We need a comprehensive national strategy to resolve insurgencies
The recent spike in violence by insurgents in the Bastar and north eastern regions is a cause of grave concern.It is historically proven that discontented people resort to violence against the governing system. Even today, while the world has over a hundred unconventional, asymmetric and revolutionary internal armed conflicts, each one of them is distinctly unique. A large number of such conflicts are predominant in the underdeveloped and developing regions of the world on account of poor governance and socioeconomic fault lines.
Commencing with the Naga insurgency in the mid 50s, India has witnessed a number of bloody insurgencies spread over a number of states. Apart from Mizoram and Punjab, we have not been able to resolve a single one. This is certainly worrisome.
Moreover, India already faces challenges on two strategic fronts due to unresolved boundary disputes with Pakistan and China. In such a scenario, internal security threats emanating from insurgencies, terrorism and conflicts due to religious and regional intolerance could pose a third active front if not addressed urgently. Our response to these armed conflicts has fundamentally been a blend of security and developmental initiatives, along with track two diplomacy. Success though, has come only in limited measure.
Such conflicts take a heavy toll on human security and the country's growth story. Given India's comprehensive national power, it is impossible for any insurgency to really succeed. Therefore, the moot question is, “How long will it take us to resolve our insurgencies?“ Given the track record of successive governments in power, we have really not addressed these conflicts with seriousness. The Naxalite movement for instance, has continued to sustain itself as a bloody revolution over the past five decades.
After the bloodiest years of violence in 2009-10, there has been a progressive decline in the incidents and violence due to sustained operations. Currently the Naxals are in a critical phase due to steady loss of prominent leaders, combined with a splintering of the party into a number of smaller lethal groups. As a result traditional strongholds have shrunk and there is a marked shift towards indulgence in extortion, terrorism and criminal activities. On the other hand, developmental initiatives have not kept pace with security operations.
What we need to understand is why Naxals exist in the first place. Failure to meet even basic survival needs and chronic discrimination has led to the formation of the Naxalite movement. Naxal-affected areas are extremely rich in minerals, forests, land and water bodies. Yet, these very areas are among the lowest in terms of human development indices, poverty, food security, employment, rural electrification, housing, connectivity, potable water and sanitation facilities. A classic example of `rich land but poor people'.Mere announcements of 10 or 20 point programmes do little to improve the situation on the ground, as people-centric reforms are either poorly implemented or exist on paper alone.
Naxals will continue to strike against security forces periodically, to remain relevant and to show the state in a poor light. Unfortunately, after every such lethal attack, fact finding bodies invariably point to lack of human intelligence, leadership, training proficiency of troops, poor coordination between the state police and the Central Armed Police Forces and robust logistic support. Remember, maximum violence has generally been observed in close proximity to inter-state boundaries. Given the geographical features and human terrain map, the security strategy should have a dynamic intelligence network and address the region as a whole, not necessarily within the confines of political boundaries of a state. Though already delayed, it is time to expedite modernisation of the police forces, develop effective counterinsurgency capability and rectify weaknesses, to have a dynamic force to deal with hardcore insurgents.
While there are a host of strategic challenges before we can resolve Naxalism, four major points that merit mention are: non-implementation of people-centric schemes, non-accountability, lack of sense of urgency and corruption.
As part of our comprehensive national strategy (CNS), we need to utilise all elements of national power judiciously. To formulate CNS, besides identifying the centre of gravity of each region, a meaningful dialogue should be maintained with the affected states. The next obvious question would be to analyse which single point ministry or robust organisation would be best suited to coordinate, monitor and ensure unity of effort of all departments, to implement its politicosocio-economic-security-public perception management policies on the ground.
Above all, what we require is genuine political will to ensure that these objectives are accomplished in a time bound manner. A formal document and an action plan that spells out the role of each instrument of national power up to 2025 is imperative on three counts: one, it would remove the prevailing ambiguity as each element would know its specific role and the time lines; two, accountability would be established; and three, implementation and execution would be a far more efficient process. Unless we rethink and reformulate, there is little chance of improving our success rate, even with indigenous insurgencies.
The writer, a former Lieutenant General in the army Central Command, is currently a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
