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Friday, November 05, 2021
Current Affairs-November 3, 2021
INDIA
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November 2: National Ayurveda Day
National Ayurveda Day was celebrated on November 2, 2021 by the Ministry of AYUSH, across the country.
Key Points
- Ayurveda is an integral aspect of healthcare system of India. It holds recognition as traditional medicine system by World Health Organization (WHO).
- Union Ministry of AYUSH started observing Dhanvantari Jayanti (also called as Dhanteras) as Ayurveda day in 2016.
- The day was started being celebrated with the objective of nationalising the ayurvedic system of medicine and make it global.
Theme of the day
In the year 2021, the day was observed under the theme “Ayurveda for Poshana (Nutrition)”.
History of Ayurveda Day
India celebrates Ayurveda Day each year on the auspicious occasion of Dhanteras. This day celebrated since 2016 on the occasion of Dhanvantari Jayanti. This day is celebrated to raise awareness on importance of Ayurveda in our daily lives. It also focuses on strengths of Ayurveda and its unique treatment principles.
History of Dhanteras
Lord Dhanvantari is the god of Ayurvedic medicine. Thus, Dhanteras is observed every year for the wellbeing of everyone. Lord Dhanvantari is the healer of all ailments. According to Hindu mythology, Lord Dhanvantari (a physician of the gods) appeared before Devas and the Asuras during Samudra Manthan. He was holding Amrita (or nectar of immortality) and Ayurveda text in his hand. Devas and Asuras wanted the Amrita to become immortal. This led to a fight between both the groups. Later, Garuda protected the nectar from the Asuras.
How to define a farmer
Categorising farmers based on dependence on farm income, land ownership is inappropriate
KAT reforms that are being pushed. Farmer unions are demanding withdrawal of farm laws, but also seeking mechanisms to ensure remunerative output prices.
In this context, Harish Damodaran and Samridhi Agarwal (‘Counting the kisan’, IE, October 5, 2021) use the 2019 Situation Assessment of Agricultural Households (SAAH) survey to argue that India’s farming population is much smaller than is usually estimated. Damodaran and Agarwal claim that while the official estimate of the number of agricultural households in India was 93.09 million in 2019, the number of “serious”, “full-time” or “regular” agricultural households was only 36 million.
Damodaran and Agarwal categorise as serious/regular those agricultural households that earn at least half of their total household income from crop cultivation. The authors go on to suggest that the agricultural policy should target only serious/regular farming households as they “genuinely depend on farming”. Their attempt to estimate the number of serious/regular farmers, and by implication, to differentiate them from the non-serious farmers is flawed on several counts, including the scant regard for the structural and historical context of farm-based livelihoods. We highlight some of the key problems with the Damodaran-Agarwal argument.
First, the categorisation of farmers as serious/regular based on a single ratio of farm income dependence and an arbitrary threshold of 50 per cent is an unwarranted and a non-serious exercise. Such identification based on a snapshot number for a certain year completely ignores the differential historical trajectory of development and livelihood diversification in diverse regions of India.
For example, in a rich state like Kerala, international migration and remittances has been a dominant household phenomenon for decades. While remittances often constitute a major portion of household income, it does not make small-scale spice cultivators or rubber growers any less serious in their pursuits. At the same time, in a poor yet mineral-rich state like Jharkhand, livelihood diversification may have been driven by poverty and local conditions of both farm and non-farm work, which may have intensified such coping mechanisms over time. Such a situation does not make the poor farmers who use their land for subsistence, and pursue other occupations in the lean season, any less dependent on farming.
This brings us to the second misclassification issue. Using the term “Kisan” to identify farmers obfuscates social and economic relations, including exploitative ones, that exists within agriculture. Farmers are not a homogenous category; they are differentiated into classes and castes. More realistic and useful categories of rich/middle/poor farmers or capitalist/petty-producer/agricultural labour are needed to identify those engaged in agriculture.
Third, according to Damodaran-Agarwal, their 50 per cent “serious farmer” threshold is crossed at the all-India level by farmers with more than 1 hectare of land. This is possessed by only 30 per cent of agricultural households. What about the contribution to national production of the remaining 70 per cent, that is, marginal farmers possessing less than 1 hectare of land? Research by one of us shows that the share of marginal farmers ranges between 19 to 30 per cent in the total marketed surplus for various food grains.
A significant proportion of foodgrain consumption among cultivators is from home-grown produce, particularly at the lower end of the land distribution. Forcing marginal farmers out of agriculture would also be disastrous from the perspective of household-level food and nutrition security, a serious challenge for several decades now.
The recommendations by Damodaran and Agarwal also have serious ramifications for socially disadvantaged communities. The historical and contemporary practices of caste-based exclusion and the failure of the state to undertake meaningful redistributive land reforms means that a large majority of the Dalit community remains landless. Withdrawing state support to smallholders will have a disproportionate impact on the socially marginalised groups and would further push them into asset poverty.
Finally, the elephant in the room is the land and natural resource question. If 70 per cent of agricultural households are identified as non-serious farmers who should be moved out of agriculture, what happens to their land resources? Huge land reserves are immediately opened for corporate grabbing, laying the foundation for agribusiness monopolies. The authors’ optimism notwithstanding, it is unlikely that agro-based industries will be able to create enough jobs to absorb the millions displaced from their lands.
The authors seem to be unaware of the function of agriculture as a social safety net in providing a source of sustenance to millions and thereby providing conditions of relatively stable growth in productive sectors of the economy. The crisis faced by migrant workers during the lockdown, and the phenomenon of “reverse migration” is a testimony to the fact that agriculture continues to provide a buffer to millions who face intermittent unemployment.
Damodaran and Agarwal do not discuss that the SAAH data also shows a fall in real average crop incomes between 2013 and 2019. The fall in returns from cultivation is driven by rising input prices and dwindling output prices. Marginal and small farmers face disproportionate hardships in acquiring subsidised inputs or getting remunerative prices from public procurement. Smallholders also rely more on informal sources of moneylending, which adds to indebtedness.
The fall in crop incomes and the crisis of economic viability has continued in Indian agriculture for myriad factors since the late 1990s. For several decades now, successive governments have pursued policies that have led to worsening agrarian distress. This has pushed millions into low-paying petty jobs and continues to plague those who are compelled to depend (even partially) on agriculture for survival. The need for creation of decent non-farm jobs is well-recognised, but this is unlikely to happen with the crisis-ridden farm sector. Forced destruction of the livelihoods of millions of smallholders by withdrawal of the little they receive by the way of state support is nothing but a recipe for disaster. The solution to the problem of Indian farmers needs a serious rethink of the economic policies and surely cannot lie in simply excluding them by redefinition.
This column first appeared in the print edition on November 5, 2021 under the title ‘Defining a farmer’. Anand, Banerjee and Dasgupta teach at O P Jindal Global University, Ambedkar University and South Asian University respectively.
Source: Indian Express, 5/11/21
Wednesday, November 03, 2021
Quote of the Day
“If you would thoroughly know anything, teach it to others.”
Tryon Edwards
“आप किसी चीज़ का विशद ज्ञान हासिल करना चाहते हैं तो इसे दूसरों को सिखाने लगिए”
ट्रायन एडवर्ड्स
Refugee protection in India calls for the adoption of a specific law
In December 2019, the Indian government introduced the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, which sought to make “illegal migrants" from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who are Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian eligible for citizenship. Subsequently, in May 2021, the Union ministry of home affairs (MHA) began inviting applications for Indian citizenship from non-Muslims from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan residing in 13 districts of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Haryana and Punjab.These developments, extending protection to selective communities, highlight the inconsistency in the treatment and protection of refugees and asylum seekers in India.
As of June 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has documented 208,065 “persons of concern" in India. However, India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention under which the UNHCR operates. Nor does it have a domestic legislation regulating the entry and stay of refugees. There is no distinction made between ‘foreigners’ and ‘refugees’ under Indian law. The Foreigners Act of 1946, Passport Act of 1967, Extradition Act of 1962, Citizenship Act of 1955 (amended in 2019) and the Illegal Migrant (Determination by Tribunals) Act of 1983 are some of the laws applicable to both. Under these laws, foreigners can be detained and forcibly deported, even if they are refugees escaping their countries of origin in fear of death.
India is conducted on an ad-hoc basis through administrative decision-making. Since there is no official legislative or administrative framework for refugee-status determination, the government has taken to determining the status of different groups of refugees in different ways.
Protection under international law: Under international law, refugees have two broad rights: the right to seek asylum in another country, and the right not to be returned to a country where they face a threat to their life. These are also principles enshrined under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which puts an obligation on state parties to grant them entry and protection. In order to stay neutral in the Cold War politics of that era and partially on account of the Eurocentric bias of the Convention, India has been reluctant to sign it. Another sore point for New Delhi had been that it does not account for national security interests.
However, other specialized international laws and human-rights principles are also applicable for the protection of refugees. Instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Convention Against Torture (CAT), Declaration on Protection from enforced disappearances, the UN Principles on Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) are also often invoked to provide additional protection.
The administration of refugees in India: The bulk of the refugee population in India originates from Sri Lanka, Tibet, Myanmar and Afghanistan. However, only Tibetan and Sri Lankan refugees are recognized as such by the government. They are provided protection and assistance directly through specific policies and rules formulated by the government. Presently, there are around 94,069 Sri Lankan refugees living in the country, whereas the number of Tibetan refugees has gone down to 85,000 from 1,50,000 since 2011.
On the other hand, around 43,157 refugees from Myanmar, Afghanistan and elsewhere are registered and protected by the UNHCR, as per its mandate under the 1951 Refugee Convention. For these refugees, the UNHCR issues its own documents of registration, which are recognized by Indian authorities to only a limited extent.
While refugees directly recognized by the Indian government are housed in camps and have access to local schools, hospitals and the domestic job market, those registered with the UNHCR don’t get the same treatment. They do not have access to the country’s healthcare facilities, for example, and face difficulties in finding accommodation and jobs. Conversely, complications can also arise for refugees belonging to countries that are classified under the government’s mandate. For example, these refugees, if detained, cannot approach the UNHCR, as it does not have the designated authority to process their asylum claims.
The judicial response: Remarkably, the Indian judiciary has been stepping up from time to time to safeguard refugees from deportation, expulsion and forced repatriation. The Constitution of India safeguards the rights of all persons within its territorial jurisdiction, citizen or non-citizen. Thus, in the light of India’s international human rights obligations, Indian courts have extended the scope of constitutional rights. These rights include protection from discrimination and arbitrary action under Article 14 and the right to life and liberty under Article 21.
In the case of U. Myat Kayew, the Supreme Court waived the requirement of surety so the refugees who could not acquire documentation could be freed to approach the UNHCR for protection. In another case, the expulsion of two UNHCR-certified Iraqi refugees was stopped after the court found their presence was not prejudicial to national security and sending them back could be harmful.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision to allow the deportation from India of about 170 detained Rohingya refugees has been a step in the opposite direction. It was based on the government’s claim that they posed a threat to internal security of the country.
The country’s need for specific legislation: There are gaps in refugee protection in India that can be traced to the country’s differential treatment of refugees. Since the 1951 Convention is not suitable in the South Asian context, where countries like India frequently experience a large influx of refugees, adopting a national law emerges as a better choice.
Till now, Indian administrative policies and judicial interventions have served as alternatives in the absence of sound domestic legislation. However, a long-term practical solution requires that India make a shift from its charitable approach to a rights-based approach by enacting a national refugee law.
A national refugee law will streamline refugee- status determination procedures for all kinds of refugees and will guarantee them the rights they have under international law. Additionally, it could sufficiently address India’s security concerns, while at the same time ensuring that there is no unlawful detention or deportation carried out in the garb of national-security concerns.
Radhika Nair is a lawyer and socio-legal researcher.
Source: Mintepaper, 27/1021