Time to bid goodbye to AFSPA

 

It’s only prudent to repeal this Act now. Study its record to strengthen the foundation of Indian democracy

As far back as 1776, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations reflected on the harmful effects of laws that “often continue in force long after the end of the circumstances that first gave rise to them and once made them reasonable”. In that passage, however, Smith didn’t consider laws that were not reasonable even in the circumstances in which they were made.

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is one such law. Since the full force of this onerous law comes into play only in “disturbed areas”, one must welcome the government’s announcement to reduce the number of such areas. But not to consider the repeal of this anachronistic law, which is now almost as old as the Republic, is a missed opportunity to reflect on why this law has or has not been successful, and to learn from this history and strengthen the foundation of our democracy.

AFSPA allows civilian authorities to call on the armed forces to come to the assistance of civil powers. Once a state — or a part of a state — is declared “disturbed” under this law, the armed forces can make preventive arrests, search premises without warrants, and even shoot and kill civilians. Legal action against those abusing these powers requires the prior approval of the central government — a feature that functions as de facto immunity from prosecution.

A disturbed area proclamation under AFSPA has uncanny similarities with emergencies or states of exception — including martial law and states of siege. Critics charge that it effectively suspends fundamental freedoms and creates a de facto emergency regime.

AFSPA was adopted in 1958 during the early days of the Naga uprising to apply to what was then the state of Assam and the union territory of Manipur. It is hard to believe that to contend with a small group of armed rebels in a remote infrastructure-poor region it was found necessary to have a law modelled on a colonial ordinance devised to tackle the Quit India Movement — the most serious challenge faced by British colonial rule since the rebellion of 1857, as the then Viceroy of India saw it. ThaThe counterinsurgency campaigns against the Nagas were counterproductive. The suffering brought by the forced displacements during village regrouping, for example, only broadened the support for the rebels. Senior government officials who knew the region well soon regretted the way such decisions were made. “It may well be asked how such a ghastly tragedy could have been enacted at all with civilised and intelligent human beings at the helm of the administration,” wrote Nari Rustomji of the Indian Civil Service, who held positions such as the chief secretary of Assam and adviser on tribal areas to the governor. During the Mizo uprising of the 1960s and 1970s what is now the state of Mizoram went through a similar devastating ordeal.

In the following decades, as new states were formed in Northeast India, AFSPA was amended to accommodate the names of those states.

Seven of the region’s eight states have been at the receiving end of AFSPA at one time or another.

Over the past six decades, AFSPA’s use has extended well beyond the actual conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Multiple state and non-state armed actors have operated under its shadow. For instance, in Assam in the 1990s, death squads — or “secret killers” as they were called — carried out a wave of extrajudicial killings. These could not have occurred without the cover provided by AFSPA’s disturbed area designation.

In 2012, the Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association of Manipur petitioned the Supreme Court to investigate as many as 1,528 cases of fake encounters that allegedly occurred in the state between 1979 and 2012. The Supreme Court appointed a three-member commission to inquire into the first six of the 1,528 cases in the petition so that it could be “fully satisfied about the truth of the allegations”. None of the small sample of six cases was found to be an actual “encounter”. Drawing on these findings, the Supreme Court bench decided that the allegations could not “be summarily rubbished”. Its interim judgment of July 2016 said that “there is some truth in the allegations, calling for a deeper probe”.

In the court’s view, AFSPA clearly provided the context for these killings. The practice of deploying the armed forces to assist civil power, the ruling stressed, is premised on the assumption that “normalcy would be restored within a reasonable period”. If the civil administration and the armed forces fail to achieve this, that “cannot be a fig leaf for prolonged, permanent or indefinite deployment of the armed forces”. That would be a mockery of “our democratic process” and “a travesty” of the constitutional distribution of powers between the Centre and the states, which provides the legal foundation for the practice.t such a law remains in force till this day does not speak well of our experiment with democracy.

This is not the only time the apex court has been critical of AFSPA. It is often forgotten that when it pronounced AFSPA constitutional in 1997, it also recommended some changes. Among them was the stipulation that a “disturbed area” designation be subjected to review every six months. In some parts of Northeast India, AFSPA is now routinely extended every six months. But there is little evidence that any meaningful review occurs at those times. A statement made by an Assam official in August 2018 when AFSPA was extended in the state for six months is illustrative. “The situation is peaceful,” said the state’s police chief casually, “but we will not take a decision on withdrawing AFSPA till the NRC exercise is over.”

Edmund Burke, a contemporary of Adam Smith, wrote of the circumstances in which the repeal of a law becomes necessary and appropriate. Since “laws, like houses, lean on one another”, he said, repealing a law can be difficult. But when a law’s “transgressions against common right and the ends of just government” are considerable, it is only prudent to abrogate and repeal that law. This is true of AFSPA.

Written by Sanjib Baruah

The writer is professor of Political Studies at Bard College, New York.

Source: Indian Express, 4/04/21

Assam-Meghalaya border: the dispute, and what’s been settled

 

The chief ministers of Assam and Meghalaya have signed a pact to resolve part of their five-decade-old boundary dispute. What is the root of the conflict? What is the current pact? Who gets what?

On Tuesday (March 29), the chief ministers of Assam and Meghalaya signed a pact in the presence of Union Home Minister Amit Shah to resolve part of their five-decade-old boundary dispute. Over the years, the 884-km border between the two states has witnessed frequent flare-ups.

What is the root of the conflict?

During British rule, undivided Assam included present-day Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Mizoram. Meghalaya was carved out in 1972, its boundaries demarcated as per the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act of 1969, but has held a different interpretation of the border since.

In 2011, the Meghalaya government had identified 12 areas of difference with Assam, spread over approximately 2,700 sq km.

Some of these disputes stem from recommendations made by a 1951 committee headed by then Assam chief minister Gopinath Bordoloi. For example, a 2008 research paper from the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses refers to the Bordoloi Committee’s recommendation that Blocks I and II of Jaintia Hills (Meghalaya) be transferred to the Mikir Hill (Karbi Anglong) district of Assam,, besides some areas from Meghalaya’s Garo Hills to Goalpara district of Assam. The 1969 Act is based on these recommendations, which Meghalaya rejects, claiming that these areas originally belong to the Khasi–Jaintia Hills. On the other hand, Assam says Meghalaya does not have the requisite documents to prove these areas historically belonged to Meghalaya.

A number of attempts had been made in the past to resolve the boundary dispute. In 1985, under then Assam chief minister Hiteswar Saikia and Meghalaya chief minister Captain W A Sangma, an official committee to resolve the issue was constituted under the former Chief Justice of India Y V Chandrachud. However, a solution was not found.

Key turn but twists ahead

Meghalaya was carved out of Assam in 1972, and has held a different interpretation of the border since. The resolution at six of the 12 areas under dispute is significant, but the remaining points of friction are more complex and may prove to be a bigger challenge.

What is the current pact?

Since July last year, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma and his Meghalaya counterpart Conrad Sangma have been in talks to solve the long-standing dispute.

Both state governments identified six out of 12 disputed areas for resolution in the first phase: 3 areas contested between West Khasi Hills district in Meghalaya and Kamrup in Assam, 2 between RiBhoi in Meghalaya and Kamrup-Metro, and 1 between East Jaintia Hills in Meghalaya and Cachar in Assam.

After a series of meetings and visits by teams to the disputed areas, both sides submitted reports based on five mutually agreed principles: historical perspective, ethnicity of local population, contiguity with boundary, peoples’ will and administrative convenience.

A final set of recommendations were made jointly: out of 36.79 sq km of disputed area taken up for settlement in the first phase, Assam would get full control of 18.46 sq km and Meghalaya of 18.33 sq km. The MoU signed on Tuesday was based on these recommendations.

So, who gets what?

From the 2011 claims made by Meghalaya government, an area of roughly 36.79 sq km was taken up for resolution in the first phase.

According to presentations by both states, the area has been roughly divided into equal parts, and a total of 30 sq km is being recommended to be within Meghalaya.

What are the next steps?

The next step will involve delineation and demarcation of the boundary by Survey of India in the presence of representatives of both governments. It will then be put up in Parliament for approval. The process may take a few months.

Officials said six areas taken for study did not have large differences and were easier to resolve, and were hence taken up in the first phase. “The remaining six areas are more complex and may take longer to resolve,” said an Assam government official.

Is there any opposition?

Former Meghalaya CM Mukul Sangma, who is now part of the Trinamool Congress that is the principal opposition party in Meghalaya, criticised the government’s approach. “This is a piecemeal resolution. They have taken up only 36 sq km for resolution. The larger, more complex areas (such as Langpih, Block I and II) are yet to be resolved and it will not be so easy,” he said. “The reality on ground zero is different – as far as I know, many people have not accepted the settlement and the agreement is almost like an imposition,” he said.

In Assam, too, Opposition leaders criticised the state government for rushing through the issues, and not consulting stakeholders. In January, Leader of Opposition Debabrata Saikia of the Congress had alleged that CM Sarma had gone ahead and submitted a proposal to the Union Home Minister “without even a discussion in the State Assembly.” “This is irresponsible and unconstitutional,” said Saikia, asking that the recommendations be rescinded and demanding a special session in the Assembly.

Written by Tora Agarwala ,

Source: Indian Exprss, 1/04/22

First steps to solve Assam-Meghalaya border dispute are welcome. The bigger contestations remain

 The Assam and Meghalaya governments have made an impressive beginning towards resolving a border dispute that has festered for 50 years now. The chief ministers of the two states have signed an agreement to settle six of the 12 contested spots on the 884-km border they share. True, the six other points of contestation are expected to involve longer and more complex negotiations. But that only highlights the pragmatism in not letting the perfect become the enemy of the good. The pact is a result of sustained talks and follow-up action between the two governments since last year, with the prodding of the Centre. It also suggests that both Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma and Meghalaya CM Conrad Sangma, whose NPP is also an NDA partner in the state, have staked political capital in disentangling this knot. That’s a striking — and refreshing — contrast from the situation in last July, when violence on the Assam-Mizoram border led to the death of six police personnel and descended into unseemly grandstanding by two CMs, both unwilling to yield an inch.

The many border disputes in the region are a function of history. While colonial Assam was a large lumbering landmass, administered to serve British revenue interests, several states were carved out from it after independence — as smaller tribes and local communities remained apprehensive about their interests going unrepresented in a vast political unit. Indeed, the map-making of the colonial-era ended up drawing random, arbitrary lines, leading to fault lines between communities that have only widened over time. Unfortunately, they also left a mark on the political boundaries that were drawn post-1947. As a result, nearly every state in the region has a disputed border with Assam. Land is a fraught issue in the Northeast, and often pits state against state in bitter disputes — the demand for a Greater Nagalim, for instance. Smaller states, especially, have remained anxious about not ceding territory. The contentions over the demarcation of Assam’s border with Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram are more numerous and more intractable. While Assam has initiated conversations with them, they remain at a very preliminary stage.

The gains made in Assam-Meghalaya, therefore, are significant. They offer a roadmap to the other states, have the potential of bringing down the temperature, and denting the Northeast’s image of a region of innumerable conflicts. That can only work to the region’s advantage in inviting investment and pushing for an infrastructure boost. For both Sarma and Sangma, however, the test will be to sell the agreement to their respective domestic constituencies, and ensure that the residents on the border villages are not alienated in the process. While this is a good beginning, neither the Centre nor the leaders of the region must underestimate the task that lies ahead.

Source: Indian Express, 31/03/22

At the root of Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border dispute, a committee report from 1951

 

Arunachal Pradesh, which was earlier a part of Assam, shares a boundary of 804.1 km with the state—with frequent flare-ups reported along the border since the 1990s.

Last month, just days after Assam chief minister Himanta Biswa Sarma met with his Arunachal Pradesh counterpart, Pema Khandu, to discuss a “permanent solution” over the decades-old boundary dispute between the two states, fresh tensions were reported along their border. While the flashpoint this time was the ongoing construction of the Likabali-Durpai road being built under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), the boundary dispute between Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, like other states in the region, dates back to colonial times.

Bone of contention: 1951

Arunachal Pradesh, which was earlier a part of Assam, shares a boundary of 804.1 km with the state—with frequent flare-ups reported along the border since the 1990s.

The dispute dates back to colonial times, when the British in 1873 announced the “inner line” regulation, demarcating an imaginary boundary between plains and the frontier hills, which were later designated as the North East Frontier Tracts in 1915. The latter corresponds to the area that makes up present-day Arunachal Pradesh.

After Independence, the Assam government assumed administrative jurisdiction over the North East Frontier Tracts, which later became the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 1954, and finally, the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh in 1972. It gained statehood in 1987.

However, before it was carved out of Assam, a sub-committee headed by then Assam chief minister Gopinath Bordoloi made some recommendations in relation to the administration of NEFA (under Assam) and submitted a report in 1951. Based on the Bordoloi committee report, around 3,648 sq km of the “plain” area of Balipara and Sadiya foothills was transferred from Arunachal (then NEFA) to Assam’s then Darrang and Lakhimpur districts.

“This remains the bone of contention between the two states as Arunachal Pradesh refuses to accept this notification as the basis of demarcation,” said a senior government official from Assam, closely involved in inter-state border-related matters.

Arunachal Pradesh has long held that the transfer was done without the consultation of its people. “It was arbitrary, defective, and no tribal leader from Arunachal Pradesh was consulted before the land was transferred. They just decided to draw a line between the hills and plains,” said Tabom Dai, General Secretary, All Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union (AAPSU). According to him, Arunachal had customary rights over these lands, considering the tribes living there would pay taxes to Ahom rulers. Assam, on the other hand, feels that this demarcation as per 1951 notification is constitutional and legal.

Efforts at demarcation

The border issues came to the fore after Arunachal Pradesh became a UT in 1972. Between 1971 and 1974, there were multiple efforts to demarcate the boundary but it did not work out. In April 1979, a high-powered tripartite committee was constituted to delineate the boundary on the basis of Survey of India maps, as well as discussions with both sides.

By 1983-84, out of the 800 km, 489 km, mostly in the north bank of the Brahmaputra, were demarcated. However, further demarcation could not commence because Arunachal Pradesh did not accept the recommendations, and claimed several kilometres out of the 3,648 sq km that was transferred as per the 1951 notification.

Assam objected and filed a case in the Supreme Court in 1989, highlighting an “encroachment” made by Arunachal Pradesh, while seeking demarcation of the boundary between the states.

To resolve the dispute between the two states, the apex court-appointed a local boundary commission in 2006, headed by a retired SC judge. In September 2014, the local commission submitted its report. Several recommendations were made (some of which suggested Arunachal Pradesh get back some of the territory which was transferred in 1951), and it was suggested that both states should arrive at a consensus through discussions. However, nothing came of it.

Flashpoints

According to a 2008 research paper from the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, clashes were first reported in 1992 when the Arunachal state government alleged that people from Assam were “building houses, markets and even police stations on its territory”. Since then intermittent clashes have been taking place, making the border tense. Another paper by the same institute in 2020 said that Assam had raised the issue of Arunachal Pradesh encroaching on its forest land, and had periodically launched eviction drives, leading to tensions on the ground. One was in 2005 in Bhalukpong in Arunachal Pradesh’s West Kameng district and the other in 2014 in the Behali Reserve Forest area, in the foothills between Assam’s Sonitpur and Arunachal’s Papumpare districts. Ten people died in the Behali incident.

The recent flashpoint is the ongoing Likabali-Durpai PMGSY road project in Arunachal Pradesh’s Lower Siang district—Assam claims that some parts of the road, under construction since 2019, falls under its Dhemaji district.

The road, about 65 km to 70 km, is meant to connect at least 24 villages between Arunachal Pradesh’s Durpai and Likabali and has been granted after years of petitioning by local residents. Likabali is one of the oldest towns in the foothills and has long been a site of dispute.

Last week, a culvert under construction close to Hime, one of the villages through which the road runs, was burnt by “unidentified miscreants from the Assam side”, authorities said. Following that, there were unconfirmed reports of “firing in the air” by local residents from the Arunachal Pradesh side on Wednesday night. This was preceded by a team from Assam Police stopping the construction in Hime, claiming that the road was touching disputed territory.

Authorities from both sides say this was not the first instance of trouble along the road and that it keeps happening occasionally ever since construction started two years ago. However, they claim administrations of both districts were in touch with each other.

The road ahead

In the last few months, Assam chief minister Sarma has been taking a proactive role in resolving the border disputes not just with Arunachal Pradesh, but with the neighbouring states it has issues with. While Assam and Meghalaya have made some progress, with both governments submitting recommendations to the Centre last month, Sarma has been consistently meeting chief ministers of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh as well. However, a concrete plan of action has not been chalked out yet. Just last week, Sarma met Khandu in Guwahati and both described the meeting as “positive”, saying they were ready to conduct a ground-level survey on boundary status.

Source: Indian Express, 1/02/22

What the 1971 refugees have to do with Indian politics today

 

Sanjib Baruah writes: Even if half a century later, the civil war that split Pakistan has had a decisive impact on the ideological battle over India’s national identity.

The civil war in East Pakistan in 1971 — that saw a huge influx of refugees to India — and which led to the break-up of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh, is remembered in India mostly for its impact on the subcontinent’s geopolitical landscape. The consequences of the presence of those refugees on our domestic political order do not receive much attention.

The standard story is that most refugees returned home soon after the liberation of Bangladesh. This is partly responsible for the unfounded myth that India’s domestic political order was insulated from the refugee influx. This is, of course, not how the refugee influx is remembered in Assam and other Northeastern states.

There are good reasons to doubt the narrative of near complete repatriation. Indeed, the Indian government has itself cast serious doubts on this narrative on various occasions. The fact that the political effects of the refugee influx have been most pronounced in a region long relegated to the periphery of Indian policy is surely another reason why this myth has persisted.

The fact that the Assam Movement (1979-1985) broke out in the same decade as the Bangladesh liberation war is not an accident. Those six years of political turmoil saw the collapse of four elected ministries, the outbreak of an armed insurgency, and three spells of president’s rule. The violent elections of 1983, including the horrendous Nellie massacre, are also part of this history. The troubles that began with the refugee influx eventually led to the coming of the hard state to Assam in 1990 when the whole of Assam was declared a “disturbed area” under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

The AFSPA regime has remained in force in Assam partly because the legacies of the Assam Movement remain live, unresolved issues in the state’s politics. If these are considered among the effects of the Bangladesh liberation war, the geopolitical benefits that accrued to India need to be balanced against these significant domestic political costs, even though they are concentrated in a single “peripheral” region.

There would have been no Assam Movement had there been no Bangladesh liberation war. The sheer size of the refugee population gave new life to old fears that migrants from eastern Bengal risk turning Assam’s khilonjia or autochthonous peoples into minorities in their own lands. It is not just the presence of refugees or their numbers that produced this anxiety. The phenomenon that sociologist Kamal Sadiq calls “suffraged non-citizens” gave political force to those fears. Since the exercise of franchise in India relies on rudimentary documents that can easily be obtained through informal means, the distinction between citizens and non-citizens becomes blurred. The perception that the number of voters had risen abnormally in the aftermath of the refugee influx became the trigger for the Assam Movement.

Had all refugees gone back to their homes, the foreign nationals’ issue would not have rankled Assam and the country for all these years. Indeed, it has been the conventional wisdom in Assam that the Assam Movement failed in its primary objective. This made the Assam Accord, which ended the Assam Movement, a hallowed document in the state’s political discourse. When the BJP began to move on the citizenship amendment bill, the resistance to it in Assam focused entirely on the fact that it grossly violates the Assam Accord.

A barely hidden secret about the refugee influx was that a majority of those who fled East Pakistan to India were Hindus. This was only to be expected since the Yahya Khan regime viewed the liberation movement as an Indian conspiracy and its repressive backlash fell upon most of the region’s Hindu households. Of the estimated 9.7 million refugees who migrated to India in 1971, 70 per cent were Hindus. The West Pakistani generals had calculated that by forcing millions of East Pakistani Hindus to flee to India they would weaken Bengali nationalism as a political force. Their aim, as the sociologist, late Partha Nath Mukherji, observed at the time, was “to uproot the Hindus, not to eliminate them, and in this they seem to have succeeded admirably”.

Ironically, while Indian officials liked to describe the Pakistani military’s massacre of East Pakistanis as genocide, “the best case for branding these atrocities as genocide”, as Gary Bass of Princeton University puts it, “was one that India did not dare make”. They feared that “publicising anti-Hindu genocide could have splintered Indians on communal lines . . . possibly setting off riots”. The architects of the Assam Movement, of course, saw the influx for what it was: That there were both Hindus and Muslims among the refugees, but that a clear majority were Hindus.

The Yahya Khan regime’s strategy of demographic engineering met its match in prime minister Indira Gandhi. She was determined to send the refugees back. Indeed, stopping the refugee influx and ensuring the safe return of the millions already in India were the key goals of India’s military intervention.

Whatever the official rationale for the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 2019, it marks a decisive break from the Indian policy of refusing to yield to the demographic engineering strategy of the West Pakistani generals who ran the war in East Pakistan. The CAA effectively accommodates the Hindu refugees of 1971, that is the majority of the refugees (and also people of other minority faiths, which was added for euphemistic reasons). But it excludes refugees that are Muslim. Rather remarkably, top BJP leaders continue to claim that they are working to implement the Assam Accord. But obviously they can do this only by shifting attention to the accord’s secondary clauses that are unrelated to the foreign nationals’ question.

The CAA is built on a fundamentally different set of assumptions about the idea of India than the one that informed Indian policy in 1971. With its adoption, it could be said that the civil war that split Pakistan has come to have a decisive impact on the ideological battle over India’s national identity, even if half a century later.

Baruah is Professor of Political Studies at Bard College, New York.

Source: Indian Express, 15/12/21

Nagaland’s people deserve neither AFSPA nor gun culture

 

Patricia Mukhim writes: The Northeast is not only less understood by distant Delhi but also considered ‘alien’ to the nation.

The sight of a dozen or more coffins being laid in a row while young, helpless widows and elderly grief-stricken parents come to terms with their loss is an image that is both outrageous and painful. The dead were ordinary citizens going home to their village in Nagaland after work. In one shattering moment, their lives were extinguished; just like that. For the Army’s special unit, it was an intelligence error to which they overreacted. What’s the source of that information? Surely, the government cannot hide behind the smokescreen of “classified information”. There have been too many killings based on such wrong intelligence in Nagaland, Manipur and Assam.

With every such encounter in which the innocent are mowed down, the clamour for revocation of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) grows strident — but is rarely sustained. Some years ago, all the northeastern states had come together to demand the annulment of this Act. That remained in the realm of yet another “demand”.

How can a country adopt a colonial Act meant to counter the Quit India Movement of 1942 to fight its own people? How can independent India impose an Act that gives legal protection to the armed forces to shoot down anyone on “suspicion” of being a terrorist/extremist/insurgent? In 1997, after Nagaland’s most enduring insurgent outfit, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), led by Isak Swu and T H Muivah, first decided to talk peace with the Indian government, the Naga Peoples’ Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) had approached the Supreme Court for revocation of the Act. But the apex court had then upheld its constitutionality, and said it was an enabling legislation that confers minimum powers on the army to operate in situations of widespread internal disorder. Public memory is short and it’s important to jog that. Irom Sharmila of Manipur had undertaken a 16-year fast against the law, with the state insisting on keeping her alive through regular medical intervention. Sharmila gave up her lonely battle in 2017 when she decided to contest the Manipur Assembly elections. Why did it take over 60 years for AFSPA to become an election issue? It was only in 2016, after many PILs were filed in the Supreme Court, that the court sought details of the 1,528 cases of alleged extra-judicial killings between May 1979 and May 2012 by the Manipur Police and the armed forces. The CBI was asked to go into a few of those cases. But in its report filed in March this year, it said it had no conclusive evidence and, therefore, closed the cases.

The unasked questions remain: Why are the northeastern states of India and Jammu and Kashmir singled out for imposition of AFSPA? Aren’t there internal rebellions in the rest of India too, such as “left-wing extremism?” Why are those areas not termed “disturbed areas” followed by the invocation of AFSPA? The reality is that the Northeast is not only less understood by distant Delhi but is also still considered “alien” to the nation because of racial and cultural dissimilarities. Nation-building in the region is work in progress; insurgency is the result of a colonial power — the British — being replaced by a power that people in Nagaland see as akin to its predecessor.

Many are wondering if the peace talks between the NSCN (IM) and the government of India now lie in tatters. Unfortunately, the media has focussed exclusively on the NSCN (IM) and ignored the other Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs), who have been brought on board because they are Nagaland-based and speak exclusively for Nagaland. The NSCN(IM) is led by a Tangkhul Naga from Manipur and the majority of its cadres are also Nagas from Manipur. The NNPGs and the Gaon Bura Association of Nagaland doubt NSCN(IM)’s ability to bring lasting peace in Nagaland. They know that the NSCN(IM) is not an organisation with whom dialogue is possible or which is in the habit of examining its conscience and regretting its actions. It exists to recruit resentment and to direct that resentment against the usual target — Delhi or India.

It is important to take stock of the situation on the ground as it has existed since 2015. NSCN(IM) cadres, although living in a designated camp at Mount Hebron near Dimapur, move around freely with arms and extort with impunity. In the past, they have mercilessly gunned down rival factions but there has been no reaction because the people of Nagaland are a traumatised lot. Having faced the wrath of state and non-state powers, they had lost their voice, until a few years ago when people started expressing their anger against such killings and extortion over social media.

Since 2015, the Nagaland Gaon Bura Association, the apex body of Nagas which includes all the 16 recognised tribes and the NNPGs barring the NSCN (IM), have sent several memorandums addressed to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah, asking that whatever terms are agreed upon with the NSCN (IM) should be concluded and the remaining issues be resolved through peaceful means. Why has the Centre ignored these petitions?

These representatives of the Naga people do not demand a separate flag or constitution because they understand these are tenuous demands. It is a settled issue that there will be no territorial rearrangement and the Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam will not be reorganised for that would unleash a Frankenstein’s monster. These groups have also never raised the sovereignty issue. The working committee of the seven NNPGs, roped in to join the peace talks, are also opposed to the idea of changing interlocutors as and when the NSCN (IM) decides.

Today, the people of Nagaland are being held hostage by governments both at the state and the Centre. People question why the Centre is pandering to the NSCN (IM) at the cost of the people of Nagaland. Why continue to use the army and AFSPA when killings have reduced considerably? The apex body has specifically mentioned that they want to be delivered from the gun culture. Why is the Centre not responding to that call? In fact, the GoI is seen as pandering to the political leadership of Nagaland, which is alienated from the people, instead of responding to the aspirations of the Naga people. It’s a given that if the state uses armed forces, there will be excesses because the army is trained to kill the enemy. Deploying the army means that the Government of India considers the areas where AFSPA is invoked and the people who live there as the enemy.

Countering insurgency in the Northeast is fraught also because of the Free Movement Regime (FMR) between India and Myanmar. India shares a 1,643 km border with Myanmar. The FMR signed between the two countries allows movement up to 16 km inside each other’s territory for trade and commerce. But it is misused by militants to smuggle drugs and arms. The FMR was suspended in March 2020 due to Covid — but smuggling has only increased. This border is the most difficult terrain to police. These issues need to be addressed for enduring peace to prevail.

Written by Patricia Mukhim

Source: Indian Express, 10/12/21

Hornbill Festival

 The Hornbill Festival, which is called the ‘Festivals of Festivals’, is a 10-day annual cultural fest of Nagaland that showcases the rich and diverse Naga ethnicity through folk dances, traditional music, local cuisine, handicraft, art workshops etc. The start of this festival (December 1) marks the Nagaland statehood day.

Every year the Hornbill festival is celebrated between December 1 and December 10 in the northeast region and in the state of Nagaland. The festival is named after the Indian Hornbill Bird. It is a large and colourful forest bird. The festival is named after the bird as it is displayed in folklore of most of the the tribals in the state of Nagaland.

Economic potential

The festival has contributed significant tourism revenue to the north eastern part of India. This is mainly because Hornbill festival provides an insight into the different Tribes of Nagaland. It provides a colourful mixture of craft, dancers, sports, religious ceremonies and food fairs. Naga Morungs exhibition is also organised during the festival.

Naga Morungs

The Naga Morungs are also called the Nagas. They are the ethnic groups native to North Western Myanmar and North Eastern India. These groups have similar culture and form the majority of population in Nagaland and Naga self-administered zone. The Naga self-administered zone is located in the Naga Hills of Sagaing region of Myanmar.

Other Naga Festival

Apart from the Hornbill festival, the other popular festival of the Nagas is the Lui Ngai Ni. It is the seed sowing festival that is celebrated by the Naga Tribes of Manipur. It is celebrated in the month of February to mark the beginning of spring season.

Hornbill

Hornbill bird is common in tropical and subtropical Asia, Africa and Melanesia. The festival is named after this bird because, it forms the centre of many local folklore. Also, the tribes in the state consider the bird to be sacred. The IUCN status of hornbill bird is “Near Threatened”.

AFSPA and the Northeast

 

The Nagaland govt has called for repeal of AFSPA in the wake of public outrage against the killings in Mon. What impunity does the Act give the armed forces, and how have earlier attempts at repeal played out?

The Nagaland Cabinet on Tuesday recommended that the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958 be repealed from the state after the incident in Mon district in which security forces gunned down 13 civilians. This has been a long-standing demand in the North eastern states. After the firing, Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio and Meghalaya Chief Minister Conrad Sangma have both called for repeal of AFSPA.

Nagaland leaders feel the killings have the potential to create mistrust in the Indian government and derail the peace process currently underway between the Centre and the Naga insurgents groups.

What is AFSPA?

The Act in its original form was promulgated by the British in response to the Quit India movement in 1942. After Independence, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru decided to retain the Act, which was first brought in as an ordnance and then notified as an Act in 1958.

AFSPA has been imposed on the Northeast states, Jammu & Kashmir, and Punjab during the militancy years. Punjab was the first state from where it was repealed, followed by Tripura and Meghalaya. It remains in force in Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, J&K, and parts of Arunachal Pradesh.

Are there safety nets?

While the Act gives powers to security forces to open fire, this cannot be done without prior warning given to the suspect. In the Mon firing, it has been an issue of discussion whether the security forces gave prior warning before opening fire at the vehicle carrying coal miners, and then later at a violent mob.

The Act further says that after any suspects apprehended by security forces should be handed over to the local police station within 24 hours.

It says armed forces must act in cooperation with the district administration and not as an independent body. In the Mon operation, local law-enforcement agencies have said they were unaware of the operation.

What attempts have been made to repeal AFSPA in the past?

In 2000, Manipur activist Irom Sharmila began a hunger-strike, which would continue for 16 years, against AFSPA. In 2004, the UPA government set up a five-member committee under a former Supreme Court Judge. The Justice Jeevan Reddy Commission submitted its report in 2005, saying AFSPA had become a symbol of oppression and recommending its repeal. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission, headed by Veeerapa Moily, endorsed these recommendations.

Former Home Secretary G K Pillai too supported the repeal of AFSPA, and former Home Minister P Chidambaram once said the Act, if not repealed, should at least be amended. But opposition from the Defence Ministry stalled any possible decision.

The UPA set up a cabinet sub-committee to continue looking into the matter. The NDA government subsequently dropped the sub-committee and also rejected the findings of the Reddy Commission.

How often have state governments opposed it?

While the Act empowers the Centre to unilaterally take a decision to impose AFSPA, this is usually done informally in consonance with the state government. The Centre can take a decision to repeal AFSPA after getting a recommendation from the state government. However, Nagaland, which has freshly recommended a repeal, had raised the demand earlier too, without success.

The Centre had also imposed AFSPA in Tripura in 1972 despite opposition from the then state government.

In Manipur, former Congress Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh had told The Indian Express in 2012 that he was opposed to the repeal of AFSPA in light of the dangerous law and order situation.

Many politicians have built their careers on an anti-AFSPA stance, including incumbent Manipur Chief Minister N Biren Singh, who contested his first election in 2002 in order to “fight AFSPA” after 10 civilians had been gunned down by the 8th Assam Rifles at Malom Makha Leikai in 2000.

What has been the social fallout?

Nagaland and Mizoram faced the brunt of AFSPA in the 1950s, including air raids and bombings by the Indian military. Allegations have been made against security forces of mass killings and rape.

It is in Manipur that the fallout has been perhaps best documented. The Malom massacre in 2000, and the killing and alleged rape of Thangjam Manorama led to the subsequent repeal of AFSPA from the Imphal municipal area.

Human rights activists have said the Act has often been used to settle private scores, such as property disputes, with false tip-offs provided by local informants to security forces.

Have these excesses been probed?

In 2012, the Extrajudicial Execution Victim Families Association of Manipur filed a case in the Supreme Court alleging 1,528 fake encounters between 1979 and 2012. Activists said these peaked in 2008-09.

The Supreme Court set up a three-member committee under former judge Santosh Hegde and including former Chief Election Commissioner J M Lyngdoh and former Karnataka DGP Ajay Kumar Singh. The committee investigated six cases of alleged fake encounters, including the 2009 killing of 12-year-old Azad Khan, and submitted a report with the finding that all six were fake encounters.

The Court set up a special investigation team that included five CBI officials and one National Human Rights Commission member. The CBI booked Army Major Vijay Singh Balhara in Khan’s death in 2018, but there has been no prosecution against security forces in other cases.

Activists note that AFSPA creates an atmosphere of impunity among even state agencies such as the Manipur Police and their Manipur Commandos, believed to be responsible for most encounters in the state, some of them jointly with Assam Rifles.

The SIT has investigated 39 cases involving deaths of 85 civilians so far, and filed the final reports in 32 cases. While 100 Manipur police personnel have been indicted, no action has been taken against Assam Rifles personnel with the exception of the Khan killing.

Written by Esha Roy

Source: Indian Express, 8/12/21

What is ‘Greater Tipraland’ and why are tribal outfits in Tripura pushing for it

 

The demand has grown louder to carve out a separate state of 'Greater Tipraland' for the indigenous communities in Tripura under Article 2 and 3 of the Constitution.

Several tribal outfits in Tripura have joined hands to push their demand for a separate state for indigenous communities in the region, arguing that their “survival and existence” was at stake. They staged a dharna at Jantar Mantar on November 30 and December 1 with the demand, which at least three political parties – the Congress, Shiv Sena and AAP – have promised to take up with the Union government.

Among the political parties that have come together for the cause are TIPRA Motha (Tipraha Indigenous Progressive Regional Alliance) and IPFT (Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura), which had so far been rivals in the electoral fray.

What is their main demand?

The parties are demanding a separate state of ‘Greater Tipraland’ for the indigenous communities of the north-eastern state. They want the Centre to carve out the separate state under Article 2 and 3 of the Constitution. Among the 19 notified Scheduled Tribes in Tripura, Tripuris (aka Tipra and Tiprasas) are the largest. According to the 2011 census, there are at least 5.92 lakh Tripuris in the state, followed by Reangs (1.88 lakh) and Jamatias (83,000).

What does the Constitution say?

Article 2 of the Constitution deals with admission or establishment of new states. “Parliament may by law admit into the Union, or establish, new States on such terms and conditions, as it thinks fit,” it states. Article 3 comes into play in the case of “formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of existing States” by the Parliament.

How did the demand originate?

Tripura was a kingdom ruled by the Manikya dynasty from the late 13th century until the signing of the Instrument of Accession with the Indian government on October 15, 1949.

The demand mainly stems from the anxiety of the indigenous communities in connection with the change in the demographics of the state, which has reduced them to a minority. It happened due to the displacement of Bengalis from the erstwhile East Pakistan between 1947 and 1971. From 63.77 per cent in 1881, the population of the tribals in Tripura was down to 31.80 per cent by 2011. In the intervening decades, ethnic conflict and insurgency gripped the state, which shares a nearly 860-km long boundary with Bangladesh. The joint forum has also pointed out that the indigenous people have not only been reduced to a minority, but have also been dislodged from land reserved for them by the penultimate king of the Manikya dynasty Bir Bikram Kishore Debbarman.

What has been done to address the grievances of indigenous communities?

The Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTADC) was formed under the sixth schedule of the Constitution in 1985 to ensure development and secure the rights and cultural heritage of the tribal communities. The TTADC, which has legislative and executive powers, covers nearly two-third of the state’s geographical area. The council comprises 30 members of which 28 are elected while two are nominated by the Governor. Also, out of the 60 Assembly seats in the state, 20 are reserved for Scheduled Tribes. ‘Greater Tipraland’ envisages a situation in which the entire TTADC area will be a separate state. It also proposes dedicated bodies to secure the rights of the Tripuris and other aboriginal commu

What was the immediate trigger for the dharna?

The churn in the state’s politics with the rise of TIPRA Motha and the Assembly polls due in early 2023 are the two major reasons behind the development. TIPRA Motha, led by Pradyot Debbarman who is the titular head of the royal family, won a majority in this year’s TTADC polls, leaving the IPFT, which is an ally of the ruling BJP, with a diminished influence.

In the lead up to the 2018 Assembly polls, the IPFT had captured the imagination of the tribal electorate as it aggressively campaigned with the demand for a separate state of “Twipraland”. After the elections, it joined the BJP-led Cabinet and lowered its pitch. In 2018, the Centre formed a 13-member committee to address tribal grievances. However, that committee has met only around three times in the last four years, according to an IPFT leader.

Pradyot has so far been successful in occupying the space vacated by the IPFT, leaving it with no choice but to join hands with him. During the two-day dharna, Congress MP Deepender Hooda, Shiv Sena MP Priyanka Chaturvedi and AAP’s Rajya Sabha MP Sanjay Singh addressed the gathering of supporters at Jantar Mantar. Incidentally, Pradyot had quit the Congress in 2019 after serving as the working president of its Tripura unit.nities living outside Tripura.

Written by Sourav Roy Barman

Source: Indian Express, 6/12/21

Act East policy’s success rests on peace and trust between neighbours

 

Sanjoy Hazarika writes: Goodwill among all northeastern states, including Assam and Mizoram, will enable economic cooperation, transport and trade.

The initial steps have been taken in calming the roiling waters on the Assam-Mizoram border confrontation. First, the FIRs and cases which were filed against each other’s leaders — involving both Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma and K Vanlalvena, Mizo National Front (MNF) MP — have been withdrawn. Cases against officials from both states have been dropped. While these should not have been initiated in the first place, stepping back in this manner is a good way to reduce the political and emotive temperatures, which were soaring on both sides.

A sharp war of words and aggressive social media posts on either side did not help. Indeed, an outsider may be excused, if after listening to, watching or reading the passionate, angry and even, in some cases, inflammatory remarks by either side, for being perplexed by these declarations — were they, s/he may well have wondered, by citizens of neighbouring states or opposing nations. Some have added fuel to the fire by casting aspersions on the citizenry of their brethren on the disputed border or referring inappropriately to a part of their own state. These need be seen in the background of the extensive suffering faced by the region as a result of misunderstanding and ill will.

Second, the Assam chief minister’s decision to send two ministerial emissaries from Assam to Aizawl is a good gesture to open dialogue and appears to have paid off initially. Both states have agreed to the deployment of neutral Central forces at the disputed stretches of the interstate border. Atul Bora, one of the ministers sent to Aizawl is from the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) in the BJP-led coalition, and also party president. The significance of an AGP leader in the peace mission should not be underestimated. The AGP led a regional coalition in the 1980s and 1990s in the Northeast that emerged as an anti-Congress front. The MNF had been part of this process and has had good relations with the AGP from that time.

Part of the confidence-building measures has been the welcome withdrawal of the Assam government’s travel advisory which asked people not to travel to Mizoram and urged people from the state working or staying there to “exercise utmost caution”.

There is a third element that has become a seemingly endemic part of political confrontation between states. These are the blockades that have closed roads and highways in Assam leading to Mizoram — and in the past few days to Tripura. This has happened repeatedly in confrontations between different states in the region such as Nagaland and Manipur and last year between Assam and Mizoram.

These crackling tensions go far beyond interstate border disputes and have regional, national and international repercussions. For one, they have adverse economic impacts which are felt most sharply at the local level, leading to a rise in prices and shortage of commodities. This is a time when Covid-19 cases continue to rise in all the states of the region, including Mizoram and Assam, and essential supplies cannot be blocked by public agitations.

The economic fallouts of such actions are felt down the entire supply chain, from producer to transporter and receiving customers/markets. National highways are the direct responsibility of the Centre and it must ensure that these economic veins remain clear for passenger and freight traffic.

In addition, images, especially of violence and confrontation, go “viral” without delay. They move from mobile to mobile, over social platforms, one group to the other, leaping across boundaries of state and nation. Among those who look at them are potential investors and policymakers, not just in Delhi but other state and national capitals. The adverse impacts of these can be considerable.

For decades, we must remember, the public image of the Northeast was shaped by conflict and confrontation, bandhs and violence. It had been shedding that image slowly and steadily, facing many hurdles, agitations and risks. Sustainable peace continues to be elusive although flawed insurgencies have failed and fallen. There are new challenges such as border divides and sharpening sectarian tensions. Economic growth is visible as are continuing concerns. Lakhs of young people from the region, despite discrimination and pressures, have moved and made their lives in other parts of the country, engaging with the idea of India, before, during and after the waves of the pandemic.

That is why communities at the border, stakeholders such as business leaders and transporters as well as civil society need to be involved in conversations and dialogue for sustainable settlements. Political leaders must set the pace and provide the platform. However, since both sides use different yardsticks of history and geography to negotiate, it is difficult to visualise a situation where either side will emerge as a clear winner. There will have to be give and take, count net gains against losses. That is the practical side which politicians are best equipped to deliver. Herein lies the importance of the concept of a Development Corridor on the border that would have to be agreed to by both sides and guaranteed by the Centre. This could build on the natural advantages of the bordering states — vegetable, meat and fruit processing, handicrafts and designer handlooms to name just five — and create jobs, livelihoods and better incomes for people on the border and beyond, building an equitable supply chain.

A fundamental point needs to be underscored: The visionary Act East Policy and its predecessor Look East Policy rest on the pillars of peace and trust, not just better roads and physical infrastructure. They depend on good relationships between neighbours which enable economic cooperation, transport and trade not just cultural and social collaboration.

Source: Indian Express, 9/08/21