Followers

Wednesday, April 07, 2021

An effective migrant labour policy must consider where existing labour laws fail

 The Niti Aayog’s draft Migrant Labour Policy is a clear statement of intent to better recognise migrants’ contribution to the economy and support them in their endeavours. It puts forward several radical ideas, including the adoption of a rights-based approach and establishing an additional layer of institutions to create a more enabling policy environment for migrants. It proposes a new National Migration Policy and the formation of a special unit within the Labour Ministry to work closely with other ministries. The new structure would bring about much-needed convergence across line departments and would be a huge step towards a universal understanding of the causes and effects of migration as well as the interventions needed.

The policy calls for improving the record on the implementation of the country’s many labour laws that have, by and large, failed to make a difference to the lives of labour migrants. It discusses at length the provisions under the Equal Remuneration Act, The Bonded Labour Act, the Building and Other Construction Workers Act and the Interstate Migrant Workmen Act, among others. The draft also invokes the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda as well as the Sustainable Development Goals which aim to protect labour rights. It acknowledges the challenges of welfare provision to a highly fragmented migrant workforce due to recruitment patterns and the lack of data. It refers to the importance of collective action and unions and there are detailed plans for improving the data on short-term migration, especially seasonal and circular migration. As a statement of goals, the draft contains much to be celebrated.

But the policy needs to delve deeper into the causes underlying the poor implementation of labour laws that are linked to the political economy of recruitment and placement. Labour migrants from rural areas find work in the urban economy and high productivity rural enterprises either through kinship networks or labour market intermediaries. These networks are critical for supplying workers that can be positioned in jobs, where there is a demand for hard-working and controllable workers who will stay tied to the job. One way of ensuring that workers do not leave because of harsh conditions is to bond them through the notorious system of advances. Although illegal, this kind of arrangement is attractive for migrants from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds as they cannot mobilise large sums of money for weddings, housing and repaying loans. There is reference to unfair recruitment practices in the document, but virtually no analysis of why the system persists and how it is enabled by the employment structure of businesses and enterprises.

Another area where the draft needs to be strengthened is addressing gender differences in employment. Domestic work is one of the most important occupations for migrant women from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds. Although the new policy aims to be inclusive of all kinds of marginalised migrants, it could do more to explicitly mention the challenges faced by domestic workers. It would be very easy for them to remain excluded as India has not ratified the ILO Convention on Domestic Workers and The Domestic Workers Bill 2017 has not become law. Other kinds of home-based work, enormously important for female migrants could similarly remain excluded.

Another point to raise here is the apparent ambivalence about the ability of tribal migrants to think for themselves and decide how they access the opportunities offered by migration. Early in the draft we see a commitment to recognising migrant agency, but this is less clear in the section where tribal migration policies are discussed. Tribal migration is constructed as a process whereby recruiters are “luring” or even trafficking them. Domestic work, which is mentioned in this context, is an important source of income for tens of thousands of tribal women from impoverished backgrounds in eastern Indian states. There are, of course, some instances of abuse, but these do not represent the majority experience. There is a need to better understand how migrants themselves weigh up the costs and risks against potential benefits of working in the city. Controlling tribal migration would go against the objective of recognising migrant agency.

To conclude, the draft policy is a good start which could, with a few adjustments, reduce the vulnerability and risks faced by labour migrants and ultimately build a more sustainable model of development.

Written by Priya Deshingkar

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 7, 2021 under the title ‘Recognising the migrant’. The writer is Professor of Migration and Development, University of Sussex

Source: Indian Express, 7/04/21

Myanmar crisis is India’s opportunity to develop long-term refugee policy

 The Ministry of External Affairs has underlined the government’s changing position on the Myanmar crisis, moving to a more pro-active stand as concerns grow worldwide about growing internal strife and instability there. On social media and in briefings, Ambassador TS Tirumurti, India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, who also represents India as a non-permanent member at the high table of the Security Council, and Arindam Bagchi, the government spokesman in New Delhi, signaled that change.

After a closed-door UNSC meeting on Myanmar, Tirumurti’s tweets condemned the violence, condoled the loss of lives, called for the release of detained leaders and urged maximum restraint. The social messages, significantly, said that the situation must “meet the hopes and aspirations of the people” and underlined India’s commitment to a democratic transition. There was a line about supporting peace efforts by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN, of which Myanmar is a member). However, ASEAN has been tentative, even timid, in the face of China’s support to the junta. Bagchi was more unequivocal: “Let me be very clear … We believe that the rule of law should prevail. We stand for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.”

The language is the bluntest so far by India on Myanmar and a response to criticism of its earlier stand within and outside the country. This marks a welcome departure from the tightrope walking by befriending the military (which has not always been friendly to India’s interests) and engaging with the civilian government, which held office only for five years. It is not just the horror of troops firing into crowds of peaceful demonstrators but also at mourners in a funeral and the growing number of civilian casualties — more than 500 in the past weeks. Despite its strong-arm tactics, however, the military is still not in control.

Our concern should be two-fold: One, the people of Myanmar, who, having tasted freedom of expression, assembly and association for the first time in decades under Suu Kyi, are determined to hold on to it. In their tens of thousands, they are rallying on city streets and village squares, refusing to turn up for work, leading processions and protests, and have not been cowed by bullets, beatings, brutality and detentions. The second is the future stability and security of the North-east as well as the policies that have been emphatically espoused at the highest levels of government — the Act East and Neighbourhood First policies are anchored in the eight states of the North-east. We also cannot forget that various insurgent groups from the North-east have a history of relations with ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, where they have taken shelter and established bases and where some still live.

A few factors probably account for the steady change in South Block’s approach. The first is the growing accounts of disorder in Myanmar which appears to be escalating as the civil disobedience movement (CDM) flares in this extremely complex nation. The CDM has been innovative, energetic and driven by young people in the majority Burman and Buddhist-dominated heartland. Disobedience could lead to extensive civil disorder and worse. Already, telecommunications are cut, curfews are in place but daily shows of defiance occur, the banks are not functional, markets are shut, the only courts which appear to be open are those used to present detainees and those charged with violations of regime controls while the cases against Suu Kyi and her colleagues pile up. The battle-scarred armies of the ethnic groups, which fought the Myanmar army to a standstill over nearly 70 years but which signed a ceasefire with Suu Kyi, are girding for war again and are allying with each other. A provisional government of leaders who escaped detention has been announced.

Another would be the impact on India’s border states of the North-east. Not less than four states — Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram — have long borders with Myanmar and the last two states have taken some 1,500 persons, including a number of junior police officials, fleeing from the crackdown in the bordering Chin State. This has raised issues of Centre-state relations, with New Delhi advising the states on the border not to allow Myanmar nationals fleeing the crackdown to enter Indian territory.

Mizoram Chief Minister Zoramthanga has rejected this approach, saying that his government will accept people fleeing, on humanitarian grounds. He wrote to the prime minister saying that as the world’s largest democracy India could not stand aside: “Mizoram cannot just remain indifferent to their sufferings. India cannot turn a blind eye to this humanitarian crisis unfolding right in front of us in our own backyard.”

The Manipur government, too, has withdrawn its circular which had asked district officials along the border to “politely” turn back refugees. What many in the country need to understand is that the Chins in Myanmar and the Mizos and Kukis (and sub-groups) in Mizoram and Manipur are kin; a historical affinity connects them by ethnicity, religion, language. In the aftermath of the 1988 army crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, which killed thousands, many Chins and other refugees fled to Manipur and Mizoram. Local leaders and non-government groups, with the tacit support of central and state agencies, allowed them to live, work and even settle. They were seen as the eyes of India to look through the window on the border into Myanmar and help develop a nuanced field assessment of conditions there. This approach needs to continue.

The present situation provides an opportunity for India to develop a long-term approach to the issue of refugees fleeing political persecution in their homelands. India does not have a National Refugee Law nor is it a signatory to the UN Convention governing refugees.

India has allowed Tibetans, Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka, Chakmas of Bangladesh, the Lothsampas of Nepali origin from Bhutan, Afghans, Somalis and many others into this land. But these remain ad hoc approaches. This has been sought to be addressed for six “minority” communities of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan in a long-term manner by the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act. However, the CAA does not cover many of the cases listed above. A national mechanism needs to be developed which goes beyond short-term measures and takes into account a needs-based assessment of how best to handle rapid outflows of persecuted persons.

Written by Sanjoy Hazarika

This column first appeared in the print edition on April 7, 2021 under the title ‘Relooking at Myanmar’. Hazarika is a writer and commentator on issues of NE India and its neighbourhood. He is currently director of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative

Source: Indian Express, 7/04/21

Maoism remains India’s biggest internal security threat

 Managing India’s internal security cannot be a part-time job. There are too many challenges, and too many critical decisions to be made on a regular basis. An internal security ministry needs to be hived off from the MHA — the secretary of the ministry must be a specialist, either a serving or retired police officer of outstanding reputation, and this must be supervised by a full-time minister who is hands-on. This cannot afford to wait any longer.

In one of the bloodiest battles fought between the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and security forces in the Terram jungle of Chhattisgarh’s Bijapur district, 22 elite fighters from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and its elite Cobra battalion, District Reserve Guard (DRG) and Special Task Force (STF) lost their lives along with, reportedly, an equal number of Maoists. The five-hour-long fierce encounter on Saturday witnessed the use of light machine guns and AK-47s by the Maoists, with security forces responding in equal measure, deploying under-barrel grenade launchers and mortars against targets picked up by Heron (an unmanned aerial vehicle).

Most deaths and injuries took place when, during the fierce phase of the firefight, security personnel moved the wounded to the huts at Tekulgudam village, unaware that the village along with two others, Jeera Gaon and Jonaguda, had been vacated on the diktat of the Maoists in a well-planned strategy. Once the force was trapped, relentless fire from the enemy positions caused further damage.

This was part of a joint operation launched by the districts of Bijapur and Sukma on late Friday night, on reliable information about the presence of the dreaded Maoist commander in the area, Madvi Hidma. The operation was aimed at targeting multiple locations, and comprised around 2,000 security personnel. The group, which was targeted by the Maoists, was 450-men strong. They did not walk into a trap. Nor were they ambushed. A movement of 2,000 men would surely alert the Maoists and the force has to be prepared for such exigencies. The Heron would have picked up Maoist movements — so it was a fair and square fight where equal numbers were lost on both sides. An enquiry will reveal the real truth and the lapses of strategy and tactics. But the security personnel displayed grit and valour, fighting heroically for five hours till the Maoists broke their ranks and retreated.

This is yet another grim reminder of the capability of Maoist cadres to lie low for long periods, regroup and strike at intervals. An improvised explosive device (IED) mine blasted a bus carrying security men last month, killing three. In March 2020, in an ambush in Sukma, the Maoists killed 17 security personnel.

The downward trend of Maoist violence over the last few years has led the government and some security analysts to declare that the battle against Maoism (or Naxalism, as the terms are interchangeably used) is almost won. According to the annual report of the ministry of home affairs (MHA), Maoist violence was restricted to 251 police stations (PS) in 60 districts of eight states in 2018, in comparison with 330 PSs in 76 districts of 10 states in 2013. In the first half of 2020, it was restricted to 46 districts. The incidents of violence (670) and deaths of security personnel were the lowest in 2019, as per the available official figures.

Despite data revealing an overall reduction in violence, the capacity of Left-wing extremists to retaliate with ferocity indicates that Maoism still remains the biggest threat to our internal security, almost 11 years after then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh acknowledged and framed the scale of threat in exactly this manner. Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand lie in the eye of the storm. Out of 670 incidents of Naxal violence in 2019, 463, ie 69%, occurred in these two states. The Maoists are entrenched in the jungles in these two states, and intelligence agencies, at great risk, glean their activities and plans, as deliberated upon in their central committee meetings, and share it with other central forces and state police.

But if statistics belie the real situation on the ground, what is lacking in the government’s approach towards fighting Maoism? Is a course-correction in combat strategy also desired? First, senior police commanders will have to rethink the rationale of large-scale operations. The stakes are too high and heavy losses of men are causes of serious worry. It is important to change tactics according to the situation. The Greyhounds of undivided Andhra Pradesh, a specialised force that achieved great success in weakening the Maoists, conducted their operations with small-sized teams, acting on pinpoint intelligence. Even their platoon strength team had a clear chain of command.

Second, there is a complete administrative and security vacuum in such areas to counter the Janatana Sarkar of Maoists run through their Revolutionary People Committee (RPC), equivalent to gram panchayats. For instance, allegations abound of RPCs seizing grains distributed under the public distribution system and distributing it under their aegis. The erosion of State authority is also reflected in the fact that civilians often act as the eyes and ears of the Maoists in affected areas. While extending roads and hoisting mobile towers have certainly helped, CRPF will have to set up its camps deeper in the jungles. The Rural Roads Programme (RRP) aimed at constructing 5,411 kms and connecting 44 Naxal-affected districts, must also be speeded up as most of these districts fall in Chhattisgarh.

And, finally, managing India’s internal security cannot be a part-time job. There are too many challenges, and too many critical decisions to be made on a regular basis. An internal security ministry needs to be hived off from the MHA — the secretary of the ministry must be a specialist, either a serving or retired police officer of outstanding reputation, and this must be supervised by a full-time minister who is hands-on. This cannot afford to wait any longer.

Yashovardhan Azad is a former IPS officer, who served as Central Information Commissioner, secretary, security and special director, Intelligence Bureau.

Source: Hindustan Times, 6/04/21

Monday, April 05, 2021

Quote of the Day April 5, 2021

 

“Once you start working on something, don't be afraid of failure and don't abandon it. People who work sincerely are the happiest.”
Chanakya
“जब आप किसी योजना पर काम शुरु कर दें तो असफ़लता का डर न रखें और उसे अधूरा न छोड़ दें। पूरे मनोयोग से काम करने वाले व्यक्ति ही सबसे अधिक प्रसन्न रहते हैं।”
चाणक्य

What is Suez Canal Blockade?

 A container ship called the “Ever Given” recently ran aground in the Suez Canal. This blocked more than 400 ships from transiting the canal. The blockage created huge impacts on global trade and is referred to as Suez Canal Crisis 2021 or Suez Canal Blockade.

Impacts of the Blockade

The Cargo ship was headed from China to Netherlands. It had run aground in the canal and got stuck for a week. The global trade losses due to the blockage is estimated to be 9 billion USD.

India’s Four Point Plan to deal the Blockade

The Government of India had framed a 4-Point Plan to deal with the Suez Canal Blockade. The plan included prioritization of cargo, advisory to ports, freight rates and re-routing of ships. The plan mainly focuses on reducing Indian trade losses due to the blockage.

Under prioritization of cargo, the APEDA, MPEDA and FIEO will work together and identify perishable cargo for priority movement.


APEDA-Agricultural and Processed food products Export Development Authority

MPEDA-Marine Products Export Development Authority

FIEO-Federation of Indian Export Organizations

About Suez Canal

The Suez Canal connects Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. The canal was officially opened in 1869. Until 1956, the canal was primarily owned by the European shareholders (mostly British and French) and partly by the Egyptian Government. In 1956, the then President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the canal. This led to Suez Canal Crisis.

Suez Canal Crisis

It is also called Suez Crisis or the second Arab-Israeli war. In Israel, it is called the Sinai war and in the Arab world it is called the Tripartite Aggression. The motive of the aggression was to regain the control of Suez Canal and remove President Nasser who had nationalized the canal. The aggression against Egypt was started by Israel followed by UK and France. The three allies succeeded in capturing the canal. However, there was huge pressure from the US and the Soviet Union against the invasion.

The crisis led to the closure of the canal between October 1956 and March 1957. Due to the conflict, the UN created the United Nations Emergency Force Peacekeepers. The force polices Egyptian-Israeli border.The British Prime Minister Anthony Eden resigned due to the crisis. The Canadian External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the conflict.

Economic & Political Weekly: Table of Contents

 

Vol. 56, Issue No. 14, 03 Apr, 2021

IISc tops ARWU ranking 2020, Calcutta University best Indian varsity

 ARWU ranking 2020: The Indian Institute of Science (IISc Bangalore) has secured the top position among the best higher education institutes in India, while Calcutta University became the best varsity in the country, as per the recently published Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU 2020).

As per the recently published Shanghai Ranking, the other top higher educational institutions in the country are- Indian Institute of Technology (IIT-Madras) (rank 2-4), University of Delhi (rank 2-4), Indian Institute of Technology (IIT-Delhi) (rank 5-7), Indian Institute of Technology (IIT-Kharagpur) (rank 5-7), Jawaharlal Nehru University (rank 5-7), Aligarh Muslim University (rank 8-9), Vellore Institute of Technology (rank 8-9), All India Institute of Medical Sciences (rank 10-15), Anna University (rank 10-15), Bharathiar University (rank 10-15), Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur (rank 10-15), Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee (rank 10-15), Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research (IISERs) (rank 10- 15).

Meanwhile worldwide, the Indian institutes are not even in the top 100 list, the best higher education institute, (IISc Bangalore) is in the category of 501- 600. West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee congratulated Calcutta University for securing the top position.

Source: Indian Express, 3/04/21