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Monday, May 02, 2022

Revisit the Seventh Schedule to improve Centre-state relations

 The Union government recently revoked the orders and guidelines issued under the Disaster Management Act (DMA), 2005. Many of these were issued once the Act was invoked on 24 May 2020, soon after covid came knocking on India’s doors. The DMA has been the backbone of policy interventions to fight covid. However, since health is a state subject, how was something like the DMA passed in the first place to deal with issues related to health, among others?

Any legislation can be passed under an enabling constitutional provision. Article 246 of the Constitution in the Seventh Schedule has Union, state and concurrent lists. Disasters do not figure in any of these lists. So, under which enabling provision was the DMA passed? Before it was passed, the related Bill was referred by the Rajya Sabha to a parliamentary panel headed by the late Sushma Swaraj. One should quote the 115th report of the Department related Parliamentary Standing Committee, Home Affairs, on The Disaster Management Bill, 2005: “The proposed legislation is relatable to Entry 23 (Social Security and Social Insurance) in the Concurrent List of the Constitution. This will have the advantage that it will permit the States also to have their own legislation on disaster management." It was ‘Social Security and Social Insurance’ which enabled central legislation on disasters.

In the early days of the pandemic, Prime Minister Narendra Modi urged the nation to turn the ongoing crisis into favourable opportunities. However, some states cleverly converted it into an opportunity to fill state coffers. States like West Bengal, Maharashtra, Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh legalized the home delivery of alcohol to address a shortfall in tax revenues. Funnily enough, liquor delivery was done under the ambit of the DMA. Ironically, it was invoked for liquor delivery to promote social security and social insurance.

Taxes on alcohol account for a significant share of the total revenue in many states. India’s five southern states cumulatively account for 45% of total domestic consumption, with alcohol accounting for 10 to 15% of state revenues in each. One should probe the correlation between revenue generated from the sale of liquor and good development indicators. That said, whatever might be a state’s stance on prohibition, if a state allows the sale of liquor in its jurisdiction, why can’t it be delivered home?

Apart from political reasons, one reason is the absence of enabling legislation. Now that orders under the DMA have been revoked, unless the states come up with appropriate legislation, they will have to curtail their home delivery of alcohol. The pertinent issue is not the delivery of it, but the impediments that state governments will face in moving such laws on account of inherent issues with the Seventh Schedule.

There are primarily five issues that plague the Seventh Schedule, which is a relic of the colonial past inherited from the Government of India Act, 1935. Why should the same principles be followed even today?

The Constituent Assembly had comprehensively enumerated subjects for legislation in the three lists and expanded them in the Government of India Act, 1935. However, these lists do not reflect the complex realities of India in its 75th year of independence.

There is no dearth of instances in which states shirk their responsibilities for even the subjects covered under the state list. For instance, state highways are often classified as national highways so that they can be properly looked after. Similarly, if the pandemic has taught us something, it is that the Union government should be in a position to legislate more freely on some issues related to health (vaccination, for instance). Another example is of the police. While law and order is a state subject, states often ask for the help of paramilitary forces in times of crisis.

States have also advocated the transfer of some subjects from the Union and concurrent lists to the state list. For instance, entry No. 58 of the Union list is on the manufacturing, supply and distribution of salt by Union agencies; and regulations and control of manufacture, supply and distribution of salt by other agencies. It can be argued that it is unnecessary for the Union to legislate on issues related to salt. States have also criticized the transfer of some subjects from the state list to the concurrent list. ‘

Two key commissions have looked at Centre-state relations, i.e. the Sarkaria Commission and the Punchi Commission. Both advised comprehensive consultation between the Union and state governments before moving anything from the state list to the concurrent list. But neither commission has looked into it comprehensively. N.K. Singh, chairman of the 15th Finance Commission, has time and again argued for reforms in the Seventh Schedule.

Some have even advocated further decentralization of that Schedule by introducing a local government list. This list is especially pertinent in the light of rapid urbanization across countries. While we acknowledge that there are issues with introducing a local body list, the idea is worth a debate.

Thus, there is a need for periodic reviews of these lists—say, after every 20 years. Liquor being linked to disasters is a stark reminder of that.

Bibek Debroy & Aditya Sinha are, respectively, chairman, Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister; and additional private secretary, research, at the EAC-PM

Source : Mintepaper, 1/05/22

Economic & Political Weekly: Table of Contents

 


Vol. 57, Issue No. 18, 30 Apr, 2022

Editorials

Comment

From the Editor's Desk

From 50 Years Ago

Commentary

Book Reviews

Perspectives

Insight

Special Articles

Postscript

Current Statistics

Letters

Engage Articles

Current Affairs- April 30, 2022

 

INDIA

– Reserved category candidates are entitled to general seats on the basis of merit: SC

– Mandate Document of National Curriculum Framework launched in Bengaluru

– Mission SAGAR IX: INS Gharial reaches Colombo, delivers critical medical aid to Sri Lanka

– Lieutenant General B. S. Raju to take over as Vice Chief of Army Staff on May 1

– Govt reinstates IAS officer Shah Faesal in service 3 years after he resigned and joined politics in J&K

– Tamil Nadu 11 die as chariot in religious procession near Thanjavur touches live wire

– EU special representative for human rights Eamon Gilmore visits India

ECONOMY & CORPORATE

– Foreign exchange reserves down by USD 3.271 billion to USD 600.423 billion in the week ended April 22

– Star9 Mobility to buy 51% govt stake in Pawan Hans for Rs 211.14 cr

– Global Patidar Business Summit (GPBS) being organized by Sardardham on April 29-May 1 at Surat

– PM Modi inaugurates Semicon India Conference-2022 in Bengaluru

WORLD

– 60 countries join hands for open, free and secure global internet

– Ukraine: Russia claims having destroyed production buildings at defence factory in Kyiv

– 2022 Whitley wildlife conservation award winners announced; Whitley gold award, worth £100,000, won by Dr Charudutt Mishra, the world expert on snow leopards

– THE (Times Higher Education) Impact Rankings 2022 released; topped by Western Sydney University

2022 LAUREUS WORLD SPORTS AWARDS

– Sportsman of the Year Award: Max Verstappen (Formula One racing)

– Sportswoman of the Year Award: Elaine Thompson-Herah (Athletics)

– World Team of the Year Award: Italy Men’s Football Team

– Breakthrough of the Year Award: Emma Raducanu (Tennis)

– Comeback of the Year Award: Sky Brown (Skateboarding)

– World Sportsperson of the Year with a Disability Award: Marcel Hug (Wheelchair Athletics)

– World Action Sportsperson of the Year Award: Bethany Shriever (BMX)

– Lifetime Achievement Award: Tom Brady (American football)

– Academy Exceptional Achievement Award: Robert Lewandowski

– Sporting Icon Award: Valentino Rossi (Motorcycle Racing)

– Sport for Good Award: Lost Boyz Inc (Baseball)

– Sport for Good Society Award: Real Madrid Foundation

– Athlete Advocate of the Year Award: Gerald Asamoah and the Black Eagles (football)

Ending AFSPA

 

AFSPA should go entirely because of the impunity it offers armed forces


It augurs well for the future that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has given the first authentic indication that the operation of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) may come to an end in the whole of the north-eastern region, if ongoing efforts to normalise the situation bear fruit. Mr. Modi’s remark that a good deal of work is being done in that direction, not only in Assam but also Nagaland and Manipur, may be rooted in his keenness to demonstrate the level of progress achieved in the region under his regime; but it will bring immense relief to the citizens, nevertheless. Areas notified as ‘disturbed areas’ under AFSPA have been progressively reduced in the last few years, mainly due to the improvement in the security situation. About a month ago, the Union Home Ministry reduced such notified areas considerably in Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. There was a substantial reduction in Assam, where AFSPA was removed entirely in 23 districts and partially in one. In Nagaland, after the removal of the law from 15 police stations in seven districts, it remains in areas under 57 police stations, spread across 13 districts. Areas under 82 police stations are still notified under the Act in Manipur, even though 15 police station areas were excluded from the notification from April 1. Mr. Modi, who spoke at a ‘peace, unity and development rally’ in Diphu in Assam last week, cited “better administration” and the “return of peace” as the reasons for the removal of AFSPA in these areas in a region that has seen insurgencies for decades.

AFSPA was revoked in Tripura in 2015 and in Meghalaya in 2018. It is not unforeseeable that other States will also be excluded from its purview at some point of time. It is convenient to link the exclusion of an area from AFSPA’s purview with reduction in violence by armed groups, improvement in the security situation and an increase in development activity, but what is important is the recognition that the law created an atmosphere of impunity and led to the commission of excesses and atrocities. It was hardly four months ago that 15 civilians were killed in Mon district in Nagaland in a botched military operation. Therefore, alongside the gradual reduction in the areas under the Act, there should be serious efforts to procure justice for victims of past excesses too. On the political side, it is indeed true that much headway has been made in moving towards a political solution to some of the multifarious disputes in the region, in the form of peace accords, ceasefire and creation of sub-regional administrative arrangements. The removal of AFSPA from the entire region will be an inevitable step in the process. But irrespective of the security situation, AFSPA should not have allowed such impunity to the armed forces.

Source: The Hindu, 2/05/22

Transgender people and utilities

 

Using a public restroom is a person’s basic right. India is a country with equal rights for all people, not just men and women. Despite the fact that everyone has the right to equality, a few people have been denied it. For instance, transgender people face difficulties in using public facilities.

Two lines of men and women had formed in front of the restroom at a bus stop. In addition to the women, a transgender person joined their line. There was an uproar, and the women glanced at each other, murmuring. That individual was the topic of conversation. The women abruptly began to leave, one by one. After a few minutes, only the transgender person remained in the line. But the ticket collector said, “This line is for women, not for someone like you.” The person then walked over to a nearby ditch for the biological emergency. There were obscene remarks and screams coming from every direction. This was even described as shameful conduct by some.

Yet, when we think about it, the women who stepped away were shameful, as was the ticket collector who threw the money and refused use of the restroom.

Being a transgender person is not simple, and the struggles they face in life are unlike any other. When people discover their sexuality is not male or female, they experience depression, and even develop suicidal thoughts.

If they’ve made it this far, they’ll have to face the next challenge: getting their parents to accept them. When their parents refuse to accept them, many of them become like orphans. They scavenge for food in the slums. They aren’t given any work. As a result, they take up any job that comes their way. They have a difficult life, and yet we make it even more difficult for them by our actions.

We pass judgment on their circumstances and regard them as second-class citizens. Even the educated, who should be setting an example, are unaware of the transgender community’s plight.

Despite the fact that there are seats available in colleges and workplaces, transgender people do not occupy them because they are discriminated against. Only if people’s hearts have a sliver of humanity can this be changed. Being human does not imply that you must be born as a man or woman; rather, it implies that you have a proclivity to accept all living things. Labelling of public restrooms for men, women, and transgender people is a better strategy.


The Hindu, 1/05/22

Nishuna Sugumar


Why caste among Muslims must be studied

 For the last two decades, the Indian public sphere has seen a slow but steady rise in discussions on caste among Muslims. A series of events has contributed to this: The influence of Mandal politics on Muslim organisations and the coming together of lower caste Muslim groups in Maharashtra, as well as in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh under the banner of “Pasmanda” (“left behind”); the commissioning of the Sachar Committee and Ranganath Misra Commission reports by the UPA government; and a rise in academic scholarship on several aspects of caste among Muslims.

The realisation that Muslims too are affected by caste has far-reaching effects: It has the potential to unravel how Muslims and “Muslim issues” are seen in India, most notably by those who claim to represent them. Scholars have pointed out that most Muslims of India belong to backward castes. Imtiaz Ahmed and Khalid Ansari have put the figure at 85 per cent — a number which, if accurate, would show several “Muslim issues”, including low socio-economic indicators, as first arising from caste factors.

However, the lack of data has affected comprehensive studies and claims on Muslim caste and their socio-economic backwardness. To start with, there is no reliable recent estimate of the proportion of Muslim caste groups across the nation. Data from the 1871 census suggests a ratio of around 19 per cent upper caste to 81 per cent lower caste Muslims. However, the Sachar Committee report put the figure of lower caste Muslims at 40 per cent of the Muslim population, based on NSSO data. The Mandal Commission report also put it at only 52 per cent (though it did not calculate the Dalit Muslim population).

The discontinuation of counting caste in the Census after independence (except for Scheduled Castes) has affected the understanding of the status of communities and castes across India. But in the case of Muslims — where the presence of caste itself is too easily denied by the state and elite Muslim representatives’ “egalitarian scriptures”—there is a dual denial in play. The absence of a caste census has meant the erasure of caste as a category to understand Muslims — their impoverishment, educational backwardness or occupational precarity. For instance, the Gopal Singh Committee report of 1983, commissioned to look into poverty, expresses surprise at the fact that Muslim artisans “who possess so much of talent in arts and crafts” are still landless, poor, and exploited. If the commission understood “art” among Muslim communities not as an ahistorical de-contextualised “talent”, but as traditional occupations steeped in caste structures, they would have been able to better understand poverty among Muslims.

In this context, two studies published this year come as a welcome addition to help us understand caste among Muslims better and help put some figures in perspective. First, a recently published paper in the Journal of International Development by Chhavi Tiwari, Srinivas Goli, Mohammad Zahid Siddiqui and Pradeep S. Salve looks at 7,000 households in UP to compare landholding, poverty, employment, education and health indicators at a sub-caste level for both Hindu and Muslim castes.

The study estimates that 76 per cent of Muslims are lower castes, with Dalit Muslims comprising 24 per cent of the Muslim population. The percentage of Dalit Muslims, in particular, comes across as quite significant as very few policy decisions take into account this section of the population which faces untouchability but (along with Dalit Christians) does not get any protection under the Scheduled Caste status.

The study reiterates the difference in indicators for upper caste and lower caste Muslims. Rural poverty among Dalit and OBCs Muslims is 53 per cent and 42 per cent, respectively, as against 31 per cent among upper caste (general) Muslims. The share of landless households is 80 per cent among Dalit Muslims against 44 per cent among upper-caste Muslims. Dalit and OBC Muslims face two times greater exclusion from formal financial services such as loans from banks.

The study suggests greater socio-economic disparity among upper caste and lower caste Muslims, and a higher percentage of lower caste Muslims than previous studies estimated. While NSSO approximates caste data about Muslims by cross tabulating responses under the heads of “religion” and “social group”, this study follows a bottom-up approach, directly asking “biradaris”(communities) in the survey, and matching them to the traditional caste-occupational structure for both Hindus and Muslims.

However, the study also reiterates that upper caste Muslims are still at a considerable disadvantage compared to Hindu upper castes across the spectrum of socio-economic indicators. For example, the poverty ratio in rural areas for Upper caste Hindus is 14 per cent, while the same is 31 per cent for Muslim upper castes. A similar disparity can also be found in urban poverty, land and wealth holding. Overall, upper-caste Hindus are at a greater advantage compared to any other group in the country.

Another recent study by Julien Levesque, Laurence Gautier, and Nicolas Belorgey is of note. Mapping the “social spaces” that Muslim leaders occupy, the study offers some quantitative insight into Muslim leadership. In his 2000 book Masawat ki Jung, Ali Anwar emphasised the overrepresentation of Syeds and Sheikhs in several Muslim bodies in Bihar (For example, at the time, out of 39 executive members of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, 36 were upper caste). This study looks at a larger geographical spread, narrowing down to 164 Muslim leaders across India. It notes that 70 per cent of Muslim leaders belong to upper castes. Further, the composition hasn’t changed in the last 30 years.

These works are welcome and necessary. They underline that caste remains the fundamental unit of Indian society across religions and a caste census could unravel many questions about power, representation and “appeasement” in the country.

Written by Shireen Azam , Srinivas Goli 

Source: Indian Express, 2/05/22

Friday, April 29, 2022

Quote of the Day April 29, 2022

 

“Action is not a matter of right and wrong. It is only when action is partial, not total, that there is right and wrong.”
Bruce Lee
“कर्म सही या गलत नहीं होता है। लेकिन जब कर्म आंशिक, अधूरा होता है, सही या गलत की बात तब सामने आती है।”
ब्रूस ली