Manipur’s Dilemma

 Today, as the first votes are cast in India’s general election, the spotlight naturally turns to the bustling political activities across the country.

Today, as the first votes are cast in India’s general election, the spotlight naturally turns to the bustling political activities across the country. Yet, in the remote north-eastern state of Manipur, a contrasting scene unfolds, marked not by fervent public rallies but by a conspicuous silence borne out of fear. Manipur, along with most other north-eastern states, step into the electoral process today alongside Tamil Nadu in the south.

Unlike the rest, though, Manipur carries the weight of on-going strife and the palpable fear of violence. Manipur’s quiet streets during this significant democratic exercise are a tell-tale sign of the deep-seated troubles that have plagued the state. Ethnic tensions between the majority Meitei community and the minority Kuki-Zo tribes have escalated into a violent conflict that the Centre and the BJP-ruled state seems unable to quell. The state, split into two hostile enclaves, is a stark representation of the failure to foster peace and unity. The situation in Manipur is not just a local issue but a test of India’s ability to manage its internal affairs.

The promise of democracy is to provide a voice to all its constituents, yet the people of Manipur feel forgotten, their grievances largely unaddressed. The Centre’s responses, including strategic changes to border policy and security measures, have thus far not mitigated the tensions, and in some cases, may even have exacerbated them. The general elections are a time of hope and change, yet for many in Manipur, the vote casts a shadow rather than light. Despite the despair, there is a reluctant drive among the people to participate in the voting process. This dichotomy underscores a critical aspect of democracy: the right to vote, which is both a privilege and a powerful tool for expressing an opinion. Whether this democratic change will bring about change though remains in question.

The local support for the BJP points to a complex interplay of resigned acceptance and hopeful expectation that the Union government will eventually intervene more constructively. The Congress party’s promises to bridge the community divisions if elected offer an alternative, but whether this can convert into electoral gain or meaningful change is uncertain. Manipur’s electoral significance may seem minor on the national scale with its two seats in the Lok Sabha. Yet, the state’s current turmoil is a significant indicator of the broader challenges facing India’s democracy.

It is a reminder that the strength of a nation’s democratic process is tested not at the height of its peaceful gatherings but in the quiet corners where fear and conflict overshadow the fundamental and democratic act of voting. As India votes, it must not forget Manipur. The true measure of this election’s success will lie in how it addresses the silent challenges unfolding in such neglected regions, ensuring that every part of the country can partake of the democratic promise of peace, security, and prosperity.

Source: The Statesman, 19/04/24

Express View on Manipur crisis: State government, step up

 

Continuing violence points to a lack of political will, and obduracy in failing to acknowledge that far more needs to be done

Recurring instances of violence in Manipur point to the obvious — the unrest that erupted in the state last year in May is far from over. This week alone, a mob targeted the 3rd Indian Reserve Battalion in Khangabok, Thoubal; Thoubal Police Headquarters was also attacked. Though authorities managed to repel the mobs in both instances, three BSF personnel were injured. In Moreh, a beleaguered border town, an Indian Reserve Battalion jawan and a havildar on deputation with the Manipur police commandos were killed and two others injured. The state’s Home Department Commissioner has put in a request with the Home Ministry requesting “air assets” in Imphal to meet with similar emergency situations.

These instances, only the latest in a dismal series, highlight how eight months into the ethnic conflict, the state government is yet to step up to its challenge. The attacks on security personnel are disturbing on multiple counts. After the initial inertia, the state has seen a larger deployment of security forces, including the Army and paramilitary forces, to bring the situation under control. Yet, accusations of partisanship are rife on the ground, posing hurdles in their way. Despite the Army chief’s recent assertion of growing stability in the state, violence against the security forces also highlights that force alone cannot tame a situation that requires sensitivity and compassion in equal measure. The instability in Myanmar, where Arakan insurgents claim to have taken control of Paletwa town in Chin state, that lies close to Myanmar’s border with India and Bangladesh, is a troubling development, compounded by the fact that of the estimated 4,500-odd arms looted from state police armouries in Manipur in the early days of the ethnic clash, only about 30 per cent have been recovered so far. This means that unaccounted-for arms remain in circulation in a state where borders and buffer zones have deepened along ethnic lines between the hill and valley people and where each feels distrust for the other and for those meant to govern and protect them.

In June last year, Home Minister Amit Shah had announced the formation of a peace committee, with representatives from different ethnicities, political parties and civil society, to begin the process of healing. The committee ran into internal differences soon after and is yet to meet. In the unending season of anger and grief in the state, this shows both a lack of will and an obduracy in failing to acknowledge that far more needs to be done.

Source: Indian Express, 19/01/24

History of UNLF, Meitei insurgent group that signed peace deal with Centre

 

The UNLF was formed on November 24, 1964, and is the oldest valley-based insurgent group — distinct from the insurgent groups active in the state’s Naga-dominated and Kuki-Zomi dominated hills.

Union Home Minister Amit Shah Wednesday announced the signing of a peace agreement with the Meitei separatist group United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in Manipur, terming it a “historic milestone.”

The Home Minister also expressed the hope that this would encourage other valley-based insurgent groups (VBIGs) to participate in a peace process.

What is the UNLF?

The UNLF was formed on November 24, 1964, and is the oldest valley-based insurgent group — distinct from the insurgent groups active in the state’s Naga-dominated and Kuki-Zomi dominated hills. It was formed with the demand of secession from India under the leadership of Arembam Samarendra Singh, who was the general secretary of the group. Two of the top central committee leaders — Khalalung Kamei and Thangkhopao Singsit — were a Naga and a Kuki. The UNLF is believed to have received its initial training from the NSCN (IM), the largest Naga insurgent group. Its armed wing, the Manipur People’s Army, was formed in 1990 and over the years, it has carried out multiple attacks targeting Indian security personnel. There are now two factions of the UNLF and jointly, government estimates place the number of cadres at 400-500. Its area of operation includes all the valley areas of Manipur, as well as some villages in the Kuki-Zomi hill districts. A proscribed group, banned under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, it has largely been functioning from camps and training bases in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region, Chin state, and Rakhine state with the patronage of the Myanmar military. However, it is now on the backfoot there, with mounting attacks against the military junta by various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs).

While the UNLF has weakened over the years, pushed across the border to Myanmar, there have been concerns about its increased activity, along with other VBIGs, during the course of the ongoing ethnic conflict in Manipur. The two UNLF factions are believed to have trained around 500 new recruits in the past months.

What is the precedent for the peace agreement?

The VBIGs have never entered into an agreement with the Centre or participated in any peace talks. Author and former fellow at Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Malem Ningthouja, however, said it was not possible to definitively state that this was the first group to come to an understanding.

“In the past, there have been some groups like the UPPK, KCP and Maoist Communist Group — though their strength may have been insignificant — which have been either disbanded or rendered into insignificance. And we don’t know under what terms they did so. Even in this case, we don’t know the terms of the agreement but this has a spectacular impact since it’s considered to be a major group. At a recent flag raising event in Manipur, more than 1000 people attended, and it has its mass organisations,” he said.

The UNLF underwent a formal split in the mid-1990s, when N Oken broke away, and his faction became the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL, another proscribed group).at is the precedent for the peace agreement?

After Samarendra was assassinated in 2000, the UNLF leadership was taken up by R K Meghen, who was arrested in 2010. While Meghen was imprisoned, Khundongbam Pambei became chairman.

There was another split in 2021, when Pambei broke away from the rest of the central committee. So now, there are two factions, one under the chairmanship of Pambei and the other under the chairmanship of NC Koireng. Pambei has been open to talks, and the process to begin ceasefire negotiations goes back to 2020.

What about the other groups?

While the UNLF is the oldest of such groups, several other Meitei insurgent groups have come into being in subsequent years. The UNLF is one of the seven “Meitei Extremist Organisations” banned by the Union government.

The UNLF faction under Koireng continues to be opposed to talks.

On the other hand, a tripartite Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement between the Centre, Manipur state and the Kuki-Zomi insurgent groups had been reached in 2008.

In March this year, the Manipur government pulled out of the agreement with the Zomi Revolutionary Army and the Kuki National Army, saying they were “influencing agitation among forest encroachers”.

Written by Sukrita Baruah

Source: Indian Express, 30/11/23

Limits of identity: On facilitating peace in Manipur

 

Civil society should strive to be non-partisan to aid peace in Manipur

One of the most disconcerting features of the ongoing ethnic strife in Manipur remains the inability of civil society representatives to rise above their “ethnic” affiliations and work towards peace. This is exemplified by the acts of the Meira Paibi, an amorphous organisation of Meitei women, who have in the past mobilised against armed forces and police excesses, alcoholism, drug addiction and sexual violence in the State. During the conflict that has raged on since early May, however, the Meira Paibi has been working towards disrupting the operations of the Assam Rifles in their attempt to maintain peace, especially in the foothills. These areas, called “buffer zones”, were created to ensure that there is no further escalation of violence between arms-wielding people of the two ethnic communities, but there have been violent attacks with the armed forces unable to act on time because of disruptions, allegedly, by the Meira Paibi among others. Clearly, the situation has been brought to a boil by the looting of weapons by both Kuki-Zo and Meitei groups and their use in the strife. But the inability of the State government and its police and the Union government-deployed armed forces in maintaining peace has also been due to civil society groups supporting those engaging in violence.

Some Meira Paibi representatives had, in a press conference in New Delhi on Wednesday, claimed that they do not recognise the buffer zones, calling them “unconstitutional”. The presence of armed forces in peacekeeping is not an ideal solution in most circumstances. But with the ethnicisation of law enforcement, aided by a State government that seems to have lost its legitimacy of power across ethnic divides, leading to demands for a separate administration by Kuki-Zo representatives, the armed forces’ presence and the need for buffer zones to maintain a semblance of peace have become essential in Manipur. Civil society groups such as the Meira Paibi can rise above their narrow ethnic identities to press for justice for women affected in the conflict and thus build solidarity networks that will aid the process of reconciliation and peace-building. Sadly, that does not seem to be the case today. Civil society organisations have whipped up the frenzy of ethnic hatred, partially due to the recurring trauma from the violence, as much as cynical political representatives have. And this has meant that the cycle of violence has endured. History suggests that a breakthrough can only be achieved through non-partisan leadership and civic dialogue among civil society and political representatives. As things stand, for that to happen there needs to be a credible alternative to the current leadership in the State.

Source: The Hindu, 15/09/23

Manipur Proposes More Autonomy for Hill Councils Amid Conflict

 Manipur’s state government has proposed granting more autonomy to existing autonomous hill councils in an attempt to address the ongoing conflict and appease the Kuki community. The Kuki community has been demanding separate administration since the violence erupted on May 3, but the state government is opposing this demand and suggesting increased autonomy for the existing councils as an alternative solution. However, sources indicate that the Kuki community may not be willing to compromise, arguing that the hill councils have proven ineffective.

Manipur’s hill areas were never included under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, unlike other northeastern states, which enjoy more extensive legislative powers. The proposed solution aims to bridge this gap but faces resistance from various quarters.

What is the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, and how does it relate to autonomous councils?

The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution provides for the formation of autonomous administrative divisions within states, known as autonomous district councils (ADCs). These ADCs have legislative, judicial, and administrative autonomy within their respective states, particularly in matters related to tribal areas and their governance.

How do Manipur ADCs differ from Sixth Schedule ADCs?

Manipur ADCs differ from Sixth Schedule ADCs in terms of their legislative powers. While Sixth Schedule ADCs enjoy wider legislative authority, Manipur’s ADCs have limited powers, primarily focusing on personal matters like marriage, divorce, and social customs. Additionally, Sixth Schedule ADCs receive central grants, while Manipur’s ADCs depend on the state government for financial support.

Why did the hill people in Manipur boycott ADC elections for two decades?

The hill people in Manipur boycotted ADC elections for two decades (1990-2010) due to dissatisfaction with the provisions and alleged non-cooperation from the state government. They felt that the ADCs did not effectively represent their interests and demands.

What challenges have hindered the functioning of ADCs in Manipur?

ADCs in Manipur have faced challenges such as inadequate devolution of powers, budgetary constraints, and non-cooperation from the state government. Some powers granted to ADCs remained recommendatory, and budgetary allocations were insufficient, leading to non-functional ADCs in some cases.

How has the Ministry of Home Affairs viewed the functioning of ADCs in Manipur?

The Ministry of Home Affairs has observed that ADCs in Manipur have operated haphazardly, with poor budgetary allocations resulting in ADCs struggling to pay salaries. For practical purposes, many ADCs in Manipur are considered non-functional, according to official sources.

A land in trouble

 

An overview of Manipur's three-way ethnic conflict between Meitei, Naga and Kuki groups, which started since the era of British rule and the Anglo-Kuki war of 1917-19 during World War I

One regularly sees headlines describing the clashes in Manipur as ‘attacks on Christians’ because more than 100 churches and some temples have been attacked. That gives a communal colour to what is a decades-old ethnic conflict resulting from complex ethnic relations and land management systems of Manipur. The state has three main ethnic families — the predominantly Christian Naga and Kuki tribals and the mostly Hindu, non-tribal Meitei who form 53% of the 2.86 million population (2011 census) living on 10% of Manipur’s land in the valley. The tribes comprise 40% of the population living on 90% of the land in the hills. However, tribal land includes most forests that are 67% of the state’s landmass. The Meiteis complain that they cannot own land in the hill areas while tribals can own land in the valley; they thus call this arrangement unjust. The tribes rebut by saying that the Meiteis monopolise jobs as well as economic and political power in the state and that they cannot claim land over and above of what they have. In reality, some poor Meitei families live in the hills and some well-off tribal families live in the valley. The valley-based leaders do not necessarily represent the poor but land remains central to this conflict.

Legal measures have been attempted to change the nature of land-ownership in the hills. The tribes have resisted these attempts. They have been demanding the Sixth Schedule and have been granted some concessions under Article 371C. The conflict has continued, but till now it had taken the form of highway blockades, strikes and shutdowns. Moreover, it is a three-way conflict. The Nagas and the Kukis join hands to oppose moves of the State that they perceive to be pro-Meitei but they, too, have a conflict centred on land. During World War I, the Kukis refused to go to Europe as porters for the British army; the British army then attacked them. After the defeat of the Kukis in the Anglo-Kuki war of 1917-19, the British regime evicted them from their land, dispersed them all over the Northeast, and justified its actions by creating the myth that the Kukis were nomads who went around occupying land belonging to other tribes. Most people accept that myth today and treat Kukis as refugees with no right over land. The refusal of other communities to recognise the Kukis’ rights over land further complicates ethnic relations.

Some Meitei leaders decided recently that the only way of gaining access to tribal land was to include their community in the tribal schedule. They approached the Manipur High Court with a plea to act on this demand. A single bench judge ordered the government of Manipur to consider recommending tribal status for the Meitei to the Union government. On April 26, the state government used a 1966 boundary notification to evict some Kuki families in Churachandpur district from their land on the plea that it was forest land. For good measure, it added that the Kukis were growing poppy; they do so, but only as bit players. The State has not touched the masterminds. These events combined to light the fuse. The violence began on May 3 when the joint Naga-Kuki demonstration against the high court judgment was attacked. The Supreme Court has since reprimanded the Manipur High Court. But the damage had been done.

Three features distinguish the present conflict from past ones. First, although the Nagas and the Kukis joined hands to oppose the move on tribal status for Meiteis, the Kukis were singled out for attacks. Attempts seem to have been made to provoke the Nagas and turn it into a Naga-Kuki conflict but they failed. Second, for the first time, religious places were attacked in order to give the conflict a communal turn. Third, eyewitness accounts state that gangs of young men came on motorbikes from Imphal to places around 50 kilometres away to attack churches. Unfounded rumours were spread that some Meitei women had been raped in Churachandpur to justify the raping of Kuki women in retaliation.

One would be justified in concluding from these events that the conflict was well-planned, funded, and executed with precision by people in power. In most cases, the security forces remained mute spectators. Significantly, the chief of the defence staff has stated that Kuki militants were not involved in the conflict. But if the situation continues, it can encourage the militants to intervene. For many years, civil society organisations of all three communities have attempted to facilitate dialogue among the ethnic groups. But they have been sidelined in the last few years. Violent groups have taken their place and seem to play a major role in intensifying ethnic divisions. There evidently is a link among the court case, evictions, the conflict, and the break-up of dialogue.

There are, however, some signs of hope. Not all Meiteis are involved in the conflict. Many of their leaders and thinkers have come out against it. Houses of some of them have been attacked in retaliation and they are in hiding. In Churachandpur, when some Kuki men were planning to attack Meiteis, Kuki women formed a human chain to prevent these attacks. In neighbouring Moirang, Meitei parents and students stood near the gate of a Jesuit school to prevent attacks on it by an armed group. These are among many instances that suggest that a beginning can be made towards reconciliation. Even as the organisers of the conflict tried to turn the Nagas against the Kukis, a few Naga outfits and some political leaders based in Nagaland visited Kuki villages with relief material to express their solidarity with them. The chief minister of Nagaland sent a massive consignment of relief to the Kuki-majority Kangpokpi district. Naga outfits based in Manipur are yet to show similar solidarity with the Kukis but they have not opposed them. These actions offer the ray of hope that the Nagas and the Kukis can be brought together and, then, bridges can be built by beginning a dialogue with the Meiteis.

Walter Fernandes is Director, North Eastern Social Research Centre, Guwahati

Source: The Telegraph, 25/06/23

Manipur crisis reveals the limits of BJP’s politics in the Northeast

 The continuing violence in Manipur ought to be shocking for many reasons. But its sheer scale, endurance and brutality is still not getting national attention. As is typical, the prime minister who is never shy of taking leadership credit, is completely absent when there is an actual crisis that goes to the heart of both constitutional values and national security. In this instance, it seems like the double-engine sarkar, even after invoking Article 355, is unable to control the violence.

It takes nothing away from the culpability of the present dispensation to acknowledge the long-standing and irresolvable contradictions of Manipur politics. Whenever the central organising axis of politics is a distributive conflict between identity-based groups, there is a high chance of violence. This is particularly the case where the conflict inherently has the character of a zero-sum game. In Manipur, the politics of distribution between Kukis and Meiteis turns on four goods whose inherent logic is zero-sum.

The first is inclusion in the ST quota which is the proximate background to the current conflict. By its very nature, the inclusion of more groups in the ST quota will be a threat to existing beneficiaries. The second is land, and the tension between the valley and the hills. This is also a zero-sum resource, where protecting the land rights of Kukis is seen as foreclosing the opportunities for other groups. The third is political representation, where historically Kukis have felt dominated by the Meiteis. The fourth is patronage by the state in the informal economy, in which groups compete against one another for control of informal trade. Each state intervention in regulating trade becomes a locus of conflict.

Place on top of that a default demand that the boundaries of ethnicity and territorial governance should, as much as possible, coincide. In principle, these demands could be negotiated through building inclusive democratic institutions. But this is easier said than done, when every policy instrument in contention — quotas, land, representation, and the state-economy nexus — are defined in terms of zero-sum games. The tragedy of Manipur was that, in part, there was no other game in town, one that could prise politics away from this zero-sum alignment of distribution and ethnicity.

Dealing with such a situation requires at least three things. It requires a capable state impartially enforcing constitutional values. It requires a political culture that respects identity but does not politicise it. It requires a development narrative that all sections of society can potentially participate in.

Instead, the Indian state made Manipur a charnel house of human rights violations, abetted violence and militarisation to unprecedented levels. It opportunistically used ethnicity both for electoral alliances and divide and rule. In some ways, under colonial divide and rule, the state pretended to hover above the various contending groups. The point of divide and rule was to present the state as neutral and shore up its legitimacy. But in democratic India divide and rule has meant the state itself getting implicated with one group or the other. The result was a weakening of the state’s capacity to govern. We can see the long-term effects of this even in the present crisis, where there is widespread agreement that the state security forces and police cannot be trusted to be neutral and impartial. This creates a vicious cycle where all ethnic groups feel the need to preemptively protect themselves. And finally, the state was not a neutral actor in the economy.

It is worth remembering this structural contradiction when we diagnose the present moment. The politics of majoritarianism in Manipur was always more complicated. It was this history that had first given the BJP an opening, where the Congress was seen as an instrument of the Valley, so much so that the Kukis called for supporting the BJP. But the current dispensation, rather than seizing the opportunity to create a new politics, has made the same mistakes. Only this time, the consequences are even more tragic and irrevocable. The violence has given a lie to the BJP’s project in three senses. The first is that the BJP can build a capable law and order state. In this instance, that state has proven to be both deeply incompetent and partisan. The ease with which literally thousands of weapons have been looted would shame any half capable state. But more disturbingly, the pattern that the state is seen to be a partisan actor in the violence continues unabated. Second, it exposes the ideological dangers of the BJP’s project.

The BJP tried for a brief moment to run with the hare and hunt with the hound. It tried to capitalise on Kuki construal of Congress in Manipur as majoritarian at the same time as it politicised and promoted Meitei identity. Now that contradiction has burst open: A visible demonstration of the limits of Hindutva accommodation. Contingently convenient alliances will, in the end, be overrun by the ideological juggernaut. And third, it has shown that the BJP’s political instincts can be overrated: Its capacity to negotiate complicated social fissures in the North-east has been overestimated. What the BJP had touted as the moment of its greatest ideological triumph, winning in the North-east, is turning out to also expose the limitations of its politics.

It is not going to be easy for Manipur to recover from this violence. There are no credible public institutions that can hold perpetrators of violence to account, impartially. The nature of the violence is such that both the Kukis and Meiteis will be left with a deep sense of victimhood. But there is a deeper question: Is there any political force left in the state that can do the job of political mediation? In a situation where, singly, all parties are considered partisan, the only possibility would be an all-party mediation, one that tries to lift Manipur out of a fatal combination of zero-sum identity politics. But such imaginative gestures are now beyond our ruling establishment.

When I first read journalist Sudeep Chakravarti’s book, “The Eastern Gate”, one line stood out. He recounts a visit to Churachandpur, ground zero of the current violence, where he sees a sign by a church: “There is a way that seems right to a man, but it ends in death.” Alas, these words seem all too prophetic at the moment, when no one is prepared to break the mould of politics in Manipur. Nero will, of course, continue to fiddle, while Manipur burns.

Written by Pratap Bhanu Mehta 

Source: Indian Express, 9/06/23

What is Cheiraoba?

 Cheiraoba, also known as Sajibu Nongma Panba, is a significant festival celebrated by the Meetei community that follows Vaishnav Hinduism in Manipur. This festival is considered one of the most important festivals of the northeastern state and is celebrated with great pomp and joy.

When is Cheiraoba celebrated?

Cheiraoba is usually celebrated in the month of April and marks the beginning of the lunar new year for the Meiteis residing in Manipur and elsewhere. While the followers of Sanamahism, Meitei’s indigenous religion, celebrate it on the first day of the lunar new year, the followers of Vaishnav Hindus celebrate it on the 13th or 14th of April every year according to the solar Hindu calendar.

Celebrating Cheiraoba

On this day, Meiteis clean their houses and dress up in their traditional attires to mark the occasion. Traditional cuisines such as eromba, pakora, ooti, and many more are prepared and offered to the local deity in addition to flowers and incense sticks in front of the gates. The dishes are also exchanged with neighbors.

Visiting the Nearest Hillocks

After they consume the sumptuous meal, people visit the closest hillocks for merriment in the afternoon. According to traditional beliefs, climbing the hilltop to worship the deity on this new year of the Meiteis will usher in prosperity and help people achieve greater heights in life. This tradition has great significance as it aids in digestion after consuming a lot of food.

Thabal Chongba

At night, Thabal Chongba, the Manipuri folk dance, is organized by the locals across Manipur valley as a joyous event for ushering in the much-awaited Meitei new year. It is a lively dance, which involves rhythmic clapping, and the dance itself is performed in a circle.

Customs on Cheiraoba

On Cheiraoba, women visit their paternal homes with gifts for the family’s male members. This custom is an act of repaying the gifts received by them on the day of Ningol Chakouba, a festival celebrated for the strengthening of the bond between brothers and sisters.

How teachers are being silenced in Manipur

 

Censorship in academic publication and restrictions of free speech in Manipur is not only an affront to academic freedom, it is dangerous for democracy

On September 15, the government of Manipur issued an order that requires prior approval to publish books on the state. Listing certain topics that are under scrutiny, a committee will examine the manuscripts. The topics include works on the history, culture, tradition and geography of Manipur.  The order stated that “any publication of a book in violation” of the order “shall be liable to be punished under the relevant law”. The order came in the wake of a book that the government considers “may either distort facts or disturb the peaceful co-existence amongst the various communities in the State”.

The regulation is a direct offshoot of the recent controversy surrounding a book that argues that only 700 square miles of the valley of the state was merged with the Indian Union in the merger agreement and not even a single inch of the hill areas was covered under it. Another order on November 9 declares every copy of the book titled The Complexity Called Manipur: Roots, Perceptions & Reality authored by Sushil Kumar Sharma as “forfeited to the Government”.

However, there is a larger malaise that has long existed in the hills. In the last decade, several vigilante groups in the valley have been actively engaged in spewing venomous claims about indigenous minority groups as “refugees”. The state government is complicit in this by allowing these hate groups to continue their activities despite several objections raised by community-based organisations. The unending hate campaign has unsettled many in the hills and they finally found teeth in the contents of the book. It provided them with the counter-argument to strike back at the toxic hegemony and clamour that the hill areas are not parts of the territory of Manipur

Two years earlier, on August 10, 2020, the N Biren Singh government issued an office memorandum enforcing the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965, to all government college teachers and other staff working under the state higher education department. This order requires approval to “be taken before publishing or making statements regarding any government policy or programme in the media”, and failure to do so will invite disciplinary action. Before this order was issued, the relationship between the ruling coalition partners, BJP and NPP, soured, leading to a public spat between leaders. The political environment worsened when leaders began switching parties between the Congress and BJP before election for the lone Rajya Sabha member from the state. The manner in which the BJP won the floor test and evaded the anti-defection law became a matter of public concern and discussion. This was debated in local television channels where teachers from government colleges were often invited. It was this that triggered the N Biren Singh government to issue the aforementioned order.

A vibrant liberal democracy requires a corresponding civil society and a knowledge system free of government interference. Freedom to publish and participate in debates in the media is an essential part of the freedom of speech and expression. Any censorship on academic publication and restrictions of free speech is an affront to the Constitution. It implies that the dominant perspective acceptable to the government will prevail and alternative perspectives will be derided.

The enforcement of CCS rules on teachers, particularly those in higher educational institutions, is an impairment to their profession. Under the rules, a teacher may no longer have the freedom to train students in critical thinking and analysis. A political scientist can no longer freely discuss politics. An economist can be punished for discussing the economic policy of the government. The strictures on “publication or making statement” imply that the academic activities of writing opinions in newspapers and magazines, or participating in a discussion or debate in television shows, will involve bureaucratic scrutiny, hassle and red tape. Writing an editorial for a journal can become a violation of service rules. In short, teachers can be criminalised for the very activity that they are expected to perform.

The National Education Policy 2020 emphasises the development of cognitive skills such as critical thinking. For this, the quality of engagement of teachers is considered to be the most important factor. Therefore, “the criticality of faculty in achieving the goals of higher education” and “the criticality of research” is considered to be essential for the progress of the country.

In the last few years, not only were the CCS rules imposed on teachers, there were relentless attempts to stifle dissent in the state. Several academic and political activists were incarcerated for expressing their views against the policies and programmes of the state. A teacher of Manipuri was served a show cause notice by Manipur University on September 28 for criticising the state government’s “legalisation of liquor”. The imposition of CCS rules is also in contradiction to the UGC regulations on ‘Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education’ of 2018. The regulations clearly stated that teachers in universities and colleges should be able to “express free and frank opinion by participation at professional meetings, seminars, conferences etc, towards the contribution of knowledge”. They are required to “work to improve education in the community and strengthen the community’s moral and intellectual life” and “be aware of social problems and take part in such activities as would be conducive to the progress of society and hence the country as a whole”.

Academic disagreements need academic debate and engagement, not government censorship and intimidation. The clampdown on free speech and the imposition of regulation on publication is not only an impairment to academic freedom, it is inimical to democracy.

Written by Thongkholal Haokip

The writer is assistant professor, Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, JNU

Source: The Indian Express, 29/11/22

All Manipur Shumang Leela Festival 2021-2022

 Recently, the 50th All Manipur Shumang Leela Festival 2021-2022 began at Iboyama Shumang Leela Shanglen in Palace Compound, Imphal.

Key Points

• Shumang Leela is a traditional form of theatre in Manipur and the roles of female artists are all played by male actors and male characters are played by female artists in case of female theatre groups. The activities are done in the open air.

• During the festival, the Governor also distributed medals to the winners of the 49th All Manipur Shumang Leela Mahotsav 2020-21.

Background of Shumang Leela Festival

Originally Shumang Leela began as a comedy genre presented to kings and nobles, which evolved into the present form of courtyard drama. The Shumang Leela of those days tried to preserve and promote humanity, tolerance, self-confidence, devotion, truth and justice through its performances.

In the present day Shumang Leela is trying to focus on issues of moral values, unity and integrity. It is also striving to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood and friendship between different communities in the state.

Manipur’s Hill-Valley divide turns ugly; Centre must act

 The latest incident of strife between the Meiteis of the Valley and Kukis of the Hills show that the Centre should form a task force and initiate course correction to save the state from a serious ethnic conflict. Mulling the possibility of according ST status to the Meiteis could be a starter

Among all the insurgency-affected states in the North East, Manipur is probably the one that has always been the most disturbed. Accounting for 46 per cent of the violence that has been perpetrated in the region, the state has been caught in a cycle of ethnic strife and insurgent violence. Furthermore, the state’s economy has not developed in the manner that it should have. The most important reason for the lack of development in the state is the ‘Hill-Valley Divide’ that continues to fester in the province.

Resistance to counter-insurgency

Sporadic blockades that are regularly engineered by almost all the ethnic groups as well as the parallel economy that is being run by the insurgents have added to the malaise. Although the Centre has improved its annual outlay for the state, the economy has not shown signs of progress. It is reported that only about 20-24 per cent of the amount is used for development. Purportedly, the rest is siphoned away by disreputable forces and the militants. As a matter of fact, Manipur’s fortunes have principally been restrained to instituting military strategies against myriad insurgencies that have camps across the border in Myanmar. Manipur, therefore, regretfully remains resistant to all possible counter-insurgency interventions.

Hill vs Valley strife turns ugly

Civil strife has raised its malevolent head once again in Manipur. Yet another page out of the Hill-Valley Divide, the unrest this time around centres around a legislative bill that the Hill folk of the state were expecting the Manipur Assembly to table and pass. Indeed, if the Manipur (Hill Areas) Autonomous District Council Bill 2021 had been introduced and made into an Act, the Hills would have been heir to far more full-bodied financial and administrative autonomy and could have developed in a way that would have put them at par with the Valley. However, the Hill’s anger—primarily of the Kuki community—is that Imphal introduced instead the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council 6th and 7th Amendment bills which the Kukis feel cannot fulfil their aims and objectives.

It is against this backdrop that the All Tribal Students’ Union Manipur (ATSUM) had imposed an indefinite “economic blockade” along the national highways in the hill districts after “rejecting” the aforesaid bill that was introduced in the Manipur Assembly. The Meiteis of the Valley struck back by blockading the hill districts. The state administration, apprehensive of law-and-order situation, severed internet and mobile network connection across Manipur. Even as there was talk (when this article was being written) that a compromise is being sought to be reached by having released the arrested ATSUM leaders and taking a “relook” at the Manipur (Hill Areas) Autonomous District Council Bill 2021, the economic blockade, nonetheless, caused great misery to the common people of the state.

How geography sparked divide, conflicts

This author had visited Manipur in April this year and found that one of reasons for the Hill-Valley divide is geography and the fact that the Kukis are considered outlanders in Manipur. The community’s history—including the Anglo-Kuki war of 1917-1919—has been “rubbished” by other communities of Manipur. But what is more glaring is the manner in which the geographical setting of Manipur acts as the most important contributor to the great divide. With a total area of 22,347 square kilometres, Manipur divides itself into Hills and a Valley. The Valley accounts for only 2,238 square kilometres, a mere 10.02 per cent of the total area. But it houses 58.85 per cent of the total population of the state, which, according to the 2001 Census is 2,388,634. The state’s hill area with 20,089 square kilometres represents the rest 41.15 per cent.

Of the three main ethnic groups, the Meiteis, who primarily inhabit the Valley, constitute the largest section of the state and are a non-tribal group. The hills are the abode of the Nagas and the Kukis with their 29 sub-tribes. Muslims, who are mostly immigrants from pre-partition East Bengal, erstwhile East Pakistan and present Bangladesh, and who are known as Pangals, are mostly residents of the Valley. This grouping forms around eight per cent of the state’s population. The remaining non-tribal population, known as Mayang (outsiders), are from different parts of the country.

The manner in which the physical setting plays itself out to conflict can be seen from one instance. The Meiteis, the Vaishnavite Hindus, are not only debarred from special constitutional privileges granted to the Scheduled Tribes of Manipur, but are not even permitted under the state’s “Land Reform Act” to settle in the hill districts.  On the other hand, there are no restrictions on the Nagas and the Kukis, who are largely Christians, to settle in the Valley. This is one of the primary reasons for the distrust and hostility between the Meiteis and the hill tribes.

Furthermore, in the absence of a homogenous social architecture the different ethnic groups continue to maintain their respective distinct identity without a commonality of Manipuriness that could have formed the basis for harmonious existence. Indeed, this phenomenon is largely becoming a pan-North East problem, with every ethnic group in the region asserting their identity and seeking separate status.

If the setting as described above provides the framework for the Hill-Valley divide, which continues to be the core of the problem, history provides the rendition that furthers the divide.

Christianity’s role in shaping state’s demographics

Historically, Manipur was a principality until the British annexed it in 1891. However, the colonial rulers provided with it the privilege of a princely state under its dominion, as was the case with other territorial monarchies in the sub-continent. But, the imperial rulers, despite their “policy” of superficial non-interference utilised Christianity in its divisive game. The Christian missionaries, who followed the Union Jack and arrived in Manipur in 1894, gradually began to convert the animistic tribes into Christianity. This was achieved through a variety of allurement such as provision of basic medical aid and education.

In the 1901 Census, there were only 8 per cent Christians against 60 per cent Hindus. But by 1991, the number of Christians in Manipur had increased to 34.11 per cent. Indeed, if 12.81 percent of decadal growth (1991-2001, as projected in the 2001 census report) in the overall state population is taken into account, the Christian population of the state might have exceeded 36 per cent. As a result, the increasing Christianisation of the tribes widened the socio-cultural gap between the Hindu Meiteis of the Valley and the Christian tribes of the Hills. This, over time, became a permanent source of socio-political rivalry.

The scenario in Manipur is grim, to say the least. It is time New Delhi took stock of the situation and obtained particular note of the de-Indianisation process that is gripping the state. The latest incident of internecine strife between the Meiteis and the Kukis should act as a warning call for New Delhi. There has also been the long shadow of NSCN (IM) over the Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur. This has added to the apprehension among the Meiteis that passage of the Manipur (Hill Areas) Autonomous District Council Bill 2021 could be a precursor for the balkanisation of the state. Fissures in Manipur, therefore, are manifold, indeed ones which inimical foreign powers can take advantage of. With an ambivalent Myanmar abutting it and housing a plethora of insurgents, the setting could be ripe for a Chinese intrusion.

A careful study and course correction exercise have to be embarked upon immediately. A task force should be constituted to comprehensively examine the over-arching malaise of Manipur, including the possibility of accord of ST status to the Meiteis, the grant of which might assuage the community. In sum, it must be comprehended that Manipur is a “bejewelled land” land. This is despite the vagaries of geography and ethnic dissonance that fate has characterised its existence as a proud province of India. A course correction exercise must be put in place with immediate effect. The problem that characterises the ethnic divide must not be allowed to spiral. It is only then that the name “Manipur” would rightfully be taken as the “bejewelled land”.

Jaideep Saikia

Source: The Federal, 18/08/22

Who are the Tamils of Moreh in Manipur?

 

The community is represented by a body called the Tamil Sangam, and it dominates a grid of lanes and timber, cement houses in the heart of Moreh.

Two Tamil residents of the town of Moreh in Manipur on the India-Myanmar border were found dead in Myanmar’s Tamu on Tuesday (July 5). The men, P Mohan (27), and M Iyarnar (28), had crossed over into Tamu that morning. They were found with bullet wounds to the neck, and are believed to have been shot dead by a militia aligned with Myanmar’s ruling military junta.

How did Tamils reach this area on India’s border with Myanmar?

At the height of its reputation as one of the most important trading center’s in Asia, the Burmese city of Rangoon (now Yangon), attracted crowds of traders and workforce from across the continent. The British East India Company took with them labourers and businessmen – Tamilians, Bengalis, Telegus, Oriyas and Punjabis, to this affluent port city, edged strategically between India and China. The British later withdrew, but the Indians remained. They set up businesses and became drivers of the Burmese economy.

The Burmese Military Junta took over in the 1960s. Subsequently, two decisions by the then Burmese government, drastically changed things for the Indian diaspora in the country. The Enterprise Nationalization Law, passed by the Revolutionary Council in 1963, nationalized all major industries, including import-export trade, rice, banking, mining, teak and rubber and the Indian government was asked to withdraw its diaspora from their lands.

In 1965, the then Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri sent the first batch of ships to Rangoon – from Kolkata, Chennai, Vishakapatnam and Kochi. A reluctant Indian diaspora, with a considerable Tamilian population, headed to a land they no longer considered home.

The docks were heaving with Indians of all ages – the elderly who had made Burma their home, their families, young workers with their wives and children were clamouring to get on to the Indian ships. EverIn the beginning, the Burmese government allowed the Indian repatriates to carry whatever they had back to India. But soon after realising that much wealth was leaving the country, they imposed a cap of Rs 15 and one umbrella, a settler forced to leave at that time had told The Indian Express.

When did the first Tamilian settlers arrive in Moreh?

The families came in through the sea route, and some also trickled into India through the unfenced border. Those on ships were taken to their home states. The Tamilians were taken to Chennai and housed in refugee camps there and few others across the state.

But this new life remained unpalatable to many who then decided to head back to Myanmar – on foot and on boats, a journey which took several months.

Those who travelled by land, walked through Moreh – a route made familiar by Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose’s INA. But most were captured by the junta and sent back to India.

The Indian diaspora became the first settlers of Moreh, along with a handful of Kuki and Meitei families that had lived there since the 1940s. The Tamilians, however, outstripped every other community, with a population of 20,000 in the mid-60s.

How have Tamils of Moreh fared over the years?

Over the years, the Tamil community became one of the most influential communities in this border town, 110 km from the capital city of Imphal. The community is represented by a body called the Tamil Sangam, and it dominates a grid of lanes and timber, cement houses in the heart of Moreh. Little eateries serving up hot dosas, sambar vada and idli line these lanes.

The Sangam puts the number of Tamil families in Moreh at 300 now, with a population of 3,000.

The brightly hued Sri Angalaparameshwari temple in Moreh – the second largest temple complex in the North East after Guahati’s Balaji temple, was built by craftsmen and specialist labour flown from Chennai. There is a Tamil Youth Club which organises cultural events every month and girls are trained in Bharatnatyam. Timithi, or the fire walking festival, is held every year between March-April.

The Indian repatriates, particularly the Tamils, are believed to have given impetus to the informal, and sometimes illegal trade, between India and Myanmar.

However, the non-Manipuri population of Moreh has dwindled over the years. The first exodus took place in the 1990s due to a violent conflict between the Naga and Kuki insurgent groups, who wanted to control the thriving trading town.

The community of “outsiders’’ – Tamils, Bengalis, Punjabis, Odiyas, Andhraites, Marwaris – were, for years, collectively called Tamilians by the local population because of dominance of Tamilians in the group and due to locals finding it difficult to differentiate between communities.

How is the Tamil community seeing the present incident?

The Moreh Chamber of Commerce controls the trade here and is headed by the president of the Tamil Sangam. To ensure a smooth running of trade, the Moreh Chamber of Commerce maintains good relations with the military junta. In fact, no Myanmar regime has ever bothered the Tamil community.

This is why the recent incident has taken the Tamil community by surprise. For decades, the informal trade between India and Myanmar was carried out through the barter system, with products even from Japan and China making its way to India through this route.

In 1995, the Indian government directed a switch to the credit system. But over the years, with Chinese goods dominating Myanmar’s markets, trade in any form — formal or otherwise — has declined. This too has prompted more traders and their families to leave Moreh altogether.

The impetus given by the Indian government for formal trade with Myanmar has not been enough. While China has permitted 1,500 items for trade with Myanmar, India only allows 40.y ship carried around 1,800-2,000 refugees.

Written by Esha Roy

Source: Indian Express, 10/07/22

Democratic space is slowly growing in Manipur

 Lamka, Churachandpur today is predominantly a town inhabited by the indigenous Zo kindred tribes. It is multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and has a cosmopolitan worldview. Inter-ethnic clashes on June 27, 1997, had led to the breakdown of trust among communities and encouraged patronisation of ethnic affiliations. These tensions can be traced to the time of the merger of the princely state of Manipur with the Indian Union or even before to the colonial era. The Khul Union, formed in 1947, which comprises all the hill people in Manipur except the Nagas, to protect their interests and political future, was disrupted due to the assertion of linguistic dominance by the numerically larger ethnic groups. More recently, the anti-tribal bill movement in Manipur in August, 2015 widened the ethnic divide and disrupted communal harmony, especially in Churachandpur. The anti-tribal bill passed by the Manipur legislative assembly was opposed by the hill people of Manipur and a Joint Action Committee against the Anti-Tribal Bills (JACAATB) was formed to articulate the opposition. The subsequent protests led to attacks on the houses of MLAs from the hill areas and nine persons, including a 10-year-old boy, were killed in police firing. However, the ethnic divide came into play and the outcome was the withdrawal of some tribes from the JACAATB.

The ethnic and political divides impact everyday life, sometimes in a subtle manner and at other times in an explicit fashion. It triggers conflict and fuels violence. During elections, ethnic, institutional, money, gun, and muscle power become prevalent. In a region that has historically emphasised ethnicity, elections are not seen as an opportunity for electing lawmakers but imagined as a form of ethnic and geopolitical dominance and assertion. One’s candidature in an election is perceived as a representation of one’s community socio-culturally and politically. The outcome is that only a minuscule amount of space is provided to minority tribes like the Simtes, Gangte, Vaipheis, Mizos, Zous, and others to articulate their rights in a democratic manner.

Thangkhangin Ngaihte, the president of Lok Janshakti Party in Manipur and a member of the Simte community, has lost eight elections to the assembly and Parliament. He says, “Ethnic organisations govern our land, and our votes are cast on ethnic grounds. For a minority tribe like the Simtes, come a thousand years, the chances of getting their representative elected are still futile. Considering ethnicity as the ground for vote casting, a qualified candidate’s chances to get elected are nullified.”

This convoluted state of ethnic politics is further complicated by money, guns, and muscle power. It was alleged that Rs 16 crore was paid to Manipur militant groups ahead of elections to influence voters in the assembly election held in February. Congress leader Jairam Ramesh alleged that elections in Churachandpur and Kangpokpi districts in the first phase on February 28 were undemocratic because payments had been made. Demands were made for a repoll in 30 polling stations across Churachandpur and Kangpokpi districts.

The entry of James Khuma Hauzel, an independent candidate in 58 AC Churachandpur, into the electoral fray became interesting because he refused to follow the dominant pattern of political discourse. He sought to break the symbolic, social, and cultural norms ascribed to political elites during his campaign. He attacked corruption, gun power, kinship, and institutional politics from a position that combined the Zo worldview and Christian ethics and morality. On the day of the election, Khuma and his wife, Ing Borang, visited several polling stations, exposing the redundancy of the security provided to the candidates.

Churachandpur 58 AC recorded the lowest voter turnout in the state with 71.53 per cent. However, this is still the highest voter turnout for the district after several decades of public disinterest in politics. The turnouts in 2012 and 2017 were 64.13 per cent and 62.56 per cent respectively. Khuma secured only 2,244 votes while the leading candidate, LM Khaute of JD(U), secured 18,321 votes. However, Khuma’s campaign against corruption, money and muscle power, kinship, and institutional politics had a resonance among young people, who desperately yearn for a change in the political discourse. This is how a supporter put it: “Khuma paved the way for new ways of seeing politics.

Winning or losing doesn’t matter.” On March 26, 2022, a month after the Manipur assembly election, the town held a “Pakhuma Night” at Lamka public ground with a large young crowd in attendance to take forward the issues Khuma highlighted in the campaign. Addressing the crowd, Mang Taithul, a journalist from the Zou community who hosted the event, said: “Tonight, a Gangte artist sings, a Zou hosts the event. If only all the tribes in our town came together like this, why wouldn’t Lamka be a convivial place?… There is no reason for Thadou, Paite, or Zou (tribes) to segregate… The Church, tribe and ethnicity have failed to bring Lamka together. Only Pakhum and music can bring us together…”

Although Khuma lost, the election has become a catalyst to unite people of different political persuasions in Churachandpur, a region that has been riven by divisive ethnic politics. Hopefully, these non-ethnic mobilisations driven by the belief in the power of democracy to transform the society and end corruption in public life will not dissipate.

Written by Suanmuanlian Tonsing , Sangmuan Hangsing

Tonsing is a doctoral candidate at the School of Information, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor and Hangsing an independent researcher

Source: Indian Express, 23/04/22