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Tuesday, September 26, 2023

Harvard University Rowland Fellows Program 2024

 The renowned Rowland Institute at Harvard University actively seeks the most exceptional young experimentalists in all areas of science and engineering. Through the esteemed Rowland Fellowship 2024, individuals are provided with a remarkable opportunity to establish their own independent research program within the intellectually stimulating environment of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Successful applicants must have completed their doctoral degree prior to commencing their Fellowship term, ensuring a strong foundation for their research pursuits.

The Harvard University Rowland Fellowship 2024 offers a conducive environment for cutting-edge research, encouraging innovation. With ample funding for equipment, postdocs, undergraduates, and operations, the Fellowship ensures seamless progress. Collaborating with expert staff scientists and engineers, Rowland Fellows can create and construct novel experimental setups. Access to state-of-the-art research equipment is facilitated across various facilities within the Institute and Harvard University. Experience the flexible and dynamic atmosphere of the Rowland Institute at Harvard the Rowland Fellowship, driving groundbreaking research.

The Rowland Fellows Program at Harvard University offers a transformative opportunity for aspiring researchers. Designed to nurture high-risk, high-reward projects, the program empowers Fellows to push the boundaries of scientific exploration. With access to cutting-edge resources and collaboration with esteemed scientists, the program provides a launchpad for innovative careers. Rowland Fellows are supported in their pursuit of groundbreaking research across various disciplines. Join the prestigious ranks of Rowland Fellows at Harvard University and unlock your potential to make significant contributions to the scientific community. You can also apply for Banting Postdoctoral Fellowships Program 2024 in Canada

Short Summary of Rowland Fellows Program 2023:

  • Fellowship Host Country: United States
  • Host University: Rowland Institute at Harvard University
  • Course Level: Postgraduate (various disciplines)
  • Value: Generous funding and support
  • Eligibility: Open to international students

Benefits of Rowland Fellows Program 2024

  • Access to world-class resources and facilities at Harvard University, a renowned institution for academic excellence.
  • Generous funding and financial support to cover tuition fees, living expenses, and research costs.
  • Mentorship and guidance from distinguished faculty members and renowned experts in various fields.
  • Opportunities for interdisciplinary collaboration and networking with fellow Rowland Fellows and scholars from diverse backgrounds.
  • Exposure to cutting-edge research projects and the chance to contribute to groundbreaking discoveries.
  • Professional development and career support, including workshops, seminars, and networking events.
  • Possibility of publishing research findings in prestigious academic journals and presenting at conferences.
  • Integration into a vibrant academic community that fosters intellectual growth and encourages innovation.
  • Access to a wide range of academic and extracurricular resources and opportunities at Harvard University.

Check Microsoft Research Fellowship Program 2023-24

Eligibility Criteria of the Rowland Fellows Program:

  1. Applicants should have a strong academic background, typically with a doctoral degree or equivalent in their field of study.
  2. Candidates must demonstrate exceptional research potential and a commitment to pursuing groundbreaking research in their chosen field.
  3. The program is open to both domestic and international students from around the world.
  4. The program encourages applicants from diverse disciplines and seeks individuals with a strong interest in interdisciplinary collaboration.
  5. The fellowship is primarily aimed at early-career researchers, typically within a few years of completing their doctoral degree.
  6. Proficiency in the English language is essential for effective communication and participation in the program.

Deadline:

The application deadline to apply for the Rowland Fellowship 2024 is August 20, 2023.

Check World Bank Junior Professional Associates Program

How to Apply for the Rowland Fellows Program 2024:

To apply for the Rowland Fellows Program at Harvard University, follow these steps:

  1. Review Eligibility: Ensure that you meet the eligibility criteria, including holding or being in the process of completing a Ph.D. and having an experimental focus in a scientific or engineering field.
  2. Prepare Application Materials: Gather the necessary documents, including a CV/resume, academic transcripts, letters of recommendation, and a research proposal outlining your proposed project.
  3. Visit the Program Website: Go to the official Rowland Fellows Program website to access the online application portal and familiarize yourself with the program details and requirements.
  4. Complete the Application: Fill out the online application form, providing your personal information, academic background, and research interests. Upload the required documents, including your CV, transcripts, letters of recommendation, and research proposal.
  5. Submit the Application: Double-check all the information and documents before submitting the application online. Ensure that you meet the application deadline, as late submissions may not be considered.

Stomach this: Editorial on the global hunger crisis and India’s grim picture

 

n a country where 800 million survive on government rations, a reduced allocation to the PM Poshan scheme in this year’s budget represents a clear lack of political concern


Is the world losing its battle against hunger and malnutrition? A recent statement by the head of the United Nations-backed World Food Programme revealed that a shocking 783 million people — one out of every 10 human beings on the planet — go to sleep hungry every night. This alarming figure is not an exception; around 811 million people were victims of hunger in 2020 as the pandemic pushed more people into poverty. That embedded inequality and the Covid-19 pandemic have had a deleterious impact on the efforts to reduce hunger is not surprising but the global food crisis has also been aggravated by conflict. For instance, together with Russia, Ukraine accounted for about one-quarter of global wheat exports in 2019 but the invasion by Moscow and the subsequent blockading of Ukraine’s ports have led to a steep increase in the price of foodgrains worldwide and intensified the crisis in poorer countries. Libya, for instance, imported 88% of its cereals from the two nations now locked in battle. This begs an important question. At a time when geopolitical co-operation has taken centre stage and multilateral fora like BRICS and G20 are being projected as platforms capable of resolving several knotty issues, why is the international community or geopolitical blocs failing to work out ways of addressing the challenge of global hunger? The question is relevant because there are precedents of international cooperation addressing food shortages. The decline in the total number of people afflicted by hunger in Latin America and the Caribbean, from 69 million in 1990-92 to 37 million in 2012-14, was largely due to the efforts of organisations like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, underscoring the potential of regional blocs in tackling hunger and malnourishment effectively.

India’s picture continues to look particularly grim in this context. According to The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report, 973.3 million people in India were unable to afford a healthy diet in 2020. The Global Hunger Index of 2022 also classifies India’s level of hunger as “serious”. In a country where 800 million survive on government rations, a reduced allocation to the PM Poshan scheme in this year’s budget re­presents a clear lack of political concern. Go­v­ernments — including India’s — need to tackle hun­ger with a localised, piecemeal approach if the goal to eliminate global hunger by 2030 is to be met.

Monday, September 18, 2023

Quote of the Day September 18, 2023

 

“There is no pleasure in life equal to that of the conquest of a vicious habit.”
Anonymous
“अपनी खराब आदतों पर जीत हासिल करने के समान जीवन में कोई और आनन्द नहीं होता है।”
अज्ञात

Economic & Poltical Weekly: Table of Contents

 

Vol. 58, Issue No. 37, 16 Sep, 2023

Unified Portal for Agricultural Statistics (UPAg)

 The Indian government has introduced the Unified Portal for Agricultural Statistics (UPAg), an online platform developed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare. It is hailed as a significant leap forward in managing agricultural data. The UPAg Portal is intended to serve as a public resource, streamlining access to credible, granular, and objective data while reducing search costs and inefficiencies for users.

The UPAg Portal’s core function is to generate crop estimates and integrate with other agriculture-related statistical systems. It aims to combat challenges like non-standardized and unverified data, ultimately supporting data-driven decision-making in India’s agriculture sector.


What benefits does the UPAg Portal offer to users?

Users will experience reduced search costs, easier access to credible data, and the opportunity to make data-driven decisions in agriculture.

How does the UPAg Portal aim to address challenges in the agriculture sector?

It intends to provide real-time, standardized, and verified data on agricultural commodities, combating issues like non-standardized and unverified data.

What role does the UPAg Portal play in generating agricultural statistics?

The platform is designed to generate crop estimates and integrate with other systems generating agriculture statistics such as price, trade, procurement, and stock.

How does the UPAg Portal align with the principles of e-governance?

The initiative aligns with e-governance principles by bringing smartness, transparency, and agility to India’s agriculture sector.

What are some of the other initiatives mentioned in the article that the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare is working on?

The ministry is concurrently working on initiatives like the Krishi Decision Support System, farmer registry, and crop survey to enhance data accuracy and digital data governance in agriculture.

Limits of identity: On facilitating peace in Manipur

 

Civil society should strive to be non-partisan to aid peace in Manipur



One of the most disconcerting features of the ongoing ethnic strife in Manipur remains the inability of civil society representatives to rise above their “ethnic” affiliations and work towards peace. This is exemplified by the acts of the Meira Paibi, an amorphous organisation of Meitei women, who have in the past mobilised against armed forces and police excesses, alcoholism, drug addiction and sexual violence in the State. During the conflict that has raged on since early May, however, the Meira Paibi has been working towards disrupting the operations of the Assam Rifles in their attempt to maintain peace, especially in the foothills. These areas, called “buffer zones”, were created to ensure that there is no further escalation of violence between arms-wielding people of the two ethnic communities, but there have been violent attacks with the armed forces unable to act on time because of disruptions, allegedly, by the Meira Paibi among others. Clearly, the situation has been brought to a boil by the looting of weapons by both Kuki-Zo and Meitei groups and their use in the strife. But the inability of the State government and its police and the Union government-deployed armed forces in maintaining peace has also been due to civil society groups supporting those engaging in violence.

Some Meira Paibi representatives had, in a press conference in New Delhi on Wednesday, claimed that they do not recognise the buffer zones, calling them “unconstitutional”. The presence of armed forces in peacekeeping is not an ideal solution in most circumstances. But with the ethnicisation of law enforcement, aided by a State government that seems to have lost its legitimacy of power across ethnic divides, leading to demands for a separate administration by Kuki-Zo representatives, the armed forces’ presence and the need for buffer zones to maintain a semblance of peace have become essential in Manipur. Civil society groups such as the Meira Paibi can rise above their narrow ethnic identities to press for justice for women affected in the conflict and thus build solidarity networks that will aid the process of reconciliation and peace-building. Sadly, that does not seem to be the case today. Civil society organisations have whipped up the frenzy of ethnic hatred, partially due to the recurring trauma from the violence, as much as cynical political representatives have. And this has meant that the cycle of violence has endured. History suggests that a breakthrough can only be achieved through non-partisan leadership and civic dialogue among civil society and political representatives. As things stand, for that to happen there needs to be a credible alternative to the current leadership in the State.

Source: The Hindu, 15/09/23

Cold War 2.0

 hat the United States of America is entering a consequential period in its relations with China is beyond doubt. The trajectory of this bilateral relationship will shape both countries’ foreign policy agendas for decades to come. At a time when the characterisation of the intensifying competition between the USA and China as “a new Cold War” has gained global currency, what aspects of the US-Soviet or original Cold War are applicable even today? Matthew Turpin of the Hoover Institution nails it in a recent research article when he writes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views the USA as an existential threat. That is the starting point of this debate. Over the past few years, a new geopolitical condition has emerged.

The USA and China coexist, if somewhat uneasily, in a multipolar world in which each side is deeply suspicious of and hostile to the worldview of the other. Simultaneously, adds Turpin, both Washington and Beijing recognise that they cannot overpower their rival, which compels them to avoid direct military conflict while pushing their rivalry into other domains. Pithily put, this geopolitical condition is called a cold war. Thus, it is important to differentiate between the term “cold war”, and the proper noun “Cold War,” an event that took place between the USA and the USSR from 1947 to 1991. The historical event involved specific circumstances and actors, but the condition defined by the term (a state of political hostility between countries that unfolds across all domains short of open, direct warfare) aptly applies to today’s Sino-American situation, just as it did a generation ago to the US-Soviet rivalry. Therefore, goes the argument, the question that some scholars and commentators still ask ~ are the USA and China ‘destined’ for a new cold war ~ is a category error, iterates Turpin. The cold war already exists.

A unique attribute of cold wars, however, is that their beginning can only be perceived in retrospect; belligerents don’t issue formal declarations of hostility. A cold war starts incrementally as the weight of actions by both sides builds “until we reach what George Orwell called a peace that is no peace”. Beijing seems to have learnt lessons from the Cold War better than that confrontation’s victor, at least in one respect. If your rival is reluctant to acknowledge a cold war exists, it can be advantageous to paint them as harbouring a “Cold War mentality” as the CCP and the top echelons of the People’s Republic of China routinely does. It helps complicate the adversary’s political decision-making, especially if it is a democracy which for all its flaws America is, even as one wages a cold war against it as China is certainly doing. That is the grim reality. Costly and dangerous as it is, the American establishment, especially of the left-liberal variety, needs to internalise it if it is to design an effective foreign policy vis-à-vis Beijing.

Source: The Statesman, 14/09/23