Cold War 2.0

 hat the United States of America is entering a consequential period in its relations with China is beyond doubt. The trajectory of this bilateral relationship will shape both countries’ foreign policy agendas for decades to come. At a time when the characterisation of the intensifying competition between the USA and China as “a new Cold War” has gained global currency, what aspects of the US-Soviet or original Cold War are applicable even today? Matthew Turpin of the Hoover Institution nails it in a recent research article when he writes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views the USA as an existential threat. That is the starting point of this debate. Over the past few years, a new geopolitical condition has emerged.

The USA and China coexist, if somewhat uneasily, in a multipolar world in which each side is deeply suspicious of and hostile to the worldview of the other. Simultaneously, adds Turpin, both Washington and Beijing recognise that they cannot overpower their rival, which compels them to avoid direct military conflict while pushing their rivalry into other domains. Pithily put, this geopolitical condition is called a cold war. Thus, it is important to differentiate between the term “cold war”, and the proper noun “Cold War,” an event that took place between the USA and the USSR from 1947 to 1991. The historical event involved specific circumstances and actors, but the condition defined by the term (a state of political hostility between countries that unfolds across all domains short of open, direct warfare) aptly applies to today’s Sino-American situation, just as it did a generation ago to the US-Soviet rivalry. Therefore, goes the argument, the question that some scholars and commentators still ask ~ are the USA and China ‘destined’ for a new cold war ~ is a category error, iterates Turpin. The cold war already exists.

A unique attribute of cold wars, however, is that their beginning can only be perceived in retrospect; belligerents don’t issue formal declarations of hostility. A cold war starts incrementally as the weight of actions by both sides builds “until we reach what George Orwell called a peace that is no peace”. Beijing seems to have learnt lessons from the Cold War better than that confrontation’s victor, at least in one respect. If your rival is reluctant to acknowledge a cold war exists, it can be advantageous to paint them as harbouring a “Cold War mentality” as the CCP and the top echelons of the People’s Republic of China routinely does. It helps complicate the adversary’s political decision-making, especially if it is a democracy which for all its flaws America is, even as one wages a cold war against it as China is certainly doing. That is the grim reality. Costly and dangerous as it is, the American establishment, especially of the left-liberal variety, needs to internalise it if it is to design an effective foreign policy vis-à-vis Beijing.

Source: The Statesman, 14/09/23

How Indo-China border dispute once split the Communist Party of India

 

The impact of the Sino-India war on CPI becomes understandable in context of the pressures that Communist ideology was facing worldwide in an era when colonial forces were being diminished.

The killing of 10 Indian CRPF personnel by Chinese forces on October 21, 1959 is known to have been the start of hostilities that finally culminated in the Sino-India war of 1962. The events that took place at the high mountain ranges of Eastern Ladakh, at a cold dry spot known as Kongka Pass, came as a huge setback to the Indian government. It was also the moment that caused the beginning of the fractures within the second most popular political party in the country at the time, the Communist Party of India (CPI). The war between India and China in 1962 was to have its strongest impact on Left politics in India, as it caused the split of the CPI.

Of course, one cannot disregard that all was not well in the party that came to become the face of Left ideologies in India, right from the time of the Independence of the country. Differing ideologies over the nature of Indian independence, and then over the fundamental character of Indian state and society, had caused multiple factions to arise within the party. However, it was the war of 1962, that was to play a crucial role in determining the final split.

The impact of the Sino-India war on CPI becomes understandable in context of the pressures that Communist ideology was facing worldwide in an era when colonial forces were being diminished.

International communism before Sino-China war of 1962

The CPI was founded on October 17, 1920, in the city of Tashkent in Uzbekistan, which was formerly a part of the Soviet Union. The CPI is known to have been the first attempt made by the Communist International to create a Communist party in India from among Indian revolutionaries who had migrated to America and Europe. Given the international origins of the CPI, the party had an ambiguous stance, even when it came to the nationalist movement. A case in point here is the 1940s, when faced with Gandhi’s call for Quit India movement on one hand, and the Soviet Union’s appeal to back the British in the Second World War on the other, the CPI alienated itself from the freedom struggle.

In the period between the late 1950s and early 60s, an event that would have the most far-reaching consequence on Communist ideologies across the world is the breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations. The two Communist powers were at loggerheads over their interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist ideals. China decried the Soviet Union’s policy of international peaceful co-existence with the West.

At the same time, Soviet Union had found an ally in India. The USSR appealed to the CPI to lend its support to Nehru’s foreign policy, much against the wishes of certain sections of the party who had their animosities towards the Congress. Consequently, those who did not agree with the Soviet Union’s call for support towards Nehru, found themselves looking for guidance from the Communist Party in China.

The war of 1962 and split in CPI

It was in this atmosphere crisis within international communism, that the Dalai Lama escaped to India in 1959. When the Chinese brutally suppressed the Tibetan uprising, the CPI acted as a unit. “A Communist Party statement of March 31 praised the Chinese for leading the Tibetans from ‘medieval darkness’ and blamed the rebellion on Tibetan ‘serf owners’ backed by Indian reactionaries and Western imperialists,” wrote researcher Robert W. Stern, in his article published in 1965 titled, ‘The Sino-Indian border controversy and the Communist Party of India’.

Even when Nehru revealed that Chinese forces were in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh, the CPI remained largely silent and tried to minimise the importance of the affair. The situation began to change from September, when the Indian government revealed a note from China disputing the 800-mile long McMohan line as the Sino-Indian frontier. When the Central Executive Committee of the party met at Calcutta in September to discuss Sino-Indian relations, a group of leading communists from Bombay and Kerala openly dissented with the party, demanding it to declare support for Nehru’s border policy.

The Calcutta resolution though, was a defeat for the dissidents. “It equated the authenticity of the McMohan line with the authenticity of the Chinese territorial claims based on maps which had been roundly condemned in the Indian press and in Parliament,” wrote Stern. Nonetheless, party general-secretary Ajoy Ghosh managed to mediate between the two factions and retain a semblance of unity in the party. However, it was short lived.

A month later, faced with public backlash against the Calcutta resolution, and also the incident at Kongka Pass, a faction of nationalists from the CPI made public their disaffection with the party’s stance. Participating at a parliamentary board meeting of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (a multi-party organisation formed to demand a separate state for Marathi speaking people), the Communists in Maharashtra declared: “The McMahon line was India’s ‘natural boundary’ and China’s refusal to vacate Indian territory was ‘tantamount to forcible occupation’.”

Following the incident at Kongka Pass, S A Dange, one of the founding members of the CPI from Maharashtra, and representative of the party in Lok Sabha, condemned the Chinese unequivocally. “The whole country will stand behind Pandit Nehru in whatever steps he takes to avert such incidents,” he said. He was supported by A K Gopalan from Kerala, Hirendranath Mukherjee who was CPI deputy leader in the Rajya Sabha, and Jharkande Rai who represented the party in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Voices of dissent soon started to emerge from Amritsar, Ahmedabad, Delhi Haridwar and many other places.

At the same time, a strong pro-Chinese wing remained within the party. It was strongest in Calcutta and Punjab, but was also present elsewhere. This group was largely satisfied with the Calcutta resolution and refused to lend more support to Nehru’s border policy. They were called the party leftists, while their opponents were called the rightists.

In the ensuing months, while efforts were made to reach a middle ground, the disagreements within the party had become almost irreconcilable. Matters came to a head in 1961 when Ghosh passed away.

When Chinese forces invaded India in October 1962, Dange aided the Indian government in the arrest of thousands of those party members who aligned towards China.

The last straw though, that ultimately led to the splitting of the party, was the issue over a few letters written by Dange which were found by party leftist Dwijen Nandi, showed the former offering his service to the British intelligence. It culminated in the meeting of July 1964, when about 100 party leftists formally announced the creation of a new Communist party. While initially both parties insisted on being called CPI, due to necessities of election procedures, the leftist group registered themselves as Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI (M).

Sources: Indian Express, 10/09/20

India Offers Scholarships to 400 Syrian University Students to Study in India

 : India has offered fullypaid scholarships to 400 Syrian university students to study at various universities across the country. The West Asian nation is slowly getting back to normalcy after seven years of counter-ISIS operations. ET has learnt that most Syrian students for under-graduate and postgraduate courses have arrived in India as part of the initiative. This decision, first of its kind, was designed and conceived to develop closer bonds between the two countries as the Assad government has successfully thwarted terror group ISIS. As part of its goodwill gesture, the government has provided flight tickets to all these students. For over five decades now, India has been offering capacity-building courses to students and professionals of developing countries. “This was a special gesture which was extended due to Indo-Syrian political ties. India has stepped up its engagement with Damascus as the situation is returning to normal in most parts of Syria,” a person familiar with the West Asian developments told ET. New Delhi, which supported the Assad government in its fight against ISIS, is seeking to relaunch its economic and soft power engagements with Syria. High-level political engagements are also in the offing over the next few months. India has extended its strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, which, on its part, has provided support on the Kashmir issue on all international forums, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and believes India has the full right to take action it deems fit following any cross-border strike. As part of economic engagement, nearly 100 Indian companies participated in an industrial fair that was hosted in Damascus last year. Under an Indian government’s line of credit facility of $25 million, Apollo International has modernised a steel plant and BHEL is executing a project there. Damascus is also willing to offer phosphate blocks for exploration in the Syrian desert zone.

Source: Economic Times, 11/01/2019

The Great Game is not a zero-sum deal: on handling Afghanistan

India and China can work together, bilaterally and in multilateral groupings, to build a secure Afghanistan

There is an air of uncertainty about the U.S.’s intentions in Afghanistan.The likelihood of an American pullout raises the spectre of instability in Afghanistan, South and Central Asia. If this happens, security could hinge on efforts made by regional powers to stabilise Afghanistan. Could China emerge as the power broker in Afghanistan? And could India help enhance Afghanistan’s security?

Like India, China never had any intention of contributing troops to NATO’s anti-Taliban campaign. But as Asia’s strongest power and challenger to the U.S., China will shed no tears if the U.S. reduces its military strength or calls it a day after 18 years of a protracted and indecisive war in Afghanistan.

Vital to development

Sharing part of a border with Afghanistan, China has a great interest in its stability. China would be adversely affected by war and chaos, which could spill over into north-western China, Pakistan, and Central Asia. As all these areas are vital in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), peace in Afghanistan is critical.

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Over the last decade, China has gained considerable economic and diplomatic influence in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, Afghanistan’s President, Ashraf Ghani, made China the destination of his first official trip abroad in October 2014. China then announced its intention to build regional consensus on Afghanistan’s security.

It has joined the U.S. and Russia in several peace talks with the Taliban and is part of the four-nation Quadrilateral Coordination Group (with Afghanistan, Pakistan and the U.S.). It is giving military aid to Afghanistan, with the express intent of fighting terrorism and increasing security cooperation.

Despite the prevailing instability in Afghanistan, China has used diplomacyand finance to appear influential and generous. It has invested in projects such as mining, roads and railways, and health. A rail link, completed in 2016, and running from far eastern China via Uzbekistan to the river port of Hairatan in northern Afghanistan, could reduce the time taken to make shipments, from six months by road, to just two weeks. Infrastructure problems have halted work on the railway for a while, and the three countries are in talks to resume operations.

China’s diplomacy has highlighted its contacts with all parties to the conflict and enhanced its status as a power broker. In 2012, it brought Afghanistan into the regional diplomatic processes by giving it observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). At the 18th SCO summit at Qingdao, China, in 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared China’s readiness to train 2,000 law enforcement officers ‘for all parties’ in the next three years. The initiative was welcomed by Central Asian countries. For example, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which share a border with northern Afghanistan, are concerned about the Taliban and other terrorist groups becoming powerful in Afghanistan, and posing a threat. The SCO’s programme for 2019-21 also calls for combating terrorism, and generally enhancing security cooperation.

Dealing with Pakistan

If the U.S. withdrawal exacerbates conflict, southern Russia will also face the threat of an extremist spillover. Therefore, Russia and its Central Asian ‘near abroad’ would be willing to expand their cooperation with China to curb insecurity. How will China deal with Pakistan, its all-weather friend which trains and exports extremists across the Durand Line? Pakistan has become a crucial link in the BRI. And China has reportedly invested billions in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which cuts across disputed territory in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.

Since 2011, China has continually blamed Pakistan for exporting extremists to Uighur in Xinjiang, and for extremist attacks on Chinese workers in the CPEC area. But these incidents have not affected their friendship. Could China have some leverage over Pakistan? Pakistan remained the largest recipient of Chinese arms imports (2013-17). Would China’s strategic and economic interests prompt it to press Pakistan to stop exporting terrorists across the Durand Line? These are the big questions.

India supports China’s role in international negotiations on Afghanistan, the activation of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group and other mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation for restoration of peace and development in Afghanistan.

For its part, India has certainly contributed much ‘soft power’ ranging from telecommunications to education, Bollywood movies and pop music. The building for the National Assembly was built with Indian assistance to support Afghanistan’s democracy. Indian reconstruction largesse, amounting to some $3 billion, has earned it goodwill and popularity.

Sitting across the table

India, which has been against holding talks with the Taliban for a long time, finally sent two retired diplomats, at the ‘non-official level’, to join them at the Moscow peace parleys in November last year. But India’s lengthy absence from regional diplomacy has resulted in its limited contribution to the negotiations that are necessary to stabilise Afghanistan.

The Afghan government would like to see India-China economic cooperation in Afghanistan that could boost progress and enhance human security. Last October, in a first, India and China started a joint training project for Afghan diplomats. They could expand cooperation by facilitating Afghanistan’s full membership of the SCO.

China’s leadership role of the SCO and contacts with all parties (the U.S., the Taliban, the Afghan government, Pakistan, Russia and the five Central Asian states) could give it a vantage in crafting a regional solution on Afghanistan. That should not prevent India and China from working together, bilaterally and in the SCO, to build a secure Afghanistan.

Anita Inder Singh is a Founding Professor of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in New Delhi

Source: The Hindu, 10/01/2019

Searching for an elusive peace

India must remain engaged with the multiple processes underway on Afghan reconciliation

Russia hosted a regional conference on Afghanistan last week to nudge the reconciliation process between the Taliban and the Afghan authorities. The Taliban were represented by the political council chief, Sher Mohammad Stanikzai. Representatives from Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, the U.S. and India swere also present at the meeting, making it the first time that all stakeholders were present in the same room.

Back in the game

Considerable political manoeuvring preceded the meeting. It was earlier planned for September, but failed to materialise. The Taliban were opposed to attending since the Afghan government insisted on co-chairing the meeting. The diplomatic solution was to have Afghanistan represented by the High Peace Council (HPC), set up and supported by the government with the specific aim of furthering peace talks, though formally not part of government. India sent two seasoned former diplomats, with the Ministry of External Affairs describing its participation as “non-official”. The U.S. was represented by its Moscow embassy officials. Aware of the differences, the Russians refrained from attempting a final statement or even a group photograph. Nevertheless, with this meeting, Russia has sent a clear signal that it is back in the game in Afghanistan.

The idea of reconciliation with the Taliban has been around for over a decade. As the Taliban insurgency grew 2005 onwards, the British, deployed in Helmand, soon found merit in doing side deals with local Taliban commanders by turning a blind eye to opium production in the area. With the help of the Germans and the Norwegians, they began to persuade the U.S. to work for a political outcome.

After being elected in 2008, President Barack Obama ordered a full-scale review of the U.S.’s Afghanistan policy. After extracting an assurance from the generals that the insurgency would be defeated in 18 months, Mr. Obama announced a shift to counter-insurgency mode with a surge of over 40,000 troops, but added that phased drawdown of troops would begin in end-2011. Operation Enduring Freedom formally ended in December 2014, handing over primary responsibility for combat operations to the Afghan security forces even as the insurgency gained ground.

The U.S. soon realised that it had run out of options. Insurgency could not be contained as long as sanctuaries existed in Pakistan and the carrot and stick policy with Pakistan had cost the U.S. $33 billion but failed to change Pakistan’s policy. A total cut-off was not possible as long as U.S. troops in Afghanistan depended on supply lines through Pakistan. In 12 years, the U.S. had lost 2,300 soldiers and spent $105 billion in rebuilding Afghanistan, more than $103 billion (in inflation-adjusted terms) spent under the Marshall Plan on rebuilding West Europe after World War II. War weariness demanded an exit and a political solution was unavoidable.

Taliban’s growing visibility

After prolonged negotiations, a Taliban office opened in Doha in June 2013 to promote talks and a peace process. However, when the office started flying the Taliban flag, calling itself the political bureau of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, it angered both the U.S. and Afghan governments. The office was closed down though the Qatar authorities continue to host Taliban leaders.

Coming to power in 2014 after a bitterly contested election, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani moved to improve relations with Pakistan, even calling on then Army Chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif, at the GHQ, to push for reconciliation. Preliminary talks were held in Murree but derailed in July 2015 when Mr. Ghani asked for a supportive audio/video (instead of a written statement) by Taliban leader Mullah Omar and learnt that he had died over two years earlier.

An internal power struggle within the Taliban erupted with Mullah Akhtar Mansour emerging as the leader. Insurgency grew with the Taliban briefly taking over Kunduz and Ghormach districts and threatening Ghazni. Mr. Ghani felt betrayed and lashed out, accusing Pakistan of “waging war”.

A new initiative (Quadrilateral Coordination Group) involving the U.S., China, Pakistan and Afghanistan was launched in January 2016. After a couple of meetings, there was a roadmap; Pakistan was to use its influence to get the Taliban to the negotiating table. Hopes were dashed when the Taliban demanded exit of foreign troops, release of detainees from Guantanamo, and removal of its leaders from international blacklists. Frustrated with Pakistan’s inability to get Mullah Mansour to fall in line, the U.S. eliminated him in a drone strike in May 2016 in Balochistan. Maulvi Haibatullah was appointed as his successor.

Meanwhile, there were signs that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan were converging under the banner of the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan’s northern and eastern provinces. In December 2015, Russia publicly acknowledged that it had “communication channels with the Taliban for exchange of information” and “a shared interest with the Taliban to counter the threat posed by the IS”. Clearly, it was getting back into the game. Preliminary consultations were held in 2017, at which Afghan officials (and senior Indian diplomats) were present but the Taliban declined to share the table with the Afghan government.

Remaining engaged

Mr. Ghani launched the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, and in February, made an unconditional dialogue offer to the Taliban. The Taliban rejected his overture, declaring that they were ready to engage in direct talks only with the Americans. Mr. Ghani persisted, resulting in a three-day ceasefire during Eid. The U.S. softened its stand on an “Afghan-led and Afghan owned peace process”, and in July, senior State Department official Alice Wells was in Doha for a meeting with the Taliban. In September, the State Department announced the appointment of Zalmay Khalilzad (former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan) as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation. Mr. Khalilzad, a pushy go-getter, has since been making the rounds in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the situation continues to worsen. Today, the Afghan government controls barely half the country, with one-sixth under Taliban control and the rest contested. Most significant is the ongoing depletion in the Afghan security forces because of casualties, desertions and a growing reluctance to join. U.S. President Donald Trump’s South Asia policy announced last August aimed at breaking the military stalemate by expanding the U.S. and NATO presence, putting Pakistan on notice and strengthening Afghan capabilities has clearly failed, and this is why multiple processes are underway. Everyone agrees that the war has to end; the question for the U.S. is how to manage the optics of the exit while not conceding victory to the Taliban.

Since July 2011, when the former President and Chair of the HPC, Burhanuddin Rabbani, visited Delhi, India has supported an ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ peace process. Last month, during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s India visit, both countries expressed their commitment to the Moscow Format. India doesn’t have the leverage to play spoiler but its presence is recognition that its economic cooperation programmes make it the most widely accepted development partner. Pragmatism dictates that India remain engaged with the multiple processes underway. Peace remains elusive but India’s engagement demonstrates commitment to the idea of a stable, independent and peaceful Afghanistan.

Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and currently Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation

Source: The Hindu, 16/11/2018

India must become an integral part of the region

India’s role in Asean should be anchored by growing economic ties, a goal that both sides have steadily advanced over the years. Since 2005, the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) has been the nucleus and nexus of our partnership.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is in Singapore today for the 33rd Asean Summit and Related Summits. His visit caps a year of sustained high-level engagement with the region, which started in January when all 10 Asean leaders came to New Delhi for the Asean-India Commemorative Summit to mark the 25th anniversary of relations. The leaders also attended India’s Republic Day celebrations as chief guests, an unprecedented honour.

In June, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to deliver the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Laying out a vision for the Indo-Pacific, he presented a confident and resolute India ready to take on a greater role in the region.

This week, we look forward to further realising this vision. Modi will attend Asean’s year-end summits and the East Asia Summit (EAS) for the fifth consecutive year, a testament to his personal commitment to India’s Act East policy.

Singapore has long advocated for India to take up its role as an integral part of the region. It is gratifying to see how Asean-India relations have grown over the past 25 years. In 1991, when the Cold War ended and India began its economic liberalisation, we saw an opportunity to deepen ties and build on its historical and cultural links with our region. We pushed for India to become a full Asean dialogue partner in 1995 and join the EAS in 2005.

Since then, Asean-India ties have strengthened. We established the Asean-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA) in 2009, and elevated relations to a Strategic Partnership in 2012. Today, India contributes actively to Asean-led fora such as the EAS, the Asean Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, and Asean Regional Forum. All in all, around 30 platforms for cooperation exist, including seven ministerial dialogues and the annual Leaders Summit.

However, we can, and must, do more. For instance, there are tremendous opportunities in enhancing physical and digital connectivity between India and Asean.Asean is committed to strengthening land, air, and sea linkages with India. These linkages will enhance people-to-people flows, as well as boost business, investment, and tourism. The India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway will connect India’s Northeast to mainland southeast Asia. While one can fly directly between India and several Asean countries, there is still much room to expand air links to support growing business and tourism. There is potential in burgeoning cruise tourism as well.

Beyond physical linkages, digital connectivity is the new frontier in the 4th Industrial Revolution. India has made great progress in innovation, start-ups, and digital inclusion. There are opportunities to apply initiatives such as Aadhaar in our region. E-commerce and FinTech are two other areas of potential collaboration. As an economic hub, Singapore can serve as a springboard to launch these ideas to southeast Asia and beyond.

India’s role in Asean should be anchored by growing economic ties, a goal that both sides have steadily advanced over the years. Since 2005, the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) has been the nucleus and nexus of our partnership. This was India’s first comprehensive economic pact with another country and Singapore’s first with a south Asian country. CECA paved the way for the AIFTA in 2009; following which, Asean-India trade expanded 25-fold from US$2.9 billion in 1993 to over US$73 billion in 2017.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is the next step in economic integration. Covering 16 countries and over a third of global GDP and trade, RCEP will create an integrated Asian market, including half the world’s population. Over the past few decades, Asia Pacific economies have grown robustly under an open and integrated regional economic architecture.

During Diwali recently, I saw many rangoli decorating homes and offices. Our region is similar — multiple countries, each diverse and bright, interconnected within a pattern that constitutes our regional architecture. As Asean Chair and in the years ahead, Singapore will do its best to invigorate this evolving mosaic of regional cooperation.

Source: Hindustan Times, 13/11/2018

Winning the neighbourhood

India has displayed an ample supply of national self-confidence and pride in recent years. But the self-confidence has not translated into good public policy.

When it comes to trade relations with its immediate neighbours, India is strikingly different from other regionally-dominant major countries. Despite being the region’s largest and fastest growing economy, India absorbs as little as 1.7 per cent of Bangladesh’s exports, and accounts for only 14 per cent of its imports. Economist Ashok V Desai, who has pointed this out recently (The Telegraph, October 16), contrasts India’s trade profile with that of other regionally dominant countries such as the US vis-à-vis Canada and Mexico, the European Union vis-à-vis Poland and the Netherlands, and South Africa vis-à-vis Namibia and Mozambique. In order for India to achieve a similar trading position as those countries, Desai would like to see India take the initiative to free the movement of goods and people between India and Bangladesh. It not only makes eminent economic sense, he believes, it is quite practical. After all, India treats Bangladeshis as foreigners and has an “extremely costly infrastructure to prevent illegal immigration” from there. But Indian policy vis-à-vis another regional neighbour is not as economically dysfunctional: Nepalis are treated as “permissible aliens”.

How has the legal status of Nepalis and Bangladeshis come to be so different in post-colonial India? One would not necessarily have predicted this from past history. It hardly needs to be stated that the ties between present-day Bangladesh (eastern Bengal) and India in British colonial times were closer than those between India and Nepal. After all, both were part of the same political entity. Moreover, the district of Sylhet in Bangladesh was a part of the province of Assam; and for a brief period from 1905 to 1911, Eastern Bengal and Assam constituted a single province. But Nepal was not a part of British India. However, like the neighbouring Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Sikkim, it was part of Britain’s informal empire.

During the British colonial period, migration across this entire region — whether from Bengal to Assam or from Nepal to India — was not only unrestricted, it was actively encouraged. Thus the ethnic Nepali population of Darjeeling district in West Bengal, Sikkim, parts of Northeast India as well as Bhutan is a legacy of the informal empire.

Decolonisation created a new territorial order in the region and it tried to bring a period of extraordinary mobility to an end. The illegality regimes created by newly-independent countries made the status of many people in the region — most importantly in India — suddenly more vulnerable.

There is nothing predetermined about the fact that the legal status of Nepalis in post-colonial India would be different from that of Bangladeshis. Ethnic Nepalis have had to struggle for this status; and in certain parts of India, they continue to feel quite vulnerable. Indeed, ethnic Nepali political mobilisation in the entire transnational region has been an effort to assert citizenship rights in response to a growing sense of post-colonial vulnerability. After all, nearly 1, 00,000 ethnic Nepalis of Bhutan or the Lhotshampas — southern Bhutanese in the Dzongkha language — were expelled from Bhutan in the 1990s.

Ethnic Nepalis form the social basis of the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling. Indeed, the use of the term Gorkha is itself a way of making claims to Indian citizenship, since it avoids confusion between citizens of Nepal and ethnic Nepali citizens of independent India inherent in the term Nepali.

But what are the chances of India making policies vis-à-vis Bangladeshis that are in India’s economic interest? The expectation that the NRC process would lead to a resolution of Assam’s long-festering citizenship crisis has now faded. The confrontational atmosphere building in Assam around the Citizenship Amendment Bill has eerie similarities with the Assam of the early 1980s. A group of Mumbai-based activists now describes the NRC updating process as the NRC crisis since it has led to 30 suicides so far.

Whatever else one can say about the Citizenship Amendment Bill, it is hard to argue that it will promote greater economic integration between India and Bangladesh. The distinction between Hindus and Muslims in India’s citizenship laws that the bill will introduce — albeit through the backdoor — would only make the situation worse for “Bangladeshis in Bangalore”, who in economist Desai’s words, “are treated as illegal immigrants and hounded”.

The proposed bill may turn out to be the beginning of a major shift in India’s refugee policy. Its closest international analogue may be the Cold-War era refugee policy of the US. From 1952 to 1980, the Cold War shaped the very definition of a refugee in US law. A refugee was defined as a person fleeing “from a Communist-dominated country or area”. Cubans became the biggest beneficiary of this policy because of the island nation’s proximity to the US.

Not unlike India’s Citizenship Amendment Bill, Cuban immigrants according to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 could not be treated as illegal in the US. They qualified for US residency within a year of being in the US and were eligible for citizenship five years later, no matter how they entered the country. Since they were admitted for humanitarian reasons — allegedly for fleeing communist oppression — Cubans quickly became a significant immigrant group in the US. Within a decade after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Cuban population in the US grew by six-fold.

If the proposed amendment to India’s citizenship law is passed, it could stimulate a similar wave of emigration of Hindus from Bangladesh, perhaps from Pakistan and Afghanistan as well. The proposed amendment will, of course, limit refugee status and the road to citizenship, to those already in the country. But the history of immigration from the communist countries to the US during the Cold War suggests that signals are always very important in pushing modern emigration.

Former BJP leader Jaswant Singh, known for his strategic thinking, once said that “in considering the totality of national security, economic security is the pivot: Its vitality, growth and dynamism becomes the principal security imperative”. If one follows his insight, Desai’s recommendations should be very high on the ruling party’s policy agenda. But unfortunately, while the BJP-led government proclaims a foreign policy of “neighbourhood first”, the ruling party is also presided over by a president who talks of Bangladeshis as “termites” that are “eating the grain that should go to our poor and they are taking our jobs”.

The major reason why India cannot make the “vitality, growth and dynamism” of its economy a priority in its policy-making has to do with the country’s internal weaknesses and the ideological predilections of its ruling elite. India does not have the domestic political constituencies to back the kind of policies that Desai proposes. Nor is there willingness on the part of the ruling elites to invest in creating potential constituencies to make its immigration and refugee policies compatible with India’s economic aspirations.

India in recent years has displayed an ample supply of national self-confidence, pride, and perhaps even some hubris. Unfortunately, there is no straight-line between self-confidence and good public policy.

Source: Indian Express, 2/11/2018

Real, sustainable peace does not come about by chance

The UN Security Council has dispatched more than 70 operations to help maintain cease-fires between countries, end protracted civil wars, protect the vulnerable and save lives, strengthen the rule of law, establish new security institutions, and help new countries, such as Timor Leste, come into being.

United Nations peacekeeping is a concrete example of multilateralism at work. It demonstrates how the global community can address some of today’s most complex and dangerous issues with a mixture of creativity and pragmatism.

Since the first blue helmets were deployed in 1948, peacekeeping has enabled the countries of the world to meet common threats to peace and security and share the burden under the UN flag. Over the past 70 years, more than one million peacekeepers — women and men, soldiers, police, and civilians from countries across the world — have responded to a vast range of conflicts, and peacekeeping has adapted constantly to meet these demands.

The UN Security Council has dispatched more than 70 operations to help maintain ceasefires between countries, end protracted civil wars, protect the vulnerable and save lives, strengthen the rule of law, establish new security institutions, and help new countries, such as Timor Leste, come into being.

But peacekeeping is a dangerous business. Tens of thousands of peacekeepers today are deployed where there is little peace to keep. Last year, 61 peacekeepers were killed in hostile acts, and our peacekeepers were attacked more than 300 times — almost once a day. In Mali and in the Central African Republic, I saw for myself the important work the blue helmets do every day — not only keeping the peace but supporting the delivery of humanitarian aid and protecting civilians. I’ve also laid too many wreaths for fallen peacekeepers.

We have enacted new measures to address the rise in fatalities, and I have commissioned independent strategic reviews of each peacekeeping operation. But it’s clear to me that we don’t have any chance of succeeding without the world’s clear and unambiguous support.

Expectations of peacekeeping vastly outstrip both support and resources. Yes, we need more helicopters, we need mine-proof vehicles and night vision, and we need police and civilians with specialised skills to help us build sustainable peace. But we also need UN Member States to send us personnel equipped and trained properly and with the mindset to use these capabilities effectively. And, above all, we need their sustained political commitment, a critical factor in the long-term success of our peacekeeping operations.

That is the background to the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, launched in March. It aims to ask all UN Member States and other partners to revitalise their commitment to UN peacekeeping so that we can continue to improve it together. We’ve had in-depth and candid discussions to identify the areas where more effort is required and created a Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations.

The declaration represents a clear and urgent agenda for peacekeeping. By endorsing the declaration, governments show their commitment to advancing political solutions to conflicts, to strengthening protection for the vulnerable people under our charge, and to improving the safety and security of our peacekeepers. Now we need to translate these commitments into practical support in the field.

The declaration calls for all of us to improve our operations, to increase the participation of women in all areas of peacekeeping, to strengthen partnerships with governments, and to take measures to ensure our personnel live up to the highest standards of conduct and discipline.

Unacceptable cases of sexual exploitation and abuse have tarnished the reputation of UN peacekeeping, and I am determined to do everything in my power to prevent and end this scourge. We must hold ourselves accountable to the highest standards of performance and conduct. As of today, 141 countries [including India] and three international and regional organisations have made these commitments, signalling a consensus around renewed support for UN peacekeeping.

These countries include those that decide on peacekeeping mandates in the Security Council and those that contribute the women and men who serve as peacekeepers; those that pay for peacekeeping missions; and the governments of countries where peacekeeping missions are deployed.

Representatives from these countries and organisations met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly last week to express their commitment to peacekeeping, celebrate its many achievements, discuss the challenges we face, and renew their support.

But the real test will come on the ground in our missions around the world. Real, sustainable peace does not come about by chance. It is hard and sometimes expensive work to support countries on their path from conflict to stability

It is hard and sometimes expensive work to support countries on their path from conflict to stability, but it is a lot cheaper than war in every sense.

For our part, we are determined that UN peacekeeping will live up to the expectations of the millions of people we serve and who depend on us.

The cost of failure is unacceptable. We cannot let them down.

Antonio Guterres is UN Secretary-General

Source: Hindustan Times, 6/10/18

Emmanuel Macron knows what France needs. But can he push through reforms?

It is a remarkable moment for France, the country voting for the 39-year-old political newbie, Emmanuel Macron, as its next president.

It is a remarkable moment for France, the country voting for the 39-year-old political newbie, Emmanuel Macron, as its next president. In just a year since creating his centre-left party En Marche!, Macron defeated second-generation politician Marie Le Pen, who, evoking an inward-looking “nationalism”, was feverishly anti-Muslim, promised to counter terrorism with violence, close the country to immigrants and “salvage” France out of the European Union (EU). With Macron’s win, there is a distinct sigh of relief across Europe.

In 2003, when I was 23, I had started working in the office of the President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac. I was policy analyst to Jerome Monod, Chirac’s chief counsellor. The 71-year-old president closely relied on Monod, who’d been an astute businessman for decades. Once elected, Chirac requested Monod to quit his position and join him at the Elysees. The loyal Monod agreed, later earning the reputation of being the crafty “shadow president” of France.

Interestingly, my conversations with both were always sprinkled with marvellous references to France’s history. They had deep respect for the distinct cultures of the east. Their mannerisms were always poised; they seemed to embody the stature of “old France”, as did most of Chirac’s cabinet ministers, “grands hommes” of politics and business. Severely nationalistic, old-wordly men, who’d lived the history of France, and found it difficult to take France into the future now.

They fiercely defended France on the international stage, but at home, they floundered on reforms. Flip-flopping on economic issues, under their leadership, impending reforms in France’s labour market never saw light. Immigrants rioted as employment and living conditions worsened. For progress, “old France” desperately needed economic reforms, which it never could achieve.

Chirac’s presidency ended in 2007, but France had little respite thereafter. The country suffered another decade of obscure political leadership, with a GDP growth rate that hardly budged above one per cent in the past five years. Its people were further traumatised by numerous terror attacks. Meanwhile, several manufacturing companies moved out of France, to the eastern parts of the EU which had more flexible labour laws. Many French citizens also work clandestinely, to benefit from the state’s unemployment dole that can even equal 80 per cent of one’s salary. Any attempted reform by the government has only led to the French going on strikes.

A year and a half ago, I first met Macron. He was then France’s minister of economy. Devoid of any airs, he spoke candidly and laughed over a conversation about technology, economy and France. We talked about the labour market reforms France urgently needs. He told me he supported open borders, free trade and free movement of labour. I remembered my years at the Elysee — I was sure that no one from the 2003 cabinet ministry would have Macron’s worldview.

In conversation, Macron suggested that France must prove itself capable of serious internal reforms, to persuade the EU towards less austere economic policies. I agreed, but also pointed out that former French presidents, including President Chirac, had tried labour market reforms, but failed terribly.

However, I was convinced that Macron represents hope. He is young, passionate and well-meaning. What he proposes — labour market reforms — is the source of much of France’s problems today. Many former governments gave up when the French took to the streets in opposition. It is therefore a marvellous moment in France’s history that many of the same French citizens who were anti-reforms have now voted for Macron.

France is ready for change, finally. But will young, inexperienced Macron be able to deliver it to them?

Soon after Macron’s victory, the newly elected president said, “I will protect and defend France’s vital interests. I will protect and defend Europe.” His main goal, he said, was to “calm people’s fears, restore France’s confidence, gather all its people together to face the immense challenges that face us.” His speech was heavy on generalisations.

He even talked about a digital revolution, an ecological transition. But his speech was entirely bereft of mentions of specific economic reforms.

Today, Macron’s challenge for France is two-fold: To pull the French out of a nationalism that mainly draws energy from its historic, sometimes imagined, greatness, and to roll out economic reforms. Unless France bifurcates its long-nurtured, inward-looking nationalism from politics, its people cannot be mobilised to collaborate towards the economic progress of their country, in an open world.

Source: Indianexpress, 9-05-2017

For a bold foreign policy

National interest is not served by avoiding problems left over by a previous order

The strategic choices before us today are similar to the ones U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are facing: in a fast-changing world, national interest is not served by avoiding problems left over by a previous order. Prime Minister Narendra Modi needs to challenge long-established convictions on whether the elements of power in the next world order will revolve around diplomacy, force, or trade as the primary tool.

Moving to a multipolar world

In the last 20 years, incomes of 80% of the population in the West stagnated while per capita income in China quadrupled, and India’s more than doubled. Society is ageing; technology is disrupting labour markets and business models. The digital economy is expected to provide one-quarter of global productivity by 2025 and will have the U.S., China and India reinforcing the multipolar order.

The functioning of the global economy has affected the economic and political relationship between the large and small economies, reducing and increasing the leverage exercised by the U.S. and China, respectively. The China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which former U.S. President Barack Obama failed to weaken, and the New Development Bank of the BRICS could provide the required $8-15 trillion, marginalising the World Bank. China is projecting the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative as a replacement for the U.S.-led post-1950 multilateral institutions.

Mr. Trump is understandably questioning the relevance of the United Nations for the U.S., favouring bilateral deals and forcing others to rethink the nature and role of international cooperation. He is resetting priorities away from peacekeeping, environment and human rights to trade.

His ‘America First’ strategy has broad support within the U.S. Other rich countries like Japan and the U.K. are likely to adopt this new template doing away with concessions to others. There will be consequences for the World Trade Organisation, in particular if the WTO dispute resolution panels rule against the U.S., leading to a questioning of the rule-based system itself.

Mr. Trump recognises that he cannot stop global trends and the diminishing returns from a reliance on diplomacy and force, exemplified by the failure of the U.S. ‘pivot’ in containing China. Mr. Obama’s response to the entry of three billion Asians into the global economy was to attempt setting new trade rules outside the WTO. Mr. Trump has rejected this approach, favouring an employment-oriented deal around specific sectors much like the Obama-Xi understanding on climate change. The difference is that Mr. Trump is prepared to limit imports and boost exports even at the cost of upsetting long-standing agreements and allies.

Mr. Trump is “willing to find new friends and to forge new partnerships where shared interests align”, rejecting the Cold War logic of containment, reliance on foreign bases and alliances. He sees China as the greatest threat, as the combination of military and economic strength creates a strategic situation where, like in the Cold War, the U.S. will need to seek a “constructive relationship” in Asia rather than dominance and may join the OBOR.

Asian connectivity and India

Mr. Trump is moving for a political deal with Russia and a trade deal with China. Chinese exports to the U.S. are already declining, the shift to a consumption-driven economy will open markets for U.S. goods, and the RMB is now a global reserve currency. India is more vulnerable with two-thirds of the exports of the $150-billion IT industry to the U.S. and the ‘Make in India’ strategy colliding with Mr. Trump’s priorities, requiring India to make strategic choices.

As the multilateral order fragments into spheres of influence, we first need a bold vision on Kashmir and must not just seek to isolate Pakistan. We should join the OBOR, while maintaining our reservations on its branch passing through Kashmir, and become part of the growing Asian market.

The nature of conflict is changing from direct clashes to disruption of critical infrastructure through remote attacks. With world-class cyber-space-biotech capability, we should reconsider large-scale purchases from abroad for massive investment in cybersecurity and the related digital economy that will make the ‘Digital India’ initiative into ‘Digital Asia’. India expects nothing less from Mr. Modi.

Mukul Sanwal is a former UN diplomat and currently Visiting Professor at the Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Source: The Hindu, 14-03-2017