How to end Maoist violence

 When former Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh in 2010 flagged Naxalism as the important internal security challenge, the insurgency was at its peak. In line with that assessment, the government of India reinforced security and development assistance to state governments faced with this problem. This combined effort is yielding positive results. The number of civilians and security forces killed has come down. So is the number of severely affected districts, which are no more than 30. What is catastrophic though is the sporadic high fatalities suffered by security forces in the well-planned offensive ambushes laid by Naxalites. Is this an insurmountable challenge? Analysing this menace from ideological, strategical and tactical frameworks is likely to throw some convincing answers.

According to Maoist ideology, economically oppressed peasants/working class will triumph over the oppressive capitalist bourgeois class to establish a classless society. For them, the only strategy to establish a classless society is through armed revolution. The operational tactics to give shape to that strategy is protracted guerrilla warfare.

The ideological fountain of Maoism, class struggle, that erupted as a small armed rebellion between the landless peasants and the landed aristocracy in Naxalbari village in West Bengal in 1967, could not sustain. Rapid economic growth, aspirational youth and opportunities created by communication and mobility act as a strong counter for economic class-based division.

The strategy of organising the oppressed class into a people’s army and a bottom-up approach of encircling the urban areas from the hinterland periphery to overthrow the ruling elite, remained a pipe-dream. If anything, armed class struggle which appeared to be taking roots in north Telangana, Srikakulam of Andhra Pradesh and south Vidarbha in the1980s, instead of expanding from villages to urban centres has retreated further into the core forested area.

With their ideology and strategy not getting much traction, the Maoists are seemingly succeeding in their tactics. It is showing in the support and sustenance Maoists receive from the local population and their ability to mobilise their village defence forces and armed dhalams into a kind of mobile army for a virulent attack. This is the nature of mobile guerrilla warfare. Fortunately for the security forces, the so-called liberated zone is confined to about 50,000 sqkm of forested area of Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur and Sukma districts of Chhattisgarh, with little spillover into adjoining Maharashtra and Odissa.

Strategic victory over them calls for clarity on the role and responsibility of the central and state and governments; honest assessment of capabilities, operational philosophy, mindset, willingness, compulsions and resolve of security forces involved in anti-Naxalite operations; and a realistic timeframe to root out this menace.

This warfare at the tactical level can be successfully fought by an equally agile, stealthy, enduring and disciplined commando force of the state police, recruited trained and raised primarily out of the local youth. The most acclaimed of such a commando force is the Greyhounds of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh police. This is a success story to build on.

Achieving strategic victory is no guarantee for lasting peace. Maoism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security problem. Even the Maoists would like the state to respond from security rather than developmental perspective, as they know that only in relative poverty and severe infrastructure deficit, they have their captive support base of the population.

It is not merely for tactical reasons the Maoist influence thrives in contiguous forested areas spread over Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. There is a deep-rooted financial interest. This region is richly endowed with minerals of bauxite, iron ore, limestone, marble, dolomite, coal and copper and of pristine forests rich in timber and Minor Forest Produce (MFP). The MFP, which includes bamboo and tendu leaf (for rolling beedi), contrary to the nomenclature is a huge source of revenue estimated at over Rs 20,000 crore a year. The value chain in these natural resources leaves a huge profit margin for the extractive industry/contractors and scope for extortion/protection money to the Maoists. The unit of auction for extraction of MFP is a block of forest area. Quantity extracted out of a block is left to the ability of the contractor, thus leaving huge profit. The Maoists pose as RoWith many state governments notifying the Panchayat (Extension of Scheduled Areas) Act 1996, the gram panchayats now auction the MFP, including bamboo and tendu leaves. Thus, substantial revenue goes to the village panchayats for development works. In theory, it is the most decentralised and financially empowered local self-government model. With little institutional support, it needs an independent study on the ability of the tribal village panchayats in managing these entrenched bunch of contractors, threats posed by Naxalites and possibilities it leaves for extortion. It is not for nothing that the panchayat elections are keenly contested in the Naxal-affected districts and the Naxalites, who are otherwise against electoral democracy, generally do not disturb these elections.

A national policy to end Naxalist violence has to emanate out of economic, developmental and internal security considerations. There has to be a judicious and environmentally sustainable extraction of natural resources, leaving no scope for value capture by unscrupulous elements. An integrated approach spearheaded by counter-offensive operations led by well trained, disciplined, agile and stealthy commando force of state police; expansion of road networks from the periphery to core of liberated zone constructed under security cover of central forces or even constructed by the specially raised engineering units of central forces; quick expansion of mobile communication and commercialisation of economic activities are slow but sure and irrevocable process to success.

Written by Jaganathan Saravanasamy 

(The writer is additional DGP (Planning & Coordination), Maharashtra State Police)bin Hoods by seemingly negotiating a better wage for the labour or price for the produce.

Source: Indian Express, 21/04/21

Maoist challenge: Why large armies lose small wars

 For a government with an image of “strong”responses to provocation, the temptation to launch into a major retaliative operation, possibly with armed forces participation, would be strong. But that would be a mistake. Debates on the latest Maoist attacks, critiquing or defending security forces and their tactics, miss the strategic picture. As Henry Kissinger said – the conventional army loses, if it does not win. The guerrilla wins, if he does not lose.

To that extent, Maoists have been winning against security forces for over a decade now. A tactical playbook follows the trite cycle of postmortem, rolling of heads, threats of a fitting response, usually followed by a massive reprisal. Ironically, the latter is exactly what guerrillas count on. A strategic view helps join the dots.

Mao Tse Tung, the ideological fountainhead of the movement, defined revolution as an act of violence by which one class (aka peasants) overthrows another class (landlords). In the Chinese context, the revolution was to overthrow the incumbent ruler. Ironically, Mao’s strategy was influenced more by Clausewitz than Sun Tzu because of his Soviet leaning, training and patronage. In his book, On protracted War, (which borrows heavily from Clausewitz’s On War), Mao identified three phases of the revolution — strategic defence, strategic stalemate and strategic offence.The first phase is when the guerrillas are weak and the State is overwhelmingly strong. According to Mao, retreat, defeat and weakness is part of this period. Guerrillas seek to avoid contact and use this phase to build capability, garner local support, national and international alliances. When his weak and fledgling Red Army, the forerunner of the People’s Liberation Army, was encircled by General Chiang Kai-shek’s troops in their stronghold at Jiangxi, Mao retreated 9,000km, in what came to be known as the Long March, over a year, all the way to barren and inhospitable Yan’an to rebuild the Red Army’s fighting capabilities. Much like the Maoist strongholds.

In the stalemate phase, guerrillas consolidate a physical enclave where their writ runs and State forces are unable to interfere. This gives them operating room to increase numbers and lethality of their cadres. The enclave, or as in the case of the Maoists, a “corridor”, also allows them free movement and influx of external supplies from countries who are either sympathetic to their ideology or enemies of the State.

As the name implies, the stalemate phase consists of a series of undecisive skirmishes which largely benefits guerrillas. For one, home ground gives guerrillas the advantage of terrain, local support, choice of timing and location of engagement. Second, since security forces are usually overwhelmed, it gives guerrillas an additional cache of sophisticated arms, ammunition, communication equipment and other resources. And in some cases, also hostages, who can be a major bargaining chip.

Third, it boosts the morale of guerrilla cadres, especially when they have defeated crack and much vaunted government troops. The added benefit is creating legends and narratives around key guerrilla leaders and specific units – in this case, Madvi Hidma and the 1st Battalion of People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army. And most importantly, a humiliating rout compels the state to react with a heavy hand and overwhelming force — most of which is borne by the constituent population, thus cementing their support for the guerrillas. It is in this phase that the Maoist movement is now at, and probably will remain for some time to come.

For a government with an image of “strong”responses to provocation, the temptation to launch into a major retaliative operation, possibly with armed forces participation, would be strong. But that would be a mistake.

All terror operations are conducted for five audiences. The first is the incumbent government. The objective is to attack State instruments for psychological and political messaging, creating operating room and provoke disproportionate use of force especially on their second audience – the constituent population, thus alienating larger numbers from the State.

The third audience is the non-constituent population, which is rest of the country, who are now aware of the seriousness of this problem and want to get involved. People with little understanding of warfare start baying for blood, compelling the government down a slippery slope of militarising the situation. Which in a perverse way, justifies the guerrilla’s cause of fighting the State.

The fourth audience are internal cadres and potential recruits who swell because of the success of every operation and reprisals by State forces. The last audience are foreign countries who, at one extreme, will assist with moral and material support and, at the other, by internationalising the cause, reduce maneuvering room for the State.

It would be naive to assume that an operation planned with such tactical finesse by Maoists would be devoid of strategic planning for its aftermath. Our armed forces and central armed police forces are stretched on an unprecedented level. We are facing a two-and-a-half-front war right now. While tensions may have abated on the eastern and western fronts, the commitment of troops continues. Troops are also committed in Kashmir, Northeast, in security duties for elections and of course battling the pandemic. Similarly, the mindshare of national strategic leadership is dominated by several pressing political and economic issues at the moment. Besides, brute force alone seldom exterminates guerrilla movements as nations with far larger armies have found to their great expense.

Our security forces suffered heavy casualties because their tactical leaders walked into a trap. The strategic leaders shouldn’t walk into another one. And that calls for strategic restraint and maneuvering, rather than hasty resolute action.

Raghu Raman is the founding CEO of NATGRID

Source: Hindustan Times, 9/04/21

Maoism remains India’s biggest internal security threat

 Managing India’s internal security cannot be a part-time job. There are too many challenges, and too many critical decisions to be made on a regular basis. An internal security ministry needs to be hived off from the MHA — the secretary of the ministry must be a specialist, either a serving or retired police officer of outstanding reputation, and this must be supervised by a full-time minister who is hands-on. This cannot afford to wait any longer.

In one of the bloodiest battles fought between the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and security forces in the Terram jungle of Chhattisgarh’s Bijapur district, 22 elite fighters from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and its elite Cobra battalion, District Reserve Guard (DRG) and Special Task Force (STF) lost their lives along with, reportedly, an equal number of Maoists. The five-hour-long fierce encounter on Saturday witnessed the use of light machine guns and AK-47s by the Maoists, with security forces responding in equal measure, deploying under-barrel grenade launchers and mortars against targets picked up by Heron (an unmanned aerial vehicle).

Most deaths and injuries took place when, during the fierce phase of the firefight, security personnel moved the wounded to the huts at Tekulgudam village, unaware that the village along with two others, Jeera Gaon and Jonaguda, had been vacated on the diktat of the Maoists in a well-planned strategy. Once the force was trapped, relentless fire from the enemy positions caused further damage.

This was part of a joint operation launched by the districts of Bijapur and Sukma on late Friday night, on reliable information about the presence of the dreaded Maoist commander in the area, Madvi Hidma. The operation was aimed at targeting multiple locations, and comprised around 2,000 security personnel. The group, which was targeted by the Maoists, was 450-men strong. They did not walk into a trap. Nor were they ambushed. A movement of 2,000 men would surely alert the Maoists and the force has to be prepared for such exigencies. The Heron would have picked up Maoist movements — so it was a fair and square fight where equal numbers were lost on both sides. An enquiry will reveal the real truth and the lapses of strategy and tactics. But the security personnel displayed grit and valour, fighting heroically for five hours till the Maoists broke their ranks and retreated.

This is yet another grim reminder of the capability of Maoist cadres to lie low for long periods, regroup and strike at intervals. An improvised explosive device (IED) mine blasted a bus carrying security men last month, killing three. In March 2020, in an ambush in Sukma, the Maoists killed 17 security personnel.

The downward trend of Maoist violence over the last few years has led the government and some security analysts to declare that the battle against Maoism (or Naxalism, as the terms are interchangeably used) is almost won. According to the annual report of the ministry of home affairs (MHA), Maoist violence was restricted to 251 police stations (PS) in 60 districts of eight states in 2018, in comparison with 330 PSs in 76 districts of 10 states in 2013. In the first half of 2020, it was restricted to 46 districts. The incidents of violence (670) and deaths of security personnel were the lowest in 2019, as per the available official figures.

Despite data revealing an overall reduction in violence, the capacity of Left-wing extremists to retaliate with ferocity indicates that Maoism still remains the biggest threat to our internal security, almost 11 years after then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh acknowledged and framed the scale of threat in exactly this manner. Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand lie in the eye of the storm. Out of 670 incidents of Naxal violence in 2019, 463, ie 69%, occurred in these two states. The Maoists are entrenched in the jungles in these two states, and intelligence agencies, at great risk, glean their activities and plans, as deliberated upon in their central committee meetings, and share it with other central forces and state police.

But if statistics belie the real situation on the ground, what is lacking in the government’s approach towards fighting Maoism? Is a course-correction in combat strategy also desired? First, senior police commanders will have to rethink the rationale of large-scale operations. The stakes are too high and heavy losses of men are causes of serious worry. It is important to change tactics according to the situation. The Greyhounds of undivided Andhra Pradesh, a specialised force that achieved great success in weakening the Maoists, conducted their operations with small-sized teams, acting on pinpoint intelligence. Even their platoon strength team had a clear chain of command.

Second, there is a complete administrative and security vacuum in such areas to counter the Janatana Sarkar of Maoists run through their Revolutionary People Committee (RPC), equivalent to gram panchayats. For instance, allegations abound of RPCs seizing grains distributed under the public distribution system and distributing it under their aegis. The erosion of State authority is also reflected in the fact that civilians often act as the eyes and ears of the Maoists in affected areas. While extending roads and hoisting mobile towers have certainly helped, CRPF will have to set up its camps deeper in the jungles. The Rural Roads Programme (RRP) aimed at constructing 5,411 kms and connecting 44 Naxal-affected districts, must also be speeded up as most of these districts fall in Chhattisgarh.

And, finally, managing India’s internal security cannot be a part-time job. There are too many challenges, and too many critical decisions to be made on a regular basis. An internal security ministry needs to be hived off from the MHA — the secretary of the ministry must be a specialist, either a serving or retired police officer of outstanding reputation, and this must be supervised by a full-time minister who is hands-on. This cannot afford to wait any longer.

Yashovardhan Azad is a former IPS officer, who served as Central Information Commissioner, secretary, security and special director, Intelligence Bureau.

Source: Hindustan Times, 6/04/21