum by 2040. However, the initiative is not without flaws. 

Many of the investments made by China come at the expense of the host nation. In Ecuador for example, China built a dam that was supposed to account for a significant amount of the country’s energy needs. In order to finance the dam and other infrastructure projects, the Ecuadorian government took a $19 billion loan from China. Today, the dam, constructed by Chinese workers, is producing a fraction of the energy it was supposed to. Regardless, according to the terms of the agreement, China still gets paid, taking 80 per cent of Ecuador’s most valuable export – oil – until the debt is settled. To finance this, Ecuador has been forced to cancel or put on hold several other development projects.

China has invested heavily in Africa, Asia, and South America under the BRI. However, as proven with Ecuador that investment often serves as a debt trap for the receiving countries. It also comes with strings attached. China has pressured many of the countries into suspending relations with Taiwan. According to Cabestan, Xi is likely to try and annex Taiwan although the US will try to prevent it. Taiwan is the world’s largest producer of semiconductor chips, a valuable commodity in various sectors ranging from tech, automobiles, and telecom. If China succeeds in annexing Taiwan, it will further entrench its place in the global economy and cause mass instability in the region.

For India, China’s border skirmishes are a particular point of concern, as are its ambitions in the South China sea and infrastructure investments in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Countries like Australia that have tried to stand up against Beijing have been on the receiving end of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy and given how crucial a trading partner China is for India, New Delhi will be wary to risk incurring its wrath. The relationship is also aligned in China’s favour. China is India’s second largest trading partner whereas India is China’s 11th. China also exports four times the value of goods that it imports from India. In terms of the future of the relationship, Cabestan, asserts that it will include a “mixture of confrontation and cooperation.” Additionally, the “border issue won’t be solved and the great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean will continue to increase.”

Written by Mira Patel

Source: Indian Express, 16/11/21

How Indo-China border dispute once split the Communist Party of India

 

The impact of the Sino-India war on CPI becomes understandable in context of the pressures that Communist ideology was facing worldwide in an era when colonial forces were being diminished.

The killing of 10 Indian CRPF personnel by Chinese forces on October 21, 1959 is known to have been the start of hostilities that finally culminated in the Sino-India war of 1962. The events that took place at the high mountain ranges of Eastern Ladakh, at a cold dry spot known as Kongka Pass, came as a huge setback to the Indian government. It was also the moment that caused the beginning of the fractures within the second most popular political party in the country at the time, the Communist Party of India (CPI). The war between India and China in 1962 was to have its strongest impact on Left politics in India, as it caused the split of the CPI.

Of course, one cannot disregard that all was not well in the party that came to become the face of Left ideologies in India, right from the time of the Independence of the country. Differing ideologies over the nature of Indian independence, and then over the fundamental character of Indian state and society, had caused multiple factions to arise within the party. However, it was the war of 1962, that was to play a crucial role in determining the final split.

The impact of the Sino-India war on CPI becomes understandable in context of the pressures that Communist ideology was facing worldwide in an era when colonial forces were being diminished.

International communism before Sino-China war of 1962

The CPI was founded on October 17, 1920, in the city of Tashkent in Uzbekistan, which was formerly a part of the Soviet Union. The CPI is known to have been the first attempt made by the Communist International to create a Communist party in India from among Indian revolutionaries who had migrated to America and Europe. Given the international origins of the CPI, the party had an ambiguous stance, even when it came to the nationalist movement. A case in point here is the 1940s, when faced with Gandhi’s call for Quit India movement on one hand, and the Soviet Union’s appeal to back the British in the Second World War on the other, the CPI alienated itself from the freedom struggle.

In the period between the late 1950s and early 60s, an event that would have the most far-reaching consequence on Communist ideologies across the world is the breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations. The two Communist powers were at loggerheads over their interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist ideals. China decried the Soviet Union’s policy of international peaceful co-existence with the West.

At the same time, Soviet Union had found an ally in India. The USSR appealed to the CPI to lend its support to Nehru’s foreign policy, much against the wishes of certain sections of the party who had their animosities towards the Congress. Consequently, those who did not agree with the Soviet Union’s call for support towards Nehru, found themselves looking for guidance from the Communist Party in China.

The war of 1962 and split in CPI

It was in this atmosphere crisis within international communism, that the Dalai Lama escaped to India in 1959. When the Chinese brutally suppressed the Tibetan uprising, the CPI acted as a unit. “A Communist Party statement of March 31 praised the Chinese for leading the Tibetans from ‘medieval darkness’ and blamed the rebellion on Tibetan ‘serf owners’ backed by Indian reactionaries and Western imperialists,” wrote researcher Robert W. Stern, in his article published in 1965 titled, ‘The Sino-Indian border controversy and the Communist Party of India’.

Even when Nehru revealed that Chinese forces were in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh, the CPI remained largely silent and tried to minimise the importance of the affair. The situation began to change from September, when the Indian government revealed a note from China disputing the 800-mile long McMohan line as the Sino-Indian frontier. When the Central Executive Committee of the party met at Calcutta in September to discuss Sino-Indian relations, a group of leading communists from Bombay and Kerala openly dissented with the party, demanding it to declare support for Nehru’s border policy.

The Calcutta resolution though, was a defeat for the dissidents. “It equated the authenticity of the McMohan line with the authenticity of the Chinese territorial claims based on maps which had been roundly condemned in the Indian press and in Parliament,” wrote Stern. Nonetheless, party general-secretary Ajoy Ghosh managed to mediate between the two factions and retain a semblance of unity in the party. However, it was short lived.

A month later, faced with public backlash against the Calcutta resolution, and also the incident at Kongka Pass, a faction of nationalists from the CPI made public their disaffection with the party’s stance. Participating at a parliamentary board meeting of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (a multi-party organisation formed to demand a separate state for Marathi speaking people), the Communists in Maharashtra declared: “The McMahon line was India’s ‘natural boundary’ and China’s refusal to vacate Indian territory was ‘tantamount to forcible occupation’.”

Following the incident at Kongka Pass, S A Dange, one of the founding members of the CPI from Maharashtra, and representative of the party in Lok Sabha, condemned the Chinese unequivocally. “The whole country will stand behind Pandit Nehru in whatever steps he takes to avert such incidents,” he said. He was supported by A K Gopalan from Kerala, Hirendranath Mukherjee who was CPI deputy leader in the Rajya Sabha, and Jharkande Rai who represented the party in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Voices of dissent soon started to emerge from Amritsar, Ahmedabad, Delhi Haridwar and many other places.

At the same time, a strong pro-Chinese wing remained within the party. It was strongest in Calcutta and Punjab, but was also present elsewhere. This group was largely satisfied with the Calcutta resolution and refused to lend more support to Nehru’s border policy. They were called the party leftists, while their opponents were called the rightists.

In the ensuing months, while efforts were made to reach a middle ground, the disagreements within the party had become almost irreconcilable. Matters came to a head in 1961 when Ghosh passed away.

When Chinese forces invaded India in October 1962, Dange aided the Indian government in the arrest of thousands of those party members who aligned towards China.

The last straw though, that ultimately led to the splitting of the party, was the issue over a few letters written by Dange which were found by party leftist Dwijen Nandi, showed the former offering his service to the British intelligence. It culminated in the meeting of July 1964, when about 100 party leftists formally announced the creation of a new Communist party. While initially both parties insisted on being called CPI, due to necessities of election procedures, the leftist group registered themselves as Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI (M).

Sources: Indian Express, 10/09/20