Followers

Monday, November 08, 2021

How the concept of Mangal Sutra has evolved over the centuries

 

While the idea of a sacred thread did exist and so did the practise of adorning the bride with jewellery, the ritualistic aspect of a mangal sutra along with the many class, caste and community distinctions in it is a fairly modern concept.

The sacred thread of Hindu marriage, Mangal Sutra, recently made headlines for its alleged appropriation by fashion designer Sabyasachi. Although the advertisement campaign that intended to portray Indian culture through a modern, inclusive lens has been withdrawn, it has left several questions unanswered about the sociological undertones of a mangal sutra.

“There was no concept in ancient India of a marriage being solemnised through a mangal sutra as we know of it today with diamonds, pendants and the like,” explains historian of Indian jewellery, Dr. Usha Balakrishnan. As she explains, while the idea of a sacred thread did exist and so did the practise of adorning the bride with jewellery, the ritualistic aspect of a mangal sutra along with the many class, caste and community distinctions in it is a fairly modern concept.

The purpose of the wedding jewellery

Balakrishnan along with Meera Sushil Kumar in their book, ‘Indian jewelry: The dance of the peacock’ write that historically in India “ornaments functioned as auspicious symbols of marital status”. The only time one gave up on them was on the occasion of widowhood or while giving up on worldly affairs. The authors cite the Atharvaveda which said that the marriage ceremony concludes with the father of the bride stating, “I give away this girl adorned with gold ornaments to you.”

The Manusmriti categorises bridal jewellery as her ‘stridhan’, the only kind of property that is irrevocably hers. In a male-dominated and unsupported social structure, the marital jewellery came as financial security against widowhood and old age.

The mangal sutra, as Balarishnan explains, is not mentioned in any religious text as a ‘marriage ornament’. The Grihya Sutras (Hindu texts prescribing ceremonies for each stage of an individual’s life) make no mention of the practise of tying a mangalsutra for the sake of solemnising a marriage. “Etymologically, the mangal sutra refers to an auspicious thread. Traditionally and even today during auspicious occasions, a thread dipped in turmeric or kumkum is tied around the pulse points of the body like the neck or the wrist. Mangal sutras were basically talismans tied/worn to protect, ward off the evil effects of the planets and to give courage,” she says.

Speaking about the archaeological evidence of wedding ornaments, Dr. Preetha Nair, head of the department of archaeology in the University of Kerala, says that from the early historic period (roughly corresponding to 500 BCE and 500 AD), we get several black beads which were perhaps used for making the mangal sutra later. “However, it is impossible to suggest whether they were worn only by married women or unmarried ones as well,” she says. “However one of the earliest literary references to a string being tied by the groom around the neck of the bride is from the Sangam literature (300 BCE to 300 CE), which can provide some evidence of the presence of something like a mangal sutra.”

The adoption of the mangal sutra by different communities

Balakrishnan and Kumar explain in their book that the practise of tying the mangal sutra during marriage had more to do with convention than religion. Traditionally a sacred thread was worn by both men and women as part of their initiation into the life of a student. As the practise faded away for women, the sacred thread was adapted as tiru-mangalam or mangal sutra to “sanctify a woman’s marital status and accord her social recognition”. “Often on, this string was accompanied with a motif like a leaf from an auspicious tree, a tiger claw or anything that was symbolic within that community,” says Balakrishnan.

Over the years, the motifs and make of the mangal sutra came to differentiate among caste and communities as well. In Tamil Nadu and Kerala, for instance, the mangal sutra is known as the tali, which refers to a species of the palm tree or a grove of palms. “Though literary evidence is neither consistent nor conclusive on the origin of the term, even today among the Gonds, Savaras and Munda tribes, the bridegroom ties a string with a palm leaf around the bride’s neck,” write Balakrishnan and Kumar.

Variations of the tali often indicate the natural or supernatural phenomenon revered by a community or tribe. The amai-tali, for instance, carries the emblem of a tortoise. The pulippali-tali, on the other hand, displays a set of tiger’s claws. A Shaivite Brahmin Tali carries the representation of the Lingam or the three horizontal lines of the caste mark.

A most splendid variation of the tali is the necklace of the Nattukottai Chettiars of Chettianadu in Tamil Nadu. The community is known to have originated from the ancient sea port of Puhar and their patron deity is Lord Shiva, while their most important shrine is the Nataraja Temple in Chidambaram. “The necklace is a magnificent ornament made up of two rows of horizontal beads, interspersed with elaborate pendant pieces and an ornate tali pendant in the centre,” describe Balakrishnan and Kumar. “The traditional M shaped centrepiece of the necklace features a miniature replica of the temple in Chidambaram worked in repousse. Within this temple, Shiva and his consort Parvati are depicted seated on their vehicle, the bull. The claw-like pieces on either side are embellished with artistic details typical of the architecture of Chettinad.”

The practise of tying the mangal sutra has seeped into religious groups other than Hindus as well, and is often adapted to indicate their own belief systems. “For instance, the Syrian Christians in Kerala wear a mangal sutra, but with a cross on it,” says Balakrishnan.

There are other communities though among whom the mangal sutra seems to be absent. Other forms of marital tokens though seem to have taken its place, encapsulating the same idea and objective as that of the mangal sutra. In large parts of north India for instance, the bicchwa or the toe ring and glass bangles are supposed to indicate marital status of a woman. The Kashmir marriage symbol consists of a long string, drawn through a hole pierced in the cartilage of the ear, with an ornament at the end.

In Bengal, the shell and coral bangles or the shaakha pola is worn as an indicator of marital status. “The pola for instance signifies the strength of iron wished upon the woman. It also consists of lead. It is believed that a small quantity of lead is good for the body to absorb through the bloodstream. It is considered all the more important for women who are expected to bear children,” says Balakrishnan. The shell, she says, is an indicator or a fish-eating ocean bound community. “The shell is an important symbol of prosperity and longevity.”

Speaking about the rebranding of marital tokens in recent times, Balakrishnan says that “marketing companies in the west took a diamond ring and turned it into an object that was compulsory to sanctify a marriage. Every woman, therefore, wanted that ring as the ultimate symbol of a man’s love and devotion to her.” The evolution of the mangal sutra over centuries is best understood in the same context.

Written by Adrija Roychowdhury

Source: Indian Express, 5/11/21

The truth about radicalisation in India

 

Apoorvanand writes: Why is it so difficult to talk about those who are really poisoning minds?


The claim by the Indian agencies of having busted ISI terror modules has led G S Bajpai and Ankit Kaushik to believe that “the threat of radicalisation in India is pervasive and increasing exponentially” (‘Before they cross the line’, IE, October 29). The situation, according to them, is quite serious and demands a policy response from the government. We have, however, seen multiple terror cases brought by the security agencies that have failed to stand in the courts — often after years of the accused being incarcerated under the UAPA. It is, therefore, not wrong to expect experts to examine the claims by the state agencies with scepticism. That aside, the authors’ concern should not be brushed aside. Radicalisation of minds is a reality in India.

There are different kinds of radicals in our midst: Believers in the dictatorship of the proletariat replacing multiparty democracy, or in the idea of a world ruled by Sharia or in the thought of India being a land primarily of Hindus, with others having lesser rights.

The challenge is to describe the Indian reality of radicalisation. It appears that the writers hold the belief propagated by the agencies — that the sources of radicalisation lie outside the boundaries of India, ISIS or al Qaeda being most prominent. Speaking plainly, when we look at radicalisation from this lens, we tend to focus on Muslims. Looking at a government-sanctioned research project to understand the phenomenon of radicalisation in India led by Bajpai himself, one finds that his assumption is not very different. For example, “the study will be conducted in four states like Maharashtra, Assam, Kerala and Jammu and Kashmir.” One can only guess the religious profile of the 75 radicalised individuals to be sampled from these states.

The reason for such sampling and formulations is that only those acts are considered radical which are dramatic, have a suddenness about them, involve bombs or firearms like AK47s and involve groups acting in the name of Islam. The ISIS lure is real, but can the demonstrators terrorising Muslims offering namaz on the open ground in Gurgaon without using any weapon be seen as radicals? Are those who assembled at Jantar Mantar calling openly for the elimination of Muslims radicalised? In which category should those middle-class Hindus be placed who assembled to oppose the opening of a shop in Anand to terrorise Hindu partners into dropping their Muslim friend from the partnership? What about the groups across India terrorising Hindu-Muslim couples?

Such acts have become so numerous and routine that they no longer excite us enough to find them radical. Yet, if we agree with Bajpai, it is the extent of violence that radicalisation leads to which makes it dangerous. That is why we need to look at the sources of radicalisation and disable them. Can we describe the process and identify the sources of such radicalisation, which has turned into a violent threat in India? Can it be treated as “pervasive” and “exponential”, demanding an extraordinary response?

Recently, a video started circulating on social media platforms in which some students can be heard telling the reporter that Kashmiris were being fed better rice and had been exempt from paying income tax; that the Indian Constitution was not applicable there and the removal of Article 370 has corrected all these anomalies. They also believed that demonetisation had stopped stone-pelting. Should we laugh this away as a case of benign misinformation or see it as a stage in the process of radicalisation, which will make them justify violence against Kashmiris or even take part in it? What about the people in your families who believe that Muslims conspire to send their handsome men to lure Hindu girls? Or those who sincerely believe that the Muslim threat is driving Hindus away from many localities, like Kairana? Or, that Muslims are growing in numbers or people being converted to Christianity to outnumber Hindus? These beliefs lead people to participate in violence against Muslims and Christians or condone it. Should we treat such minds as radicalised or misguided? Yet, we know that in India, it is this mind which is the cause for daily, continuous violence.

It is not difficult to find the sources of this radicalisation. In a recent public meeting in Delhi, a journalist shared his experience with children attending an RSS shakha. When he first met them, they told him that Gandhi was their ideal but after a gap of two months, he had been replaced with Savarkar. Was it merely a harmless replacement of one ideal person by another one or also a change in the ideology, from non-violence to violence, from India for all to India primarily for Hindus? Is this radicalisation or not?

When the senior government and political leaders tell Hindus that their women are under threat because of certain people or their roads are taken by namazis, they are radicalising Hindus. In the same way Donald Trump was doing in the US. After he departed from office, the threat of radicalisation in America was assessed and defined differently. Farah Pandith writes about the way the Biden administration is trying to deal with the challenge of radicalisation: “It promises to create a better understanding of the domestic terrorism threat, using data to inform threat assessments and enhanced sharing across the inter-agency; it calls for a ramping up of so-called ‘prevention’, seeking to challenge extremism’s enduring ability to poison vulnerable minds and communities; it emphasises the central role played by law enforcement, seeking recommendations from the Department of Justice on areas to be improved and built; and it promises to tackle long-term contributors to escalating domestic extremism — not least longstanding racism and conspiracy theories demonising ‘others’. ”

What is our domestic threat? Who is poisoning vulnerable minds and communities here? Is it so difficult to talk about it?

Source: Indian Express, 8/11/21

Friday, November 05, 2021

Quote of the Day

 

“What we are is God's gift to us. What we become is our gift to God.”
Eleanor Powell
“हम जो हैं वह हमें ईश्वर की देन है, हम जो बनते हैं वह परमेश्वर को हमारी देन है।”
एलानर पॉवेल

Economic & Political Weekly: Table of Contents

 

Vol. 56, Issue No. 44, 30 Oct, 2021

Current Affairs-November 3, 2021

 

INDIA

– COP26 climate summit in Glasgow: PM Modi launches Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS) initiative for developing infrastructure of small island nations
– COP26 climate summit in Glasgow: India launches ‘One Sun, One World, One Grid’ (OSOWOG) programme
– COP26 climate summit in Glasgow: India joins UK’s Glasgow Breakthroughs, an international plan to deliver clean and affordable technology everywhere by 2030
– COP26 climate summit in Glasgow: UK launches India Green Guarantee, commits new funds for EVs in India
– Lok Sabha by election results – BJP-Khandwa (Madhya Pradesh), Shiv Sena-Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Congress-Mandi (Himachal Pradesh)
– Former Punjab CM Amarinder Singh resigns from Congress, announces Punjab Lok Congress as name of his party
– National Ayurveda Day celebrated on Nov 2; theme: ‘Ayurveda for Poshan’

ECONOMY & CORPORATE

– Defence Ministry approves acquisition of arms, equipment worth Rs 7,965 crore including 12 light utility helicopters from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
– RBI issues revised Prompt Corrective Action framework for banks
– RBI panel makes host of suggestions to streamline functioning of asset reconstruction companies (ARCs)
– Rajasthan Police arrests former SBI Chairman Pratip Chaudhuri in loan scam case of 2014
– Power Minister inaugurates diversion of Marusudar River at Pakal Dul HE Project (1000 MW) in J&K

WORLD

– COP26 summit in Glasgow: Global Methane Pledge launched by more than 100 nations to slash emissions of methane 30 per cent by 2030 from 2020 levels
– Asian Development Bank gets $665 million for climate projects
– Facebook to shut down its face-recognition system and delete data
– International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists observed on Nov 2

NATIONAL SPORTS AWARDS

– Major Dhyan Chand Khel Ratna Award winners: Neeraj Chopra: Athletics, Ravi Kumar: Wrestling, Lovlina Borgohain: Boxing, Sreejesh P.R: Hockey, Avani Lekhara: Para Shooting, Pramod Bhagat: Para Badminton, Krishna Nagar: Para Badminton, Manish Narwal: Para Shooting, Mithali Raj: Cricket, Sunil Chhetri: Football, Manpreet Singh: Hockey
– Arjuna Award winners include Arpinder Singh: Athletics and Simranjit Kaur: Boxing
– Dronacharya Award for outstanding coaches winners include T. P. Ouseph: Athletics and Sarkar Talwar: Cricket in Life-Time Category. In Regular Category, winners include Radhakrishnan Nair P: Athletics and Sandhya Gurung: Boxing.
– Dhyan Chand Award for Lifetime achievement winners include Lekha K.C.: Boxing and Abhijeet Kunte: Chess.
– Rashtriya Khel Protsahan Puruskar 2021 winners are 1. Identification and Nurturing of Budding and Young Talent: Manav Rachna Educational Institution 2. Encouragement to sports through Corporate Social Responsibility: Indian Oil Corporation
– Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (MAKA) Trophy 2021 winner: Panjab University: Chandigarh

November 2: National Ayurveda Day

 National Ayurveda Day was celebrated on November 2, 2021 by the Ministry of AYUSH, across the country.


Key Points

  • Ayurveda is an integral aspect of healthcare system of India. It holds recognition as traditional medicine system by World Health Organization (WHO).
  • Union Ministry of AYUSH started observing Dhanvantari Jayanti (also called as Dhanteras) as Ayurveda day in 2016.
  • The day was started being celebrated with the objective of nationalising the ayurvedic system of medicine and make it global.

Theme of the day

In the year 2021, the day was observed under the theme “Ayurveda for Poshana (Nutrition)”.

History of Ayurveda Day

India celebrates Ayurveda Day each year on the auspicious occasion of Dhanteras. This day celebrated since 2016 on the occasion of Dhanvantari Jayanti. This day is celebrated to raise awareness on importance of Ayurveda in our daily lives. It also focuses on strengths of Ayurveda and its unique treatment principles.

History of Dhanteras

Lord Dhanvantari is the god of Ayurvedic medicine. Thus, Dhanteras is observed every year for the wellbeing of everyone. Lord Dhanvantari is the healer of all ailments. According to Hindu mythology, Lord Dhanvantari (a physician of the gods) appeared before Devas and the Asuras during Samudra Manthan. He was holding Amrita (or nectar of immortality) and Ayurveda text in his hand. Devas and Asuras wanted the Amrita to become immortal. This led to a fight between both the groups. Later, Garuda protected the nectar from the Asuras.

How to define a farmer

 

Categorising farmers based on dependence on farm income, land ownership is inappropriate


KAT reforms that are being pushed. Farmer unions are demanding withdrawal of farm laws, but also seeking mechanisms to ensure remunerative output prices.

In this context, Harish Damodaran and Samridhi Agarwal (‘Counting the kisan’, IE, October 5, 2021) use the 2019 Situation Assessment of Agricultural Households (SAAH) survey to argue that India’s farming population is much smaller than is usually estimated. Damodaran and Agarwal claim that while the official estimate of the number of agricultural households in India was 93.09 million in 2019, the number of “serious”, “full-time” or “regular” agricultural households was only 36 million.

Damodaran and Agarwal categorise as serious/regular those agricultural households that earn at least half of their total household income from crop cultivation. The authors go on to suggest that the agricultural policy should target only serious/regular farming households as they “genuinely depend on farming”. Their attempt to estimate the number of serious/regular farmers, and by implication, to differentiate them from the non-serious farmers is flawed on several counts, including the scant regard for the structural and historical context of farm-based livelihoods. We highlight some of the key problems with the Damodaran-Agarwal argument.

First, the categorisation of farmers as serious/regular based on a single ratio of farm income dependence and an arbitrary threshold of 50 per cent is an unwarranted and a non-serious exercise. Such identification based on a snapshot number for a certain year completely ignores the differential historical trajectory of development and livelihood diversification in diverse regions of India.

For example, in a rich state like Kerala, international migration and remittances has been a dominant household phenomenon for decades. While remittances often constitute a major portion of household income, it does not make small-scale spice cultivators or rubber growers any less serious in their pursuits. At the same time, in a poor yet mineral-rich state like Jharkhand, livelihood diversification may have been driven by poverty and local conditions of both farm and non-farm work, which may have intensified such coping mechanisms over time. Such a situation does not make the poor farmers who use their land for subsistence, and pursue other occupations in the lean season, any less dependent on farming.

This brings us to the second misclassification issue. Using the term “Kisan” to identify farmers obfuscates social and economic relations, including exploitative ones, that exists within agriculture. Farmers are not a homogenous category; they are differentiated into classes and castes. More realistic and useful categories of rich/middle/poor farmers or capitalist/petty-producer/agricultural labour are needed to identify those engaged in agriculture.

Third, according to Damodaran-Agarwal, their 50 per cent “serious farmer” threshold is crossed at the all-India level by farmers with more than 1 hectare of land. This is possessed by only 30 per cent of agricultural households. What about the contribution to national production of the remaining 70 per cent, that is, marginal farmers possessing less than 1 hectare of land? Research by one of us shows that the share of marginal farmers ranges between 19 to 30 per cent in the total marketed surplus for various food grains.

A significant proportion of foodgrain consumption among cultivators is from home-grown produce, particularly at the lower end of the land distribution. Forcing marginal farmers out of agriculture would also be disastrous from the perspective of household-level food and nutrition security, a serious challenge for several decades now.

The recommendations by Damodaran and Agarwal also have serious ramifications for socially disadvantaged communities. The historical and contemporary practices of caste-based exclusion and the failure of the state to undertake meaningful redistributive land reforms means that a large majority of the Dalit community remains landless. Withdrawing state support to smallholders will have a disproportionate impact on the socially marginalised groups and would further push them into asset poverty.

Finally, the elephant in the room is the land and natural resource question. If 70 per cent of agricultural households are identified as non-serious farmers who should be moved out of agriculture, what happens to their land resources? Huge land reserves are immediately opened for corporate grabbing, laying the foundation for agribusiness monopolies. The authors’ optimism notwithstanding, it is unlikely that agro-based industries will be able to create enough jobs to absorb the millions displaced from their lands.

The authors seem to be unaware of the function of agriculture as a social safety net in providing a source of sustenance to millions and thereby providing conditions of relatively stable growth in productive sectors of the economy. The crisis faced by migrant workers during the lockdown, and the phenomenon of “reverse migration” is a testimony to the fact that agriculture continues to provide a buffer to millions who face intermittent unemployment.

Damodaran and Agarwal do not discuss that the SAAH data also shows a fall in real average crop incomes between 2013 and 2019. The fall in returns from cultivation is driven by rising input prices and dwindling output prices. Marginal and small farmers face disproportionate hardships in acquiring subsidised inputs or getting remunerative prices from public procurement. Smallholders also rely more on informal sources of moneylending, which adds to indebtedness.

The fall in crop incomes and the crisis of economic viability has continued in Indian agriculture for myriad factors since the late 1990s. For several decades now, successive governments have pursued policies that have led to worsening agrarian distress. This has pushed millions into low-paying petty jobs and continues to plague those who are compelled to depend (even partially) on agriculture for survival. The need for creation of decent non-farm jobs is well-recognised, but this is unlikely to happen with the crisis-ridden farm sector. Forced destruction of the livelihoods of millions of smallholders by withdrawal of the little they receive by the way of state support is nothing but a recipe for disaster. The solution to the problem of Indian farmers needs a serious rethink of the economic policies and surely cannot lie in simply excluding them by redefinition.

This column first appeared in the print edition on November 5, 2021 under the title ‘Defining a farmer’. Anand, Banerjee and Dasgupta teach at O P Jindal Global University, Ambedkar University and South Asian University respectively.

Source: Indian Express, 5/11/21