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Wednesday, December 15, 2021

Bank of Baroda launches “bob World Wave”- wearable payment solution

 Bank of Baroda (BoB) has launched a wearable payment solution called “bob World Wave”.

Key Points

  • Bob World Wave was launched for digital banking payments.
  • This technology is witnessing the rise of tremendous interest worldwide and lenders are using this opportunity for adopting more convenient and cashless digital payments systems.
  • This innovative solution seeks to perfectly deliver preventive health actions and easier payment transactions.

Who has developed this technology?

To develop the “bob world wave”, Bank of Baroda partnered with NPCI. It was developed by leveraging the existing NFC based technology.

Significance of the solution

  • Bob world wave is a “Bank’s on the go” wearable payment solution.
  • It has been designed to ensure seamless and convenient digital payments for customers.
  • It is expected that 10% of the small ticket payments will be done using wearable devices in next two years.
  • This technology will empower customer for carrying their day-to-day transactions securely and seamlessly.

What is the need of this technology?

With the increasing acceptance infrastructure, demand for contactless payment mechanisms is also increasing steadily. The overall consumer sentiment is supporting wearables’ permanence in payments industry.

Features of the bob World Wave

  • bob World Wave wearable solution will allow customers to monitor their body temperature, heart rate, Sp02 and blood pressure.
  • Bank of Baroda is also providing an exclusive 3-months free wellness package with the bob World Wave solution. Wellness package will be provided along with a personal health coach, interactive video coaching and doctor teleconsultation.
  • It will provide contactless payments of up to Rs 5000 across all NFC enabled PoS devices. Payment above Rs 5000 can be made using a pin.
  • Bank of Baroda will also provide a dummy plastic card, comprising of the same card number printed as that on the wearable device along with expiry date and CVV. This card will enable customers to do e-commerce transactions easily.

Bank of Baroda (BOB)

BOB is India’s fourth nationalised bank and a financial services company. It works under the ownership of Ministry of Finance.

Privacy assurances mustn’t result in data value losses

 In my book Privacy 3.0, I had suggested that we were entering the third age of privacy—a period in which increasingly stringent privacy regulations could, if we are not careful, deprive us of some benefits that data has to offer. Since the time of its publication, a number of countries seem to have come to similar conclusions, recognizing that unless they can come up with a better solution for protecting personal privacy, they will never be able to unlock the value inherent in personal data

The EU, whose General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is widely recognized as today’s gold standard for privacy regulation, has tacitly acknowledged the need for extra-legal solutions that data subjects can use to better control their data. The European Data Strategy, adopted in February 2020, states that individuals should be given tools so they can take control of their data and decide, at a granular level, what is to be done with it. This strategy is going to be implemented through the enactment of the EU Data Governance Act, which will establish “common data spaces" that will, through a combination of technical infrastructure and governance rules, make data more widely available for use in society while ensuring that entities which generate it remain in effective control of it.

Australia, for its part, has launched its Consumer Data Rights (CDR) initiative, aimed at ensuring that citizens have greater access to their own data, allowing them to obtain this data in a usable form so that they can direct it to be securely transferred to trusted third parties. The first implementation of the CDR has been in the country’s banking sector, where granular data transfers between participant banks has been made possible through a centrally-defined protocol. Similarly, India’s implementation of the Data Empowerment and Protection Architecture (DEPA) in the financial sector (with the launch of the Account Aggregator framework), offers tools through which users can more effectively manage the flow of their personal financial data.

While there are clearly a number of different normative technologies being developed to augment existing data protection regulations, they all fall into two broad categories. The first provides data subjects with tools they can use to manage personal data, right from the moment it is created, thus allowing them to determine how it is subsequently shared to the point of even controlling how insights generated from this data are used. Examples of this approach include the Solid project (promoted by Sir Tim Berners-Lee) and the MyData model of human-centric design. Both these sets of tools operate on data from before it is collected, granting individuals full control over the data’s entire life-cycle and giving them tools with which to manage its creation, storage and use as well as to control its flow between different data controllers. However, in order for these tools to proliferate, they need to be widely adopted by a large enough number of users that would convince data controllers of the necessity of implementing these protocols in their offerings.

Tools in the second category are designed to unlock personal data already under the control of data controllers operating in different sectors of the economy, so that the data they control can be securely transferred to others with the consent of users. Australia’s CDR and India’s DEPA frameworks are examples of this, offering users technology frameworks through which data sharing has been implemented in the financial services sector to start with. While there are several differences between the Indian and Australian frameworks, broadly speaking, tools in this category operate on data silos, unlocking data that has already been collected by making it easy to transfer it to other entities with the required consent. For this approach to have a substantial impact, these frameworks need to be adopted by institutions that control data. This might seem daunting, except that when that happens, the benefits of safe and convenient data sharing would be unlocked for all customers of participant entities.

On the face of it, these two approaches may seem contradictory, given how they focus on opposite ends of the spectrum. However, a closer examination suggests that they are not mutually incompatible. With so much data already stored in silos that are effectively beyond the ability of individuals to control, we need to implement a DEPA-like approach to unlock that data for the benefit of the consumer. Absent such an intervention, users will be unable to utilize their data that has already been aggregated in sectors such as finance and health. At the same time, tools like Solid are necessary to implement personal data stores in which newly created data can be managed so that the information contained within them can be more effectively used without detrimentally affecting personal privacy.

No technology can, of itself, deliver the data-driven future I had written about in my book. As promising as these tools are, they need to derive their legitimacy from privacy principles embedded in the law. At the same time, laws alone are incapable of delivering the level of data governance required in a world increasingly dependent on data. They need to be augmented by technology solutions that are compatible with the statutory framework.

We need models that combine normative technologies with smart regulations. Thankfully, we have more than just a few options to choose from.

Rahul Matthan is a partner at Trilegal and also has a podcast by the name Ex Machina

Source: Mintepaper, 15/12/21

What the 1971 refugees have to do with Indian politics today

 

Sanjib Baruah writes: Even if half a century later, the civil war that split Pakistan has had a decisive impact on the ideological battle over India’s national identity.


The civil war in East Pakistan in 1971 — that saw a huge influx of refugees to India — and which led to the break-up of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh, is remembered in India mostly for its impact on the subcontinent’s geopolitical landscape. The consequences of the presence of those refugees on our domestic political order do not receive much attention.

The standard story is that most refugees returned home soon after the liberation of Bangladesh. This is partly responsible for the unfounded myth that India’s domestic political order was insulated from the refugee influx. This is, of course, not how the refugee influx is remembered in Assam and other Northeastern states.

There are good reasons to doubt the narrative of near complete repatriation. Indeed, the Indian government has itself cast serious doubts on this narrative on various occasions. The fact that the political effects of the refugee influx have been most pronounced in a region long relegated to the periphery of Indian policy is surely another reason why this myth has persisted.

The fact that the Assam Movement (1979-1985) broke out in the same decade as the Bangladesh liberation war is not an accident. Those six years of political turmoil saw the collapse of four elected ministries, the outbreak of an armed insurgency, and three spells of president’s rule. The violent elections of 1983, including the horrendous Nellie massacre, are also part of this history. The troubles that began with the refugee influx eventually led to the coming of the hard state to Assam in 1990 when the whole of Assam was declared a “disturbed area” under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

The AFSPA regime has remained in force in Assam partly because the legacies of the Assam Movement remain live, unresolved issues in the state’s politics. If these are considered among the effects of the Bangladesh liberation war, the geopolitical benefits that accrued to India need to be balanced against these significant domestic political costs, even though they are concentrated in a single “peripheral” region.

There would have been no Assam Movement had there been no Bangladesh liberation war. The sheer size of the refugee population gave new life to old fears that migrants from eastern Bengal risk turning Assam’s khilonjia or autochthonous peoples into minorities in their own lands. It is not just the presence of refugees or their numbers that produced this anxiety. The phenomenon that sociologist Kamal Sadiq calls “suffraged non-citizens” gave political force to those fears. Since the exercise of franchise in India relies on rudimentary documents that can easily be obtained through informal means, the distinction between citizens and non-citizens becomes blurred. The perception that the number of voters had risen abnormally in the aftermath of the refugee influx became the trigger for the Assam Movement.

Had all refugees gone back to their homes, the foreign nationals’ issue would not have rankled Assam and the country for all these years. Indeed, it has been the conventional wisdom in Assam that the Assam Movement failed in its primary objective. This made the Assam Accord, which ended the Assam Movement, a hallowed document in the state’s political discourse. When the BJP began to move on the citizenship amendment bill, the resistance to it in Assam focused entirely on the fact that it grossly violates the Assam Accord.

A barely hidden secret about the refugee influx was that a majority of those who fled East Pakistan to India were Hindus. This was only to be expected since the Yahya Khan regime viewed the liberation movement as an Indian conspiracy and its repressive backlash fell upon most of the region’s Hindu households. Of the estimated 9.7 million refugees who migrated to India in 1971, 70 per cent were Hindus. The West Pakistani generals had calculated that by forcing millions of East Pakistani Hindus to flee to India they would weaken Bengali nationalism as a political force. Their aim, as the sociologist, late Partha Nath Mukherji, observed at the time, was “to uproot the Hindus, not to eliminate them, and in this they seem to have succeeded admirably”.

Ironically, while Indian officials liked to describe the Pakistani military’s massacre of East Pakistanis as genocide, “the best case for branding these atrocities as genocide”, as Gary Bass of Princeton University puts it, “was one that India did not dare make”. They feared that “publicising anti-Hindu genocide could have splintered Indians on communal lines . . . possibly setting off riots”. The architects of the Assam Movement, of course, saw the influx for what it was: That there were both Hindus and Muslims among the refugees, but that a clear majority were Hindus.

The Yahya Khan regime’s strategy of demographic engineering met its match in prime minister Indira Gandhi. She was determined to send the refugees back. Indeed, stopping the refugee influx and ensuring the safe return of the millions already in India were the key goals of India’s military intervention.

Whatever the official rationale for the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 2019, it marks a decisive break from the Indian policy of refusing to yield to the demographic engineering strategy of the West Pakistani generals who ran the war in East Pakistan. The CAA effectively accommodates the Hindu refugees of 1971, that is the majority of the refugees (and also people of other minority faiths, which was added for euphemistic reasons). But it excludes refugees that are Muslim. Rather remarkably, top BJP leaders continue to claim that they are working to implement the Assam Accord. But obviously they can do this only by shifting attention to the accord’s secondary clauses that are unrelated to the foreign nationals’ question.

The CAA is built on a fundamentally different set of assumptions about the idea of India than the one that informed Indian policy in 1971. With its adoption, it could be said that the civil war that split Pakistan has come to have a decisive impact on the ideological battle over India’s national identity, even if half a century later.

Baruah is Professor of Political Studies at Bard College, New York.


Source: Indian Express, 15/12/21

Tuesday, December 14, 2021

Quote of the Day December 14, 2021

 

“I like the dreams of the future better than the history of the past.”
Thomas Jefferson (April 13, 1743–July 4, 1826), Third President of America
“मुझे तो अतीत के इतिहास से कहीं अच्छे लगते हैं भविष्य के सपने।”
टॉमस जैफ़रसन (१७४३-१८२६), तीसरे अमरीकी राष्ट्रपति

Economic and Political Weekly: Table of Contents

 

Vol. 56, Issue No. 50, 11 Dec, 2021

Editorials

From the Editor's Desk

From 50 Years Ago

Commentary

Review Article

Perspectives

Special Articles

Current Statistics

Postscript

Letters

‘Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code’ in the News

 

Highlights

  • As per a written reply to a question in Lok Sabha, Union Law Minister Kiren Rijiju stated that, on May 31, 2021 Supreme Court in its order on a writ petition had observed that “ambit & parameters of provisions of Sections 124A, 505 and 153A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 requires interpretation, especially with respect to right of electronic & print media to communicate news”.
  • As per minister, SC has also issued notice to Centre on a plea in which petitioners have asked for an appropriate writ, order or direction to declare Section 124A of IPC, 1860 unconstitutional and void.

What is Sedition law?

Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) deals with the Sedition Law. This section defines sedition as an offence committed when “any person attempts to excite disaffection towards government established by law, by means of spoken or written words, or by signs, or by visible representation. Such disaffection includes disloyalty and feelings of enmity.  Sedition is a non-bailable offence. Its punishment ranges from imprisonment up to three years to a life term. Fines may also be added. A person charged with sedition law is barred from government job and they have to live without their passport.

History of the Sedition Laws

Sedition laws were enacted in 17th century. During that time, lawmakers believed that only good opinions towards government should survive, because bad opinions were detrimental to government and monarchy. Laws were first drafted by Thomas Macaulay in 1837. Original laws were inexplicably omitted when IPC was enacted in 1860.

India’s Harnaaz Sandhu crowned Miss Universe 2021

 

Key Facts

  • The 70th Miss Universe 2021 was held in Eilat, Israel.
  • India was represented by Ms Harnaaz Sandhu.
  • Ms Sandhu is 21-year-old and comes from Punjab.
  • She claimed the Miss Universe crown, siding out Nadia Ferreira from Paraguay and Lalela Mswane from South Africa.

Who presented the crown to Ms Sandhu?

Crown was presented to Ms Sandhu by Andrea Meza, who was the former Miss Universe 2020 from Mexico.

Indians who won this title before?

Before Ms Sandhu, only two Indians have won the title of Miss Universe:

  1. Sushmita Sen in 1994 and
  2. Lara Dutta in 2000.

Journey of Ms Sandhu

Ms Sandhu had started her journey at the age of 17, in pageantry. She has previously been crowned with-

  • Femina Miss India Punjab 2019
  • Miss Diva 2021
  • She was also placed in Top 12 at Femina Miss India 2019.

She has also worked in Punjabi movies such as- Yaara Diyan Poo Baran and Bai Ji Kuttange.

About Miss Universe

Miss Universe is an annual international beauty pageant. It is run by the United States–based Miss Universe Organization. This pageant is one of the most watched pageants worldwide, with an estimated audience of 500 million viewers across 190 territories. Apart from Miss World; Miss International, Miss Earth and Miss Universe are among Big Four international beauty pageants.

Who own the miss universe organization?

Miss Universe Organization and its brand are presently owned by Endeavor. Telemundo has got the licensing rights to air the pageant for next 5 years.