“Everything you’ve ever wanted is on the other side of fear.”
George Addair
“वह सब कुछ जो आपने कभी भी चाहा है, वह भय के दूसरी ओर है।”
जॉर्ज एडेयर
Thursday, August 07, 2025
Quote of the Day August 7, 2025
World Bank Income Classification System
The World Bank’s income classification system remains a key tool for comparing countries by income. Updated annually, it sorts countries into four groups based on gross national income (GNI) per capita. This system helps researchers and policymakers understand global economic diversity clearly and consistently. In 2024, the World Bank continued to classify countries into low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income groups. These categories are based on fixed income thresholds adjusted yearly for inflation. Over the past two decades, many countries have shifted upward in income groups, reflecting economic growth. However, some have moved downward due to conflicts or crises.
Gross National Income Per Capita
GNI per capita measures the average income of a country’s residents, including income earned abroad. It is reported in local currency and converted to US dollars using exchange rates. This standardisation allows for consistent comparison across countries. The World Bank uses GNI per capita as the sole criterion for income classification.
Income Group Thresholds
The income groups are defined by fixed thresholds in US dollars. As of 2024, these are:
- Low income – $1,135 or less
- Lower-middle income – $1,136 to $4,495
- Upper-middle income – $4,496 to $13,935
- High income – More than $13,935
These thresholds are updated annually based on global inflation rates but remain absolute, not relative to other countries’ incomes.
History and Purpose of Classification
The system began in the late 1980s to guide lending policies. The low-income threshold marked eligibility for concessional loans. Additional thresholds were introduced to better distinguish countries by income distribution. Today, the classification is independent of lending rules and serves mainly for statistical and policy analysis.
Country Movements Between Groups
Countries can move between income groups as their GNI per capita changes. Growth, currency fluctuations, and population updates influence these shifts. Most nations have risen over time due to economic development. However, some like Syria and Yemen have fallen due to war and economic crises, moving from lower-middle to low income.
Population Distribution Across Income Groups
Population shares in each income group are uneven. In 2004, 37% lived in low-income countries; by 2024, this fell below 10%. The share in upper-middle income countries rose from under 10% to 35%. This reflects global economic progress but also marks disparities in wealth distribution.
District Flood Severity Index
Recent research by IIT Delhi and IIT Gandhinagar has introduced the District Flood Severity Index (DFSI) for India. This index aims to provide a comprehensive measure of flood severity at the district level. It combines flood duration, area affected, deaths, injuries, and population to better assess flood impacts. The DFSI addresses gaps in existing flood data and supports improved flood management policies.
Need for a District-Level Flood Index
Flooding in India causes displacement, injuries, and deaths regularly. However, no standard data-based index existed to measure flood severity at the district scale. Districts are key administrative units for flood response. Hence, a district-level index helps target relief and prevention efforts more effectively. The DFSI fills this important gap.
Data Sources and Parameters
The index uses data collected annually since 1967 by the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD). It includes riverine floods and large inundations but often misses smaller events. DFSI incorporates five main factors – mean flood duration in days, percentage of district area flooded historically, total deaths, injuries, and district population. This multi-dimensional approach captures both flood magnitude and human impact.
Calculation and
The DFSI weighs flooding severity by combining the extent of flooding with population exposure and casualties. For example, a district with many floods but low population impact scores lower than one with fewer floods but higher casualties. This approach avoids misleading conclusions based solely on flood frequency. Patna ranks highest in DFSI, reflecting severe impacts in the Indo-Gangetic Plain.
Urban Flooding and Development Issues
Urban flooding is influenced by both heavy rainfall and poor urban planning. Cities like Thiruvananthapuram experience frequent floods partly due to unplanned development blocking natural drainage. While Thiruvananthapuram has the highest number of flood events, its DFSI rank is lower because of fewer casualties and smaller affected populations. Better urban water management can reduce such floods.
Limitations and Future Improvements
Current DFSI excludes agricultural flood impact due to lack of data. It also relies on available IMD datasets and district population figures. Researchers acknowledge the index can improve with finer data on flooded land types and socio-economic factors. The DFSI is a first-step tool to encourage more detailed flood data collection and targeted mitigation.
Significance for Flood Management
The DFSI offers a practical tool for policymakers to prioritise districts needing urgent flood relief and infrastructure investment. It marks the importance of considering human and spatial flood impacts together. Giving rivers room to move and improving urban drainage are key to reducing flood severity. The index supports data-driven, district-focused flood resilience planning.
Smoke and mirrors
The Hindutva claim that the collective resources of the nation are being unjustifiably appropriated by Muslims because of their growing numbers clearly has an economic implication
One of my friends, a political science professor at a reputed academic institution, told me an interesting story. Adhering to the norms and the protocols of the selection process set out by the competent authority and the recommendations of a duly constituted selection committee, my friend, who was also the head of the department, had selected a candidate for the post of assistant professor. The selected person fulfilled the required qualifications and his interview went very well. Yet, he was not offered the job. My friend did not share the internal matters with me; it was, however, clear to him that the candidate’s Muslim identity might be one of the reasons that made the institution’s management slightly uncomfortable.
I had another personal encounter of this kind. An app-based cab driver requested me to pay him directly for the ride. Throughout the journey, he tried his best to hide his identity. I only came to know that he is a Muslim when his name appeared on my Paytm app screen. I was curious to know about his experiences. The driver told me that the hostile anti-Muslim environment had forced him to be over-conscious about his religious identity. To deal with this situation, he had re-registered his vehicle with a religion-neutral name on the app.
There can be many ways of interpreting such incidents. One may take a straightforward position and argue that the rise of Hindutva has affected the mindset of the common people. This explanation goes well with the dominant, media-driven portrayal of Muslims as an unwanted socio-religious group. We cannot, obviously, ignore the fact that the anti-Muslim propaganda has played a significant role in strengthening communal stereotypes and prejudices.
There is, however, a need to go beyond this easy-to-use, standard answer for something which is much more complicated and nuanced. In my view, we must ask two related questions: how do Muslims become an ‘economic threat’ to the nation? And, do non-Muslims, especially Hindus, accept this claim and treat Muslims as a collective obstacle?
The ‘Muslims as an economic threat’ thesis is a relatively new phenomenon. It is different from the politics of economic boycott — an effective mobilisation tool that was used by Hindu and Muslim communal forces in colonial India (and is used even now). It is also different from the organised violence against Muslims that has been witnessed in cities such as Ahmedabad, Surat, Moradabad, and Malegaon where Muslim communities began to carve out a space for themselves in the local economy based on small-scale, artisan-centric businesses.
The Muslims as an economic threat thesis, in this sense, is a unique political development, which is inextricably associated with the growing economic distress in the country. It is an indirect consequence of an old debate on Muslim populations. The Hindutva claim that the collective resources of the nation are being unjustifiably appropriated by Muslims because of their growing numbers clearly has an economic implication.
This claim has found a new political life in the last few years. A section of the media projects the Muslim population as the fundamental problem that affects the development of the nation. It is thus plausible for a non-Muslim to start believing that Muslim population growth is solely responsible for his/her economic hardship.
CSDS-Lokniti surveys, however, give us a very different picture. The CSDS-Lokniti-APU Study (2017-2019), for example, shows that a significant majority of non-Muslim respondents (around 60%) do not think that Muslims/minorities are blocking their progress in terms of economic gains. Instead, there was a consensus that the ‘elite’ and/or ‘influential people’ are responsible for the shrinking economic opportunities. The National Election Study 2024 further substantiates these findings. Over 60% of the respondents claimed that getting a job had become more difficult in the last few years. A significant majority (around 57%) strongly asserted that both the Central government and state governments are responsible for rising unemployment and price rise.
Two inferences can be drawn from these findings. One, economic hardship is not merely about income loss, unemployment, job instability, and financial insecurity. There is a growing unease about socio-economic disparity — an ever-expanding division between ‘elite’/‘influential people’ and the ‘ordinary Indians’. Two, there is a clear expectation from the State to intervene in the economic sphere not merely to generate employment but also to ensure the equitable distribution of the nation’s wealth. This is exactly what the Constitution of India also expects from the state: “the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment” (Article 39(c)).
These popular anxieties go against the dominant political consensus. The political class envisages the State merely as a facilitator, which is responsible for creating conducive conditions for the smooth functioning of the market. Thus, the ideal economic life is about competitiveness, accumulation, and preservation of self-interest. There is virtually no space for accommodating economic disparity in this schema. That might be the reason why there is no demand for assessing the exact nature of inequalities in the country. The official claim that India is the fourth-most equal country in the world, therefore, needs to be re-examined carefully.
The ‘Muslims as an economic threat’ thesis becomes relevant in this context. It suits the agenda of the entire political class in an interesting way. Hindutva forces and a section of the media use this thesis to refashion an old argument that Muslim appeasement has adversely affected the economic prospects of Hindus. They offer a simple solution: Muslims must not be allowed to take any undue benefit and the State should protect the Hindus as a disadvantageous group. The overwhelming presence of Muslim workers in a few emerging, unorganised sector jobs (such as air conditioner repairing/maintenance!) is often cited as an example to legitimise the claim that Muslims ought to be seen as a factor behind growing economic disparity. In other words, a conscious attempt is made to communalise purely economic concerns.
The opponents of Hindutva also contribute to this process in a different way. The non-BJP parties prefer to remain silent on the economic stereotyping of Muslims. For them, ‘Muslim issues’ can only be interpreted through the prism of identity politics. In the present scenario, they do not want to be recognised as ‘pro-Muslim’ entities. The search for a non-BJP Hindu vote determines their political attitude. The economic disparity question, hence, does not become an attractive option for the Opposition as well.
The unease of an academic institution to appoint a Muslim candidate or the hesitation of a Muslim cab driver to reveal his religious identity is the outcome of this new political consensus. It creates, nurtures, and reproduces a false consciousness called communalism.
Hilal Ahmed
Source: Telegraph India, 7/08/25
Are the Rohingya ‘refugees’? Supreme Court will consider – but there is a problem
There is no national refugee law in India, which means that India does not legally recognise refugees or distinguish between refugees and other foreign nationals entering Indian territory
The Supreme Court will decide whether the Rohingya in India “are entitled to be declared as ‘refugees’” or whether they are “illegal entrants”. If they are refugees, the court will consider “what protections, privileges or rights they are entitled to”. And if they are not, whether the central or state governments are obligated to deport them in accordance with law.
The court recorded these questions on July 31 while hearing a batch of long pending petitions on the Rohingya, a stateless people whose presence in India has frequently led to discussions on national security and the infiltration of foreigners into the country.
However, it is unclear what legal frame of reference the court, which will hear the matter next month, will follow. While the Citizenship Act, 1955, defines an “illegal immigrant”, there is no definition of a “refugee” or their rights in Indian law.
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