In 2016, Xi was declared a “core” leader of the CCP, a title that has only been conferred upon three other Chinese rulers, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. A year later, Xi incorporated a list of his speeches and policies into the Chinese constitution. In his most conspicuous manifestation of power, in 2018, China’s National Congress voted to amend the Chinese constitution by abolishing the two-term limits on the Presidency. Xi has also thus far failed to nominate a successor, which previous leaders typically do at the start of their second term. Xi looks increasingly likely to win a third term during the 2022 Chinese elections and could potentially retain power for the rest of his life.
President for Life
A peaceful transition of power is integral to the stability of any country, as recently evidenced by Donald Trump’s efforts to discredit President Joe Biden’s electoral victory. China’s last leader for life was Mao, who oversaw one of the country’s most disastrous periods during the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forwards. Mao’s successor, Xiaoping spoke against the cult of personality embraced by Mao and ushered in a series of reforms that both opened the country’s economy and established limits on individual power. In a report for the Lowey Institute, Richard McGregor, and Jude Blanchette, detail the importance of an orderly transition, highlighting the fact that autocrats’ attempts to remain in power for life often trigger succession crises, formal leadership challenges or military coups. While previous Chinese dynastic power struggles were largely limited within its borders, they write, “the global impact of a 21st century succession crisis would be immense.”
Xi for his part has said that he is personally opposed to lifelong rule, but his actions indicate that he is unprepared to relinquish power anytime soon. McGregor and Blanchette argue that by removing term limits and refusing to nominate a successor, “Xi has solidified his own authority at the expense of the most important political reform of the last four decades: the regular and peaceful transition of power.” Compounding the problem, there are very few barriers between the state bureaucracy and the CCP. Describing the distinction between the two as a “mirage,” Srijan Shukla writes in an ORF report that the “matrix” structure of governance employed in China shows how “the final power lies with the party, and not the government.” As the General Secretary of the CCP, a role that notably has never had term limits, Xi wields significant sway over both the party and the Chinese government as a whole.
Control over the CCP and society
Xi has made a notable effort to consolidate his status within the CCP and the larger Chinese political apparatus. In 2013, he launched a much-heralded anti-corruption campaign which established his uncompromising leadership style and side-lined several of his more vocal rivals. Xi, as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), also restructured the organisation between 2015 and 2016 in order to remove his opponents from leading positions and install his own supporters in key roles. As described by one Jamestown Foundation report, Xi has also encouraged the practice of biaotai or ritualistic declarations of loyalty by prominent regional supporters.
Inculcating his own policies and philosophy into the party’s charter he has also consolidated his position as its unquestioned leader. In a 2018 party keynote speech, Xi stated that political thoughts such as the ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ should be used to “arm the entire party, educate the people and push forward work.”
McGregor and Blanchette summarise his grip on the political apparatus, writing that “hardening political conformity under Xi, combined with the more banal realities of bureaucratic policies, have led to numerous officials publicly declaring fealty to Xi.”
His grip over Chinese society is also noteworthy. Through the use of extra-judicial detentions and other coercive measures combined with strict restrictions on freedom of speech, Xi has spearheaded a sustained crackdown on dissent. Targeting journalists, activists, academics and ethnic minorities, this crackdown has systematically silenced and punished anyone who dares to criticise Xi.
The CCP has also engaged in revisionist history, launching a year-long campaign for the nationwide study of Xi’s philosophy. In addition to the content taught, party leaders have also been encouraged to recruit supporters from college campuses and to establish youth wings across the state. In a more creative form of indoctrination, the CCP under Xi has also established Overseas Chinese Service Centres, a global network of offices designed in name to help the Chinese diaspora to adapt to life in different countries. While the centres likely do serve that purpose, they also encourage loyalty to Xi and promote his achievements and thoughts across the globe.
Dissent
Despite these measures, there has been limited criticism of Xi to emerge from China. After his removal of term limits, Chinese social media users took to posting images of Winnie the Pooh (who they think looks like Xi) as a subtle attempt to protest his grip on power. All mentions of Winnie the Pooh were later banned by the CCP. In another rare rebuke of the President, a law professor in Beijing, Xu Zhangrun, called on lawmakers to reverse the decision to abolish term limits. Zhangrun was subsequently arrested in 2020 but has since been released. China’s slowing economic growth and mounting governmental debt could also promote dissent amongst the middle class, who are peddled a version of Chinese economic superiority that may not always match up to their experiences in the labour market.
In Hong Kong and Taiwan, two contested territories, the criticism has been even more pronounced. In 2019, after the CCP introduced an extradition order in Hong Kong, which is a Special Administrative Region of China, mass protests erupted across the state. After activists sieged the Polytechnic University, the Chinese government oversaw a series of high-profile arrests which were met with wide-spread international condemnation. Similarly in Taiwan, which China views as a breakaway state, the country’s President, Tsai Ing wen, promised to uphold its sovereignty after Xi called for the reunification of both countries. Internationally, China has faced massive criticism over its human rights abuses, its trade practices, and its aggressive foreign policy under Xi.
Impact on China
Since Mao, China has had a series of leaders who prioritised an open, almost capitalist, economic policy and a moderate, cautious foreign policy. Under Xi, much of that has changed. As another Jamestown Foundation
points out, Xi has shown a willingness to discount or rewrite history in a way which suits his priorities. On the 40th anniversary of the economic reforms instituted by Xiaoping, Xi failed to mention the venerated leader’s name even once. Instead, he made several references to ziligengsheng or self-reliance, a phrase regularly used by Mao. Xiaoping’s policies catapulted China into a 21st century economic powerhouse and Xi’s willingness to ignore that could be interpreted as a trajectory towards greater state control over businesses.
In its most recent five-year plan, the CCP has outlined tighter regulations over much of the Chinese economy. It states that rules will be introduced to cover national security, technology, and monopolies. Shares in many Chinese companies have fallen this year following concerns over the crackdown, with high-profile companies like the Ant Group, chaired by Chinese billionaire Jack Ma, failing to escape scrutiny. In an article for Foreign Affairs Magazine, Elizabeth Economy argues that “too much party control – perhaps too much consolidated in Xi’s hands – has contributed to economic stagnation.” China’s credit ratings have also fallen sharply since 2017, with agencies such as Moody’s and S&P predicting a negative outlook over fears of overarching government control and declining economic growth. In an interview with indianexpress.com, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a professor of political science at Hong Kong Baptist University, says that as Xi continues at the helm, China will increase its control over large businesses, but small ones will likely be spared.
According to another article in Foreign Affairs Magazine, policy making has also suffered under Xi with “decisions becoming more opaque and politicized.” This is largely because under the current political climate, ministers are unable to question Xi’s policies and fear giving him accurate information when that information undercuts his assumptions. Meanwhile, although Xi’s crackdown on corruption has been commendable, it has failed to end the patronage system in the bureaucracy and has also pardoned companies and individuals closely connected to Xi from oversight.
China also risks greater uncertainty in the event of a succession crisis. According to data collected by McGregor and Blanchette, 41 per cent of the world’s autocrats either experience death, exile, or imprisonment within a year of leaving office. That’s true for only seven per cent of democratic leaders. Xi’s unwillingness to relinquish control could lead to domestic tensions in China which would subsequently have cascading consequences for the rest of the world.
Impact on the rest of the world
In the early 2000s, Chinese leaders emphasised the fact that China would rise peacefully. However, under Xi, the country has assumed a far more aggressive posture. The CPP has modernised its military, employed the use of grey zone tactics in building islands in the South China Sea, has stifled civil liberties in Hong Kong and Tibet, has engaged in mass cyberwarfare, been involved with border skirmishes with India and has pursued an aggressive form of international relations known as Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. Beijing is clear in its ambitions to be a global superpower and it is willing to toe the line when it comes to means of achieving that.
Xi has also spearheaded the ambitious One Belt One Road (BRI) initiative, investing over $4.3 trillion in foreign infrastructure projects as of September 2020. Although the US has tried to counter the BRI with its Blue Dot alliance, it pales in comparison to the BRI in both scale and impact. A 2019 study by global economic consultants CEBR forecasted that the BRI would boost global GDP by $7.1 trillion per annum by 2040. However, the initiative is not without flaws.
Many of the investments made by China come at the expense of the host nation. In Ecuador for example, China built a dam that was supposed to account for a significant amount of the country’s energy needs. In order to finance the dam and other infrastructure projects, the Ecuadorian government took a $19 billion loan from China. Today, the dam, constructed by Chinese workers, is producing a fraction of the energy it was supposed to. Regardless, according to the terms of the agreement, China still gets paid, taking 80 per cent of Ecuador’s most valuable export – oil – until the debt is settled. To finance this, Ecuador has been forced to cancel or put on hold several other development projects.
China has invested heavily in Africa, Asia, and South America under the BRI. However, as proven with Ecuador that investment often serves as a debt trap for the receiving countries. It also comes with strings attached. China has pressured many of the countries into suspending relations with Taiwan. According to Cabestan, Xi is likely to try and annex Taiwan although the US will try to prevent it. Taiwan is the world’s largest producer of semiconductor chips, a valuable commodity in various sectors ranging from tech, automobiles, and telecom. If China succeeds in annexing Taiwan, it will further entrench its place in the global economy and cause mass instability in the region.
For India, China’s border skirmishes are a particular point of concern, as are its ambitions in the South China sea and infrastructure investments in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Countries like Australia that have tried to stand up against Beijing have been on the receiving end of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy and given how crucial a trading partner China is for India, New Delhi will be wary to risk incurring its wrath. The relationship is also aligned in China’s favour. China is India’s second largest trading partner whereas India is China’s 11th. China also exports four times the value of goods that it imports from India. In terms of the future of the relationship, Cabestan, asserts that it will include a “mixture of confrontation and cooperation.” Additionally, the “border issue won’t be solved and the great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean will continue to increase.”
Written by Mira Patel
Source: Indian Express, 16/11/21
